ter is as far from being in a moral view perfect, as that of any of his creatures? The fame writer affirms, that the doctrine of philofophical neceffity is a modern difcovery, not older than Hobbes, or, perhaps he might mean, than Spinofa. Strange, that a thing, in which all mankind are fo much interested; and of which every man, who thinks, is a competent judge, and has occafion to think and fpeak, every day of his life; fhould not have been found out till about two hundred years ago, and should still, in spite of all that can be faid for it, although as certain as that two and two are four, be disbelieved by all mankind, a few individuals excepted. I fhall only add, that, if the Deity be, as this author affirms, the cause of all the evil, as well as of all the good, actions of his creatures, refentment and gratitude towards our fellow men are as unreasonable as towards the knife that wounds, or the falve that heals us; and that to repent of the evil. I am conscious of having committed would be not only abfurd but impious, because it would imply a diffatisfaction with the will

of Him, who was the almighty cause of that evil, and was pleased to make me his instrument in doing it.

258. I deny not, that the oppofite doctrine of liberty may be thought to involve in it fome difficulties which our limited understanding cannot difentangle, particularly with respect to the Divine Prescience and Decrees. But in most things we find difficulties which we cannot folve; nor can any man, without extreme prefumption, affirm, that he diftinctly knows, in what manner the Divine Prescience exerts itself, or how the freedom of man's will may be affected by the decrees of God. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us: but of our own free agency we are competent judges, because it is a matter of fact and experience; and because all our moral and religious notions, that is, all our most important knowledge, may be faid to be either founded on it, or intimately connected with it.

259. As Omnipotence can do whatever is poffible, fo Omniscience must know whatever can be known. Every thing, which

God

God has determined to bring certainly to pass, he must foresee as certain: and can it be thought impoffible, that he should forefee, not as certain but as contingent, that which he has determined to be contingent and not certain? Or will it be said, that it is not poffible for the Almighty to decree contingencies, as well as certainties; to leave it in my power in certain cafes to act according to the free determination of my own mind? Our bodily strength, and our freedom of choice in regard to good and evil, are matters of great moment to us; but the latter can no more interfere with the purposes of divine providence, than the former can retard or accelerate the motion of the earth. It would not be very difficult for a prudent man, who fhould have the entire command of a few children, to make them in certain cafes promote his views, without laying any restraint on their will. Infinitely more easy must it be, for the almighty and omniscient Governor of the universe, so to over-rule all the actions of his moral creatures, as to make them promote,

promote, even while they are acting freely, his own wife and good purposes.

SECT. II.

Further Remarks on the Will*.

360. IT

was faid, that the power of beginning motion, exerted of choice by a rational and intelligent being, may be called Volition or Will. The word will has other fignifications, but I wish at prefent to use it in this fenfe. I call it a power of beginning motion; meaning by the term motion every change in the human mind or body which is ufually denominated action. When we will to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power; and when we will we always will fomething, (and this fomething may be termed the object of volition); even as when we remember we always remember fomething, which may be called the object of remem

* See Dr Reid's Effays on the active powers of man.

brance,

1

brance. Things therefore done voluntarily are to be distinguished from things done, like a new-born infant's fucking, by instinct, as well as from things done by habit, like the constant motion of the eyelids.

261. Will and Defire are not the fame. What we will is an action, and our own action but we may defire what is not action, as that our friends may be happy, or what is no action of ours, as that our friends may behave well. Nay we may defire what we do not will, as when we are thirsty and abstain from drink on account of health; and we may will what we have an averfion to, as when, on the fame account, we force ourselves to fwallow a naufeous medicine. Let us alfo distinguish between will and command; although, in common language, what a man commands is often called his will. We will to do fome action of our own; we command an action to be done by another. Defires and Commands are alfo, in popular language, confounded: but here too we muft diftinguish. "O if fuch a thing were given

"me"