## The strategy of conflict |

### From inside the book

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Page 278

adduced as a plausible characteristic of the solution of the ... Nash's theory of the

two-person cooperative game explicitly postulates

sanyi's.

**Symmetry**is not only commonly imposed on the move-structure of games butadduced as a plausible characteristic of the solution of the ... Nash's theory of the

two-person cooperative game explicitly postulates

**symmetry**, as does Har-sanyi's.

Page 285

I have no basis for arguing with what force, or in what percentage of interesting

games, mathematical

that the status of the

I have no basis for arguing with what force, or in what percentage of interesting

games, mathematical

**symmetry**does dominate "rational expectations." But I thinkthat the status of the

**symmetry**postulate is qualitatively changed by the ...Page 287

Let us — whether or not we are strongly attracted to the

whether or not we are especially attracted to the particular

solution — put ourselves in a frame of mind congenial to accepting the "Nash ...

Let us — whether or not we are strongly attracted to the

**symmetry**postulate, andwhether or not we are especially attracted to the particular

**symmetry**of the Nashsolution — put ourselves in a frame of mind congenial to accepting the "Nash ...

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#### LibraryThing Review

User Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThingThis is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review

### Contents

The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |

An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |

? Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |

Copyright | |

11 other sections not shown

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### Common terms and phrases

action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior Bernard Brodie bilateral monopoly chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value explicit game theory identify incentive initial interest involved John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies motive move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution stable strategy strike suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game