is bound to take and cause to be taken all reasonably practicable care and caution to prevent harm being thereby caused to others, and is liable as for negligence to make compensation for any harm thereby caused, unless he proves that all reasonably practicable care and caution were in fact used. Explanations.-1. Dangerous things for the purposes of this section are fire (not being used in the ordinary way of domestic purposes), earth or water artificially collected in large quantities, explosive and inflammable matters, and any other thing likely for default of safe keeping to cause harm to neighbouring persons or property. 2. A dangerous animal for the purposes of this section is (a) any animal of a kind accustomed to do mischief: 3. A person who deals with a dangerous thing and is in good faith ignorant of its dangerous character is not subject to the liability declared by this section (p). Illustrations. 1. A. is the owner of an embankment constructed by authority of the Government. Part of this embankment is carried away in a storm, whereby B.'s adjacent land and crops are damaged. If A. has in fact been diligent in constructing and maintaining the embankment in such a manner as to be capable of resisting all such violence of weather as in that part of the country may be expected to occur, or if the storm was so extraordinary that no practicable precaution could have guarded against its effects, then A. has not wronged B. If the storm was such as might have been reasonably provided against, and if A. has not been so diligent as aforesaid (which may be inferred as a fact from the failure of the embankment in the absence of proof that the best known precautions were used), then A. has wronged B. 2. Sparks escape from a railway engine used by the X. Railway (p) As to poison, fire, explosives, and dangerous animals, cf. the Penal Code, ss. 284, 285, 286, 289. INDIAN CIVIL WRONGS BILL. Company on their line, and set fire to A.'s corn in an adjoining field. The X. Company must make compensation to A., unless they prove that the best known practicable precautions were used to prevent the escape of sparks from the engines (q). 3. A. burns weeds on his own land. Sparks from the fire are carried into B.'s growing crop and set fire to it. A. must make compensation to B., unless he proves that the fire was carried by a sudden and extraordinary wind, or in some other unusual manner which he could not, by reasonable and practicable precaution, have prevented. 4. A., a zamíndár, maintains an ancient tank on his zamíndári for the benefit of agriculture. An extraordinary rainfall causes the tank to burst, and the water escaped therefrom carries away a building belonging to B. If A. has been diligent in maintaining the tank, and making provision against any ordinary overflow of water, A. has not wronged B. (r). 5. A. sends a parcel containing a detonating mixture to a railway station, to be carried as goods by the railway company, without informing the company's servants of the nature of the contents. While B., a servant of the company, is handling the box for the purpose of dispatching it by train, and with care sufficient for the safe and proper handling of ordinary goods, the contents explode and injure B. There is nothing to show the specific cause of the explosion. A. has wronged B. The explosion also damages a cart of C.'s, which has brought other goods to be dispatched by train. A. has, but the company has not, wronged C. (8). 6. A., having left a loaded gun in his house, sends B., a young person inexperienced in handling firearms, to fetch it. A. tells B. that the gun is loaded, and directs him to handle it carefully. B. fetches the gun, and on his way back points it in sport at C. The gun goes off, and wounds C. A. has wronged C. (t). (g) See Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co., 5 H. & N. 679; Fremantle v. L. & N. W. R. Co., 10 C. B. N. S. 89. Such a case as Jones v. Festiniog R. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 733, where the use of locomotive engines not being especially authorized, it was held that the company used them at its peril, could, I suppose, hardly occur in British India. If it did, and if the clause now submitted had become law, the decision would be the other way, unless Act IV. of 1879, s. 4, implies that using locomotives without the sanction of the Governor General in Council is absolutely unlawful. As to the use of fire for agricultural purposes, such as burning weeds, see Turbervil v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13, and 1 Ld. Raym.; and D. 9. 2, ad 1. Aquil. 30, § 3. (r) Madras R. Co. v. Zamindar of Carvatenagaram, L. R. 1 Ind. App. 364. (8) Lyell v. Ganga Dai, I. L. R. (t) Dixon v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198, 7. A. is a dealer in drugs. By the negligence of A.'s servant a jar of extract of belladonna is labelled as extract of dandelion, and sold on A.'s behalf to B., a retail druggist. B., in good faith, resells part of it as extract of dandelion to C., a customer, who by taking it is made dangerously ill. A. has wronged C. (u). 69. (1) A person possessed of— (a) any immoveable property: (b) any building or structure intended for human occu pation or use: (c) any carriage or vessel intended for the conveyance of human beings, or of goods which are to be handled in that carriage or vessel (a): is in this and the next following section called an occupier. (2) An occupier must keep the property occupied by him in reasonably safe condition and repair as regards (a) persons using that property as of right: (b) persons being or passing near that property as of right: and is liable as for negligence to any such person who is injured by want of such condition and repair (y). (3) A person who has delivered out of his possession to be employed for the purposes of his business any such carriage or vessel as in this section mentioned continues responsible during such employment for any want of reasonably safe condition and repair which existed at the time of his parting with the possession. Explanation.-The existence of a defect which the usual care and skill of competent persons could not have discovered or prevented (in this section called a latent defect) (u) Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, Bigelow L. C. 602. See this case discussed p. 448, above. (x) See Foulkes v. Metrop. Dist. R. Co., 5 C. P. D. 157, especially the judgment of Thesiger L. J. The words now inserted are sug gested by Elliott v. Hall, 15 Q. B. (y) Most of the previous authori- Liability of occupiers of property. is not a want of reasonably safe condition and repair, but the burden of proof is on the occupier to show that the defect which caused an injury was latent. (4) Safe condition includes careful management. (5) Persons using property as of right include(a) servants (≈) or other persons being or coming thereon in performance of a contract with the occupier; (b) persons being or coming thereon by the occupier's invitation or with his consent on any lawful business. Illustrations. 1. A. is a merchant in Bombay. His office is approached by a passage, forming part of the premises occupied by him, in which there is a trapdoor. At a time when the trapdoor is left open, and not properly guarded or lighted, B., a customer of A., comes to the office on business, and falls through the trapdoor and is injured. A. has wronged B. (a). 2. A. digs a pit on his own land close to a highway, and does not fence it off, light the place after dark, or take any other precaution for the safety of persons using the highway. B., lawfully walking on the highway after dark, falls into the pit and is injured. A. has wronged B. (b). 3. A., the owner of a road subject to rights of way, puts a heap of building materials on the road, and leaves them at night unwatched and unlighted. B., a person entitled to use the road, drives along the road after dark, his carriage runs against the heap, and his horse and carriage are damaged. A. has wronged B. (c). 4. The X. Company are possessed of a dock, in which for payment from shipowners they provide accommodation for ships, including gangways between ships in dock and the shore, and staging for the use of workmen employed about ships in the dock. A. is a person having lawful business on one of the ships in the dock; to reach the ship he walks on one of the gangways provided by the X. Company. The X. Company's servants having placed the gangway in an unsafe position, it gives way under A., and he falls into the water and is injured. The X. Company has wronged A. B. is a workman employed to paint a ship in the dock. (z) English common law authorities incline to the view that a servant injured by the defective state of the place where he is employed can hold the master liable only for personal negligence. I am not sure that even the Employers' Liability Act puts him on the same footing as a customer, but I think he ought to be so. (a) Chapman v. Rothwell, E. B. & E. 168, 27 L. J. Q. B. 315 (treated by the Court as a very plain case). (b) Barnes v. Ward, 9 C. B. 392, 19 L. J. C. P. 195. (c) Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. N. S. 556, 27 L. J. C. P. 318. He stands for that purpose on a staging provided by the X. Company, which is in fact unfit for such use by the negligence of the X. Company's servants in not fitting it with ropes of proper strength. One of the ropes breaks, and B. falls into the dock and is hurt. The X. Company has wronged B. (d). 5. A. is possessed of a bridge crossing a public road. As B. is passing along the road under the bridge, a brick falls upon him from the brickwork of the bridge and injures him. There is no specific proof of the amount of care used in making or maintaining the bridge. Unless A. proves that the fall of the brick was due to some cause consistent with due care having been used in the maintenance of the bridge, A. has wronged B. (e). 6. A. is possessed of a lamp which is affixed to the wall of his house and projects over a public street. The fastenings of the lamp, being out of repair, give way, and the lamp falls on B., a foot-passenger in the street, and injures him. A. must make compensation to B., even if A. has employed a person whom he reasonably believed to be competent to keep the lamp in repair (ƒ). licensees mises. 70. Where a person uses or comes on any property with Position of the occupier's permission, but not as of right, the occupier using preof that property is liable for harm suffered by the firstmentioned person from a defect in the condition or repair of that property only if the defect is such as to constitute to the knowledge of the occupier a danger not discoverable by a person using ordinary care (g). (d) Smith v. London & St. Katharine Docks Co., L. R. 3 C. P. 326. Cf. Francis v. Cockrell, L. R. 5 Q. B. 501 (Ex. Ch.), where, however, the duty was also put on the ground of contract; Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. Div. 503. (e) Kearney v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co., Ex. Ch. L. R. 6 Q. B. 759; cp. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 33 L. J. Ex. 13, and in Bigelow L. C., where it is said that "it is the duty of persons who keep barrels in a warehouse to take care that they do not roll out," and there was no positive evidence that the barrel was being handled by servants of the defendant, or being handled carelessly. (f) Tarry v. Ashton, 1 Q. B. D. 314. (g) It is rather difficult to say in It what respect, if any, a "bare licen- |