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He does have an incentive to bind himself to fulfill the threat, if he thinks the threat
may be successful, because the threat and not its fulfillment gains the end; and
fulfillment is not required if the threat succeeds. The more certain the contingent ...
Luce and Raiffa, who characterize threats by the phrase, "This will hurt you more
than it hurts me," explicitly making threats ... that "any criterion giving weight to the
threat positions of the players involves an interpersonal comparison of utilities.
But if the threat is secured by a penalty, the lower limit to any persuasive penalty
that Column could invoke would be 4; any smaller penalty leaves him preferring II
to I when Row chooses iii. The lower limit to a persuasive penalty on Row's ...
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LibraryThing ReviewUser Review - HadriantheBlind - LibraryThing
This is one of the most important books on Game Theory, and also, thankfully, one of the more accessible (certainly much more so than von Neumann's and Morgenstern's book). His main theses are that ... Read full review
The Retarded Science of International Strategy
An Essay on Bargaining
? Bargaining Communication and Limited War
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