## The strategy of conflict |

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Page 182

The

be deterred by some specified

presumably varies directly with the latter

above ...

The

**probability**that a burglar drawn at random from the universe of burglars willbe deterred by some specified

**probability**of apprehension and convictionpresumably varies directly with the latter

**probability**; the simple model analyzedabove ...

Page 211

parameter represents we shall leave open : it may be taken to be the

that the player is irrational, or the

misconceived and that he "really" prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the

parameter represents we shall leave open : it may be taken to be the

**probability**that the player is irrational, or the

**probability**that the pay-off matrix ismisconceived and that he "really" prefers unilateral surprise attack, or the

**probability**that ...Page 212

The

starting with finite

enlargement ...

The

**probabilities**of attack by the two sides do not interact to yield a higher**probability**, except when they yield certainty. That is, the outcome of this game,starting with finite

**probabilities**of "irrational" attack on both sides, is not anenlargement ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game