## The strategy of conflict |

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Page 137

Thus the "balance of terror" that is so often adverted to is — if, in fact, it exists and

is

analogy requires that the balance be

Thus the "balance of terror" that is so often adverted to is — if, in fact, it exists and

is

**stable**— equivalent to a total exchange of all conceivable hostages. (Theanalogy requires that the balance be

**stable**, i.e., that neither side be able, ...Page 223

... as will be seen below, this second examination may be unnecessary; for

certain behavior hypotheses, "optimal" adjustment of R and B (for any value short

of R = i) requires that the conditions for

... as will be seen below, this second examination may be unnecessary; for

certain behavior hypotheses, "optimal" adjustment of R and B (for any value short

of R = i) requires that the conditions for

**stability**of the modified matrix be met.Page 251

From the foregoing considerations, it is not at all clear that the

balance of terror — the lack of temptation to ... of what the other side does, and

assure it in a convincing way, so that a powerfully

results.

From the foregoing considerations, it is not at all clear that the

**stability**of thebalance of terror — the lack of temptation to ... of what the other side does, and

assure it in a convincing way, so that a powerfully

**stable**mutual deterrenceresults.

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game