The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 55
... problem 1 , and only 6 chose " tails . " In problem 2 , the first three numbers were given 37 votes out of a total of 41 ; the number 7 led 100 by a slight margin , with 13 in third place . The upper left corner in problem 3 received 24 ...
... problem 1 , and only 6 chose " tails . " In problem 2 , the first three numbers were given 37 votes out of a total of 41 ; the number 7 led 100 by a slight margin , with 13 in third place . The upper left corner in problem 3 received 24 ...
Page 63
... problems where there is some asymmetry between " you " and " him , " that is , between A and B , the A formulations were matched with the B formulations in deriving In the first problem , 16 out of 22 A's and 15 out of 22 B's chose ...
... problems where there is some asymmetry between " you " and " him , " that is , between A and B , the A formulations were matched with the B formulations in deriving In the first problem , 16 out of 22 A's and 15 out of 22 B's chose ...
Page 64
... problem in a substantial proportion of the cases ; they certainly do con- spicuously better than any chance methods ... problem illustrates a strong power of suggestion in the income figures . The abstract logic of this problem is ...
... problem in a substantial proportion of the cases ; they certainly do con- spicuously better than any chance methods ... problem illustrates a strong power of suggestion in the income figures . The abstract logic of this problem is ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game