The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 109
... possible outcomes , pointing to , lighting up , or focusing on one possible outcome after another . It follows perhaps some regular course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their ...
... possible outcomes , pointing to , lighting up , or focusing on one possible outcome after another . It follows perhaps some regular course , perhaps a random course . Let this machine scan ; let the players watch it scan , watch their ...
Page 135
... possible a long sequence of future agreement . By the same token , " trust " may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance , if it can be divided into a succession of increments . There are , however , particular game situations ...
... possible a long sequence of future agreement . By the same token , " trust " may be achieved for a single discontinuous instance , if it can be divided into a succession of increments . There are , however , particular game situations ...
Page 152
... possible strategy combinations . Column has eight possible strategy combinations : for each of three contingencies he has either of two moves , the moves being I and II , the contingencies being Row's commitment to i , Row's commitment ...
... possible strategy combinations . Column has eight possible strategy combinations : for each of three contingencies he has either of two moves , the moves being I and II , the contingencies being Row's commitment to i , Row's commitment ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game