The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 233
... strike back - there would be no powerful temptation to strike first . And there would be less need to react quickly to what might prove to be a false alarm . - Thus schemes to avert surprise attack have as their most im- mediate ...
... strike back - there would be no powerful temptation to strike first . And there would be less need to react quickly to what might prove to be a false alarm . - Thus schemes to avert surprise attack have as their most im- mediate ...
Page 240
... strike second and gain no advantage in striking first . At the opposite extreme is a weapon that is itself so vulnerable that it could not survive to strike second , or a weapon so specialized for finding and destroy- ing the enemy's ...
... strike second and gain no advantage in striking first . At the opposite extreme is a weapon that is itself so vulnerable that it could not survive to strike second , or a weapon so specialized for finding and destroy- ing the enemy's ...
Page 241
... strike and second - strike weapons , extolling the one and disparaging the other in our approach to the surprise - attack problem . If we were to consider eliminating all weapons that had any possible effect against the other side's ...
... strike and second - strike weapons , extolling the one and disparaging the other in our approach to the surprise - attack problem . If we were to consider eliminating all weapons that had any possible effect against the other side's ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game