The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 82
Page 25
... party and offer a modest sum in consideration of the latter's releasing the buyer from the bet , threatening to sell the house for $ 16,000 if the release is not forth- coming . The effect of the betas of most such contractual com ...
... party and offer a modest sum in consideration of the latter's releasing the buyer from the bet , threatening to sell the house for $ 16,000 if the release is not forth- coming . The effect of the betas of most such contractual com ...
Page 30
... party has a " public " and the other has not , the latter may try to neutralize his disadvantage by excluding the relevant public ; or if both parties fear the potentialities for stalemate in the simultaneous use of this tactic , they ...
... party has a " public " and the other has not , the latter may try to neutralize his disadvantage by excluding the relevant public ; or if both parties fear the potentialities for stalemate in the simultaneous use of this tactic , they ...
Page 40
... party is the inability of the threaten- ing party to rationalize his way out of his commitment once it has failed its purpose . Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself , if they are visible to the threatened party , weaken ...
... party is the inability of the threaten- ing party to rationalize his way out of his commitment once it has failed its purpose . Any loopholes the threatening party leaves himself , if they are visible to the threatened party , weaken ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
11 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game