## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

Results 1-3 of 38

Page 61

You and your

other with an "X" written on it. The one who gets the "X" has the choice of leaving

it alone or erasing it ; the one who gets the blank sheet has the choice of leaving

...

You and your

**partner**(rival) are each given a piece of paper, one blank and theother with an "X" written on it. The one who gets the "X" has the choice of leaving

it alone or erasing it ; the one who gets the blank sheet has the choice of leaving

...

Page 125

His only interest in a threatlike declaration would be to forestall his

threat; and for that purpose he needs only an unconditional commitment to his

preferred strategy — that is, the legal equivalent of "first move" in advance of his ...

His only interest in a threatlike declaration would be to forestall his

**partner's**threat; and for that purpose he needs only an unconditional commitment to his

preferred strategy — that is, the legal equivalent of "first move" in advance of his ...

Page 150

The

communicate it to him, in order that the bear may then respond by accepting the

promise (now that he sees what the "solution" is) and transmitting authoritative

evidence ...

The

**partner**must then formulate the proposition (choice) for the bear andcommunicate it to him, in order that the bear may then respond by accepting the

promise (now that he sees what the "solution" is) and transmitting authoritative

evidence ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game