## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 93

And this suggests an alternative orientation of those experiments in which

subjects are instructed to make guesses, throughout a long

red or green lights, whether red or green will come up next. Subjects apparently

persist ...

And this suggests an alternative orientation of those experiments in which

subjects are instructed to make guesses, throughout a long

**random**sequence ofred or green lights, whether red or green will come up next. Subjects apparently

persist ...

Page 97

Traditional game theory gives guidance on how to make my choice on the

assumption that I do not want you to outguess me; I can select at

defy you to have a better than

game is ...

Traditional game theory gives guidance on how to make my choice on the

assumption that I do not want you to outguess me; I can select at

**random**anddefy you to have a better than

**random**chance of guessing what I name. But if thegame is ...

Page 173

Thomas C. Schelling. part m STRATEGY WITH A

RANDOMIZATION OF PROMISES AND THREATS In the theory of games

Strategy With a

Thomas C. Schelling. part m STRATEGY WITH A

**RANDOM**INGREDIENTRANDOMIZATION OF PROMISES AND THREATS In the theory of games

Strategy With a

**Random**Ingredient.### What people are saying - Write a review

#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

### Other editions - View all

### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game