fancied, that the foul could perceive nothing but what was contiguous to it, or in the fame place with it; and, as the bodies we perceive without us are not in the fame place with the foul, (for, if they were, they would all be within the human body), it was said that we did not perceive those bodies themfelves, but only ideas or unsubstantial images of them, which proceeded from them, and, penetrating the human body, might be in the fame place with the foul, or contiguous to it. All this is not only fiction, but unintelligible. x We perceive bodies themselves; and can as eafily understand how the foul should perceive what is diftant, as how it fhould perceive what is contiguous or near.

X

14. In the Platonick, and perhaps too in the Pythagorean philofophy, ideas are thofe external, felf-exiftent, and uncreated models, prototypes, or patterns, according to which the Deity made all things of an eternal and uncreated matter; and which, while he employs himself in creation, he continually looks upon: whence it is fuppofed that the word idea (from eder to see, or behold)

behold) is derived. Cicero gives two Latin terms corresponding to idea, in this fense of the word; and those are species and forma. The first (derived from the old Latin verb Specio, I behold) is more according to analogy; but is inconvenient, because thofe oblique cafes in the plural fpecierum and fpeciebus cannot be admitted into good Latin; and therefore our author prefers the other word forma, to whofe plural cases there can be no objection. Of these felf-existent ideas Plato was, as Cicero fays, marvellously fond; fuppofing that there was something divine in their nature. The word idea, in this fenfe of it, we shall not often have occafion to repeat.

15. The fame word has ftill another meaning among philofophers; having been used to denote a thought of the mind, which may be expreffed by a general term, or common appellative, that is, by a noun which is not a proper name. The words man, borse, mountain, &c. are fignificant of ideas in this fenfe of the term, and are general names or common appellatives, because they belong equally to every man,

every horse, every mountain. That this may be the better understood, and in order to prepare my hearers for fome things that will immediately follow, it is proper to introduce here a few remarks on that faculty of our nature, which fome have called abstraction, or the power of forming general ideas by arranging things in claffes; a faculty, which the brutes probably have not, and without which both language and science would be impoffible.

one.

16. All the things in nature are individual things: that is, every thing is itself and one, and not another or more than But when a number of individual things are obferved to resemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a clafs, tribe, or species, to which we give a name; and this name belongs equally to every thing comprehended in the species. Thus, all animals of a certain form resemble each other in having four feet; and therefore we confider them as in this refpect of the fame species, to which we give the name quadruped; and this name belongs equally to every

in

dividual

dividual of the fpecies; from the elephant, one of the greatest, to the mouse, one of the least.

17. Again, Obferving several species to refemble each other in one or more particulars of importance, we refer them to a higher clafs, called a genus, to which we give a name; which name belongs equally to every fpecies comprehended in the genus, and to every individual comprehended in the feveral fpecies. Thus all the tribes of living things refemble each other in this refpect, that they have life; whence we refer them to a genus called animal; and this name belongs equally to every fpecies of animals, to men, beafts, fishes, fowls, and infects, and to each individual man, beaft, fish, fowl, and infect.

18. Further, All things animated and inanimate.resemble each other in this refpect, that they are created; whence we refer them to a genus ftill higher, which may be called creature: a name which belongs equally to every genus and fpecies of created things, and to each individual thing that is created. Further ftill, All beings whatever

B

i

whatever exist, or are, and in this respect may be faid to refemble each other: in which view we refer them to a genus ftill higher, called Being, which is the highest poffible genus,

19. The English word kind is faid to have been originally of the fame import with genus, and fort the fame with fpecies. But the words kind and fort have long been confounded by our beft writers; and hence, when we would fpeak accurately on this subject, we are obliged to take the words genus and fpecies from another language. All those thoughts or conceptions of the mind, which we exprefs by names fignificant of genera and fpecies, may be called General Ideas, and have been by fome philofophers called Ideas fimply. And those thoughts or conceptions, which we exprefs by proper names, or by general names fo qualified by pronouns as to denote individual things or perfons, may be called Singular or Particular Ideas, and were by fome English writers of the last century termed Notions. In this fenfe of the words, one has a notion of Socrates, Etna, this

town,