The Strategy of ConflictNo background in mathematics needed, but some knowledge of game theory useful. |
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Page 5
... tive gains to both sides ; or it may involve threats of damage , in- cluding mutual damage , as in a strike , boycott , or price war , or in extortion . Viewing conflict behavior as a bargaining process is useful in keeping us from ...
... tive gains to both sides ; or it may involve threats of damage , in- cluding mutual damage , as in a strike , boycott , or price war , or in extortion . Viewing conflict behavior as a bargaining process is useful in keeping us from ...
Page 83
... tive , knowledge , or freedom of choice . Traditional game theory has , for the most part , applied to these mutual - dependence games ( nonzero - sum games ) the meth- ods and concepts that proved successful in studying the strategy of ...
... tive , knowledge , or freedom of choice . Traditional game theory has , for the most part , applied to these mutual - dependence games ( nonzero - sum games ) the meth- ods and concepts that proved successful in studying the strategy of ...
Page 296
... tive structure of the game ) , it is hard to see that this solution is much less , if at all less , compelling than the one in Fig . 31 , 11 i ii Ι II III IV · → O iii 0 0 0 9 O 0 10 0 10 10 0 9 iv 0 0 0 FIG . 31 although the latter ...
... tive structure of the game ) , it is hard to see that this solution is much less , if at all less , compelling than the one in Fig . 31 , 11 i ii Ι II III IV · → O iii 0 0 0 9 O 0 10 0 10 10 0 9 iv 0 0 0 FIG . 31 although the latter ...
Contents
The Retarded Science of International Strategy | 3 |
An Essay on Bargaining | 21 |
Bargaining Communication and Limited War | 53 |
Copyright | |
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action advantage adversary agreement all-out balance of terror bargaining game behavior cell chance Chapter choice choose clue Column commitment communication concert conflict cooperative game coordination coordination game decision depends deterrence enemy enforcement evidence example expected value game theory identify incentive initial interest involved irrational John Harsanyi jointly kind knows likelihood limited limited war Luce and Raiffa mathematical matrix means military minimax missiles mixed strategies move mutual Nash Nash point negotiation no-attack nonzero-sum game nuclear weapons offer one's other's outcome pair participants particular partner party payoff payoff matrix penalty play possible potential preference principle probability problem promise pure Quemoy random rational players recognize retaliation retaliatory forces risk role Row's rules Russians side situation solution strategy strike structure suggestion suppose surprise attack symmetry tacit bargaining tacit game tactic threat threaten tion tive value system yield zero-sum game