## The strategy of conflict |

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Page 26

Consider a culture in which "cross my heart" is universally

absolutely binding. Any offer accompanied ... Each must now

possibility of stalemate and take into account the likelihood that the other already

has, or will ...

Consider a culture in which "cross my heart" is universally

**recognized**asabsolutely binding. Any offer accompanied ... Each must now

**recognize**thispossibility of stalemate and take into account the likelihood that the other already

has, or will ...

Page 261

or social characteristic of being mutually

some kind of authority, the authority deriving mainly from the sheer perception of

mutual acknowledgement, of a "tacit bargain." And a particular limit gains in

authority ...

or social characteristic of being mutually

**recognized**by both sides as havingsome kind of authority, the authority deriving mainly from the sheer perception of

mutual acknowledgement, of a "tacit bargain." And a particular limit gains in

authority ...

Page 280

The second (implicit) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so

rational-solution" postulate ; it is the second that constitutes the "symmetry"

postulate.

The second (implicit) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so

**recognized**is determined by mathematical symmetry. The first we might call the "rational-solution" postulate ; it is the second that constitutes the "symmetry"

postulate.

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game