## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 85

If chess is the standard example of a zero-sum game, charades may typify the

game of

may do the same for the coordination game. An experiment of O. K. Moore and ...

If chess is the standard example of a zero-sum game, charades may typify the

game of

**pure**coordination ; if pursuit epitomizes the zero-sum game, rendezvousmay do the same for the coordination game. An experiment of O. K. Moore and ...

Page 86

It is to be stressed that the

strict technical sense. It is a behavior situation in which each player's best choice

of action depends on the action he expects the other to take, which he knows ...

It is to be stressed that the

**pure**-coordination game is a game of strategy in thestrict technical sense. It is a behavior situation in which each player's best choice

of action depends on the action he expects the other to take, which he knows ...

Page 88

All possible outcomes of a

all of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a

game by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game,

...

All possible outcomes of a

**pure**-conflict game would be represented by some orall of the points on a negatively inclined line, those of a

**pure**common-interestgame by some or all of the points on a positively inclined line. In the mixed game,

...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game