## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 22

Page 222

24 Each player's strategy choice concerns the

minimize his expected losses, that is, ... Letting Vr denote the expected value of

the game for R, the warning-system problem for R is to choose the

...

24 Each player's strategy choice concerns the

**pair**of values for B and R that willminimize his expected losses, that is, ... Letting Vr denote the expected value of

the game for R, the warning-system problem for R is to choose the

**pair**of values...

Page 252

According to this argument, a

SAC's; and while that might be the best kind in a completely bi-polar world, it is a

luxury that we could not afford in the existing world — a world in which there is a

...

According to this argument, a

**pair**of invulnerable SAC's is a**pair**of neutralizedSAC's; and while that might be the best kind in a completely bi-polar world, it is a

luxury that we could not afford in the existing world — a world in which there is a

...

Page 291

The definition of such a solution, given by Luce and Raiffa, is as follows: "A non-

cooperative game is said to have a solution in the strict sense if: (i) There exists

an equilibrium

The definition of such a solution, given by Luce and Raiffa, is as follows: "A non-

cooperative game is said to have a solution in the strict sense if: (i) There exists

an equilibrium

**pair**among the jointly admissible strategy**pairs**. (2) All jointly ...### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game