## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 33

Page 212

That is, the outcome of this game, starting with finite probabilities of "irrational"

attack on both sides, is not an enlargement of those probabilities by the fear of

surprise attack; it is either joint attack or

not ...

That is, the outcome of this game, starting with finite probabilities of "irrational"

attack on both sides, is not an enlargement of those probabilities by the fear of

surprise attack; it is either joint attack or

**no attack**. That is, it is a pair of decisions,not ...

Page 213

22 The probabilities of irrational attack in the first of our modified matrices,

namely the probabilities of 0.2 for each of the ... Each player has fully taken them

into account, has seen that there is still a jointly preferred solution at

and by ...

22 The probabilities of irrational attack in the first of our modified matrices,

namely the probabilities of 0.2 for each of the ... Each player has fully taken them

into account, has seen that there is still a jointly preferred solution at

**no**-**attack**,and by ...

Page 216

P0] : value of game to R, joint strategy of

game to R, who attacks while C elects not to; Vc. n-a[=o.7 - 0.3/V] : value of game

to C, joint strategy of

P0] : value of game to R, joint strategy of

**no**-**attack**; Vr. «[= 0.5 - o.sPo] : value ofgame to R, who attacks while C elects not to; Vc. n-a[=o.7 - 0.3/V] : value of game

to C, joint strategy of

**no**-**attack**; Ve, a[= 0.4] : value of game to C, who attacks ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game