"me," is not the fame with "Give me "fuch a thing :" and if a tyrant, to get a pretence for punishing, were to command what he knew could not be done, it might be a command without defire.

262. I faid, that when we will to do a thing, we believe that thing to be in our power, or to depend upon our will. In exerting myself to raise a weight from the ground, I believe, either that I can raise it, or that it is in my power to try whether I can raife it or not. A very great weight, which I know to be far above my strength, I never attempt to raise. I never exert myself for the purpose of flying; I never will to fpeak a language I have not learned; because I know it to be out of my power. Our will may however be exerted in attempting to do what we know to be at the first trial impracticable; as when one begins to learn to perform on a mufical inftrument: but in this cafe we believe, that frequent attempts properly di-: rected will make the thing poffible, and at laft eafy. And we know, that the first principles of mufical performance, as well

as

as of other arts, are adapted to the ability of a beginner, and confequently in his power.

263. Some acts of the will are transient, others more lafting. When I will to stretch out my hand and fnuff the candle, the energy of the will is at an end as soon as the action is over. When I will to read a book, or write a letter, from beginning to end, without stopping, the will is exerted till the reading or the writing be finished. We may will to perfift for a course of years in a certain conduct; to read, for example, fo much Greek every day, till we learn to read it with ease: this fort of will is commonly called a refolution. We may will or refolve to do our duty on all occafions as long as we live; and he who fo refolves, and perfeveres in the resolution, is a good man. A fingle act of virtue is a good thing, but does not make a man of virtue: he only is fo, who refolves to be virtuous, and adheres to his purpose. Aristotle rightly thought, that virtue confifts not in tranfient acts, but in a fettled habit or difpofition; agreeable to which is the old defini

tion of justice, Conftans et perpetua voluntas fuum cuique tribuendi. So of the other virtues. He is not a temperate or valiant man, who is fo now and then only, or merely by chance; but he who is intentionally and habitually temperate or valiant. Him, in like manner, we judge to be a vicious character, not who through the weakness of human nature has fallen into tranfgreffion, but who perfists in transgreffion, or intends to tranfgrefs, or is indifferent whether he tranfgrefs or not, or refolves that he will not take the trouble to guard against it.

264. For actions wherein the will has no concern, a man, as obferved already, is not accounted either virtuous or vicious, and can deserve neither reward nor punishment, neither praife nor blame. This is the univerfal belief of rational nature, and on this the laws of all enlightened nations are founded. It is true, that laws have entailed inconvenience upon the guiltless offfpring of the guilty. But fuch laws either were unjust; or were made with a political view, to restrain fathers the more effectual

ly

ly from certain great crimes, high treason for example: in which laft cafe they may, as many human laws are, be good upon the whole, because profitable to the community, though a grievous hardship to individuals. Inequalities of this kind are unavoidable. At my return from a long voyage my health may require the refreshments of the land; and yet, if there be a fufpicion of plague in the fhip, I may, without having any reason to charge the government with cruelty, be forced to remain on board many days, even though my death should be thè confequence. With his parents a man is indeed fo clofely connected, that, even where the law does not interpofe at all, he may, and often muft, derive good from their virtue, or evil from their misconduct; competence, for example, from their industry, or poverty from their floth; a found conftitution from their temperance, or hereditary disease from their fenfuality; honour from their merit, or difhonour from their infamy. This may fuggeft an obvious and important leffon both to parents and to children.

SECT. III.

Principles of Action.

265. IN strict propriety of speech, and in all rational inquiry concerning the imputableness of actions, every thing that is called human action is fuppofed to depend on the human will. But, in common language, the word action is ufed with more latitude, and animals are often faid to act, or do, what they do not will, and even what they do not think of. An infant is faid to act, while it fucks; a bee, while it gathers honey; and a man while he takes fnuff without knowing that he takes it, as I have been told that fnuff-takers often do, In fpeaking of the principles of action, I muft now use the word in this inaccurate and popular fenfe. A principle of human action is, that which incites a man to act *. Our principles of action are many and various; I will not undertake to give a complete enumeration: it may be fufficient to

See Dr Reid on the active powers of man.

fpecify