The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 26
... recognized as absolutely binding . Any offer accompanied by this invoca- tion is a final offer , and is so recognized ... recognize this possibility of stalemate and take into account the likelihood that the other already has , or will ...
... recognized as absolutely binding . Any offer accompanied by this invoca- tion is a final offer , and is so recognized ... recognize this possibility of stalemate and take into account the likelihood that the other already has , or will ...
Page 261
... recognized that there is a rather continuous gradation in the possible sizes of atomic - weapon effects , a rather ... recognize , or of making adherence easy to enforce on one's own com- - manders ; it concerns the need of any stable ...
... recognized that there is a rather continuous gradation in the possible sizes of atomic - weapon effects , a rather ... recognize , or of making adherence easy to enforce on one's own com- - manders ; it concerns the need of any stable ...
Page 280
... recognize that any rational player on either side would recognize it as the indicated " solution . " The second ( implicit ) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so recognized is de- termined by mathematical symmetry ...
... recognize that any rational player on either side would recognize it as the indicated " solution . " The second ( implicit ) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so recognized is de- termined by mathematical symmetry ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game