The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 95
... pay- off matrix for a pure coordination problem would look something like that in Fig . 8. One player chooses a row , the other a column ; 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 FIG . 8 and they receive the rewards denoted by the ...
... pay- off matrix for a pure coordination problem would look something like that in Fig . 8. One player chooses a row , the other a column ; 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 FIG . 8 and they receive the rewards denoted by the ...
Page 150
... payoff matrix of the original game expanded to allow for the choices among these various moves . - - The first point to observe is that a commitment , a promise , or a threat can usually be characterized in a fashion equivalent to the ...
... payoff matrix of the original game expanded to allow for the choices among these various moves . - - The first point to observe is that a commitment , a promise , or a threat can usually be characterized in a fashion equivalent to the ...
Page 185
... payoff matrix ( Fig . 1 ) can be used to illustrate this situation if we change the rules of the game to permit Row an unconditional commitment prior to Column's choice but not per- mitting him to make his choice depend on Column's . A ...
... payoff matrix ( Fig . 1 ) can be used to illustrate this situation if we change the rules of the game to permit Row an unconditional commitment prior to Column's choice but not per- mitting him to make his choice depend on Column's . A ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game