The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 30
... initial bar- gaining position is adhered to . ) Defense against this tactic may involve , among other things , both misinterpretation of the other party's position and an effort to make the eventual outcome in- commensurable with the ...
... initial bar- gaining position is adhered to . ) Defense against this tactic may involve , among other things , both misinterpretation of the other party's position and an effort to make the eventual outcome in- commensurable with the ...
Page 31
... initial accrual of profits is thereby determined ; any other division of the profits requires that one firm be able to compensate the other . If the fact of compensation would be evidence of illegal collusion , or if the motive for ...
... initial accrual of profits is thereby determined ; any other division of the profits requires that one firm be able to compensate the other . If the fact of compensation would be evidence of illegal collusion , or if the motive for ...
Page 35
... initial position is indicated , as it is if any withdrawal from an initial " advanced " position would discredit any subsequent attempt to convey the truth . Actually , though a person does not commonly invite penalties on his own ...
... initial position is indicated , as it is if any withdrawal from an initial " advanced " position would discredit any subsequent attempt to convey the truth . Actually , though a person does not commonly invite penalties on his own ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game