The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 280
... solution . " The second ( implicit ) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so recognized is de- termined by mathematical symmetry . The first we might call the " rational - solution " postulate ; it is the second that ...
... solution . " The second ( implicit ) part of the hypothesis is that the particular outcome so recognized is de- termined by mathematical symmetry . The first we might call the " rational - solution " postulate ; it is the second that ...
Page 287
... solution - put ourselves in a frame of mind congenial to accepting the " Nash point " as the rational outcome of an explicit bargaining game.19 Consider now some variants of this game . 19 The solution proposed by J. F. Nash for ...
... solution - put ourselves in a frame of mind congenial to accepting the " Nash point " as the rational outcome of an explicit bargaining game.19 Consider now some variants of this game . 19 The solution proposed by J. F. Nash for ...
Page 291
... solution in the strict sense . ( In Fig . 26 a choice of either second or third strategy for each player constitutes the solution . ) The definition of such a solution , given by Luce and Raiffa , is as fol- lows : " A non - cooperative ...
... solution in the strict sense . ( In Fig . 26 a choice of either second or third strategy for each player constitutes the solution . ) The definition of such a solution , given by Luce and Raiffa , is as fol- lows : " A non - cooperative ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game