## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 95

The

in Fig. 8. One player chooses a row, the other a column ; Fig. 8 and they receive

the rewards denoted by the numbers contained in the cell where their choices ...

The

**payoff matrix**for a pure coordination problem would look something like thatin Fig. 8. One player chooses a row, the other a column ; Fig. 8 and they receive

the rewards denoted by the numbers contained in the cell where their choices ...

Page 150

... promises that are susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to

represent such moves in the traditional form of strategy choices, with the

various moves.

... promises that are susceptible of formal analysis, it must be possible to

represent such moves in the traditional form of strategy choices, with the

**payoff****matrix**of the original game expanded to allow for the choices among thesevarious moves.

Page 185

The same

the rules of the game to permit Row an unconditional commitment prior to

Column's choice but not permitting him to make his choice depend on Column's.

The same

**payoff matrix**(Fig. i) can be used to illustrate this situation if we changethe rules of the game to permit Row an unconditional commitment prior to

Column's choice but not permitting him to make his choice depend on Column's.

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game