sophistry, or argument how ingeniously soever it might have been prepared, and no matter what array of authorities might be brought to its support, could mislead his judgment, or induce him to give his assent to a proposition, which was not intrinsically true. He had a rectitude of the heart as well as of the head, which enabled him to detect all fallacies of an argument, how skillfully soever they were concealed from the eye of an ordinary observer.

On the bench the Chief Justice was a model of what a Judge ought to be, and though we have seen many Judges, while in the discharge of their functions, both in this and other countries, we have never met with one, who approached so near the the beau ideal of a perfect magistrate.

In ordinary life his conduct was affable and polite, and when entering the court room, which was usually before the appointed hour, for he was extremely punctual in the discharge of his duties, his conversation was cheerful, and evinced a remarkable freedom of mind, which in men of eminent attainments in any particular science, is almost an invariable criterion of superiority of

intellect.

In his colloquies on such occasions with the

members of the bar, which were frequent, no attempt was ever made to claim superiority, either on account of his age or his great acquirements; neither was there any effort to acquire popularity; but his conduct was evidently dictated by a benevolent interest in the ordinary affairs of life, and a relish for social intercourse. The moment however he took his seat on the bench his character assumed a striking change. He still continued the same kind and benevolent being as before; but instead of the of the gay and cheerful expression which distinguished the features while engaged in social conversation, his brow assumed a thoughtfulness and an air of gravity and reflection, which invested his whole appearance with a certain indefinable dignity, which bore however not the slightest resemblance to sternness. The impression made on the beholder was that of a man engaged in some highly important and grave deliberation, which he apparently pursued with pleasure, but which at the same time seemed to absorb his whole attention, and required the full exercise of his faculties.

During the examination of the evidence, as well as on the argument of a cause, he was all attention, and listened to every thing that was said on both sides with a patience which was

truly extraordinary; and we do not recollect in the course of the six years that we constantly attended the sessions of the Circuit Court of the United States, at Richmond, ever to have seen him indicate impatience even by a gesture. The remarks of Bishop Burnet with regard to Sir Mathew Hale, apply with equal force to Judge Marshall "Nothing was more admirable in him

:

than his patience. He did not affect the reputation of quickness and despatch by a hasty and captious hearing of the counsel. He would bear with the meanest, and gave every man his full scope, thinking it much better to lose time than patience." We remember on some few occasions, at the close of an argument, to have heard him address a question to the Counsel with a view either to ascertain, whether there did not exist some legal adjudications in relation to the points for which he contended, or to be assured that he had correctly understood his propositions; but always in a manner which convinced the person addressed, that his sole object was to obtain, and not to convey information. He always acted on the principle, that a Court of Justice was a sanctuary, where parties had a right to be heard; that though the law had wisely interposed a special class of agents, called lawyers,

to protect the interests of suitors; not only because they were presumed to be better acquainted with the science of the law, but also to prevent the tribunals from becoming the arena of disputes, which the passions and interests of the parties would not fail to make it, if they were permitted personally to defend their suits; yet the advocates of a cause, cause, represented their clients

and were entitled to be heard; not on account of any merit or privilege they possessed as lawyers, but because they acted in behalf of the citizens of the community, for whose benefit the administration of justice was created, and because the highest and the lowest member of society was entitled to equal favor in a Court of Justice.

Few Judges seem to have so maturely reflected on the duties of a Judge as Mr. Marshall, and few certainly carried into the practical administration of the laws so profound a respect for the rights of the citizen as he did. We doubt much, whether a single example can be adduced throughout his long judicial career, of a party or his counsel having complained, or of their having had just cause to complain of his not allowing them full latitude for the defence of a cause. Indeed so firmly was his love of justice seated, and so

desirous was he to decide correctly and after a full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances of a cause, that he listened with greater attention to the arguments of young lawyers, if possible, than to those that were more experienced. He did this, because he seemed to think that the more feebly a cause was defended the more it was necessary, that the experience of the judge should protect the rights of the suitor, who was not justly chargeable with the deficiencies of his advocate; since his means might possibly not have enabled him to procure a more skillful one, or he may have thought, that since his defender had a license to practice the law he must possess sufficient skill for his protection.

He probably also believed, that clients are not always competent judges of the legal attainments of the members of the bar. Be this as it may, it is certain, that his love of justice; his desire to adhere to the rules of law and to understand the nature of a cause in all its bearings, were equally conspicuous, and inspired a respect for his opinions which will hardly be believed, by those who have not witnessed the effects of it. This respect was carried so far that, we believe, for many years previous to his death, none of his decisions in the Circuit Court was ever appealed from, unless