fallen fhort in this last attempt. When a genus is properly divided into its fpecies, the fpecies fhould not only, when taken together, exhauft the whole genus; but every fpecies fhould have its own precinct fo accurately defined, that one fhall not encroach upon another. And when an individual can be faid to belong to two or three different fpecies, the divifion is imperfect; yet this is the cafe of Ariftotle's divifion of the fophifms, by his own acknowledgement. It ought not therefore to be taken for a divifion strictly logical. It may rather be compared to the feveral species or forms of action invented in law for the redrefs of wrongs. For every wrong there is a remedy in law by one action or another : but fometimes a man may take his choice among feveral different actions. So every fophiftical fyllogifm may, by a little art, be brought under one or other of the fpecies mentioned by Ariftotle, and very often you may take your choice of two or three.

Befides the enumeration of the various kinds of sophisms, there are many other things in this treatise concerning the art of managing a fyllogiftical difpute with an antagonist. And indeed, if the paffion for this kind of litigation, which reigned for so many ages, fhould ever again lift up its head, we may predict, that the Organon of Aristotle will then become a fashionable study: for it contains fuch admirable materials and documents for this art, that it may be faid to have brought it to a science.

The conclufion of this treatife ought not to be overlooked: it manifestly relates, not to the present treatise only, but also to the whole analytics and topics of the author. I fhall therefore give the fubftance of it.

Of those who may be called inventers, fome have made important additions to things long before begun, and carried on through a course of ages; others have given a small beginning to things which, in fucceeding times, will be brought to greater perfection. The beginning of a thing, though small, is the

"chief part of it, and requires the greatest degree of invention; "for it is easy to make additions to inventions once begun. Now "with regard to the dialectical art, there was not something done, "and fomething remaining to be done. There was abfolutely nothing done: for those who professed the art of disputation, "had only a set of orations compofed, and of arguments, and of captious questions, which might fuit many occafions. Thefe "their scholars foon learned, and fitted to the occafion. This 66 was not to teach you the art, but to furnish with the mate"rials produced by the art: as if a man profeffing to teach you "the art of making fhoes, fhould bring you a parcel of fhoes of "various fizes and fhapes, from which you may provide those "who want. This may have its ufe; but it is not to teach the art of making shoes. And indeed, with regard to rhetorical "declamation, there are many precepts handed down from an"cient times; but with regard to the conftruction of fyllogifms,

you

"We have therefore employed much time and labour upon “this subject; and if our system appears to you not to be in the "number of those things, which, being before carried a certain "length, were left to be perfected; we hope for your favourable acceptance of what is done, and your indulgence in what is left imperfect."

CHA P. VI.

Reflections on the Utility of Logic, and the Means of its Improvement.

SECT. 1. Of the Utility of Logic.

MEN rarely leave one extreme without running into the contrary. It is no wonder, therefore, that the exceffive admiration of Aristotle, which continued for fo many ages, fhould end in an undue contempt; and that the high esteem of logic as the grand engine of science, fhould at last make way for too unfavourable an opinion, which seems now prevalent, of its being unworthy of a place in a liberal education. Those who think according to the fashion, as the greatest part of men do, will be as prone to go into this extreme, as their grandfathers were to go into the contrary.

Laying afide prejudice, whether fashionable or unfashionable, let us confider whether logic is, or may be made, fubfervient to any good purpose. Its profeffed end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reafon, with precifion and accuracy. No man will fay that this is a matter of no importance; the only thing, therefore, that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught.

To refolve this doubt, it may be obferved, that our rational faculty is the gift of God, given to men in very different measure. Some have a larger portion, fome a lefs; and where there is a remarkable defect of the natural power, it cannot be fupplied by

any culture whatsoever. But this natural power, even where it is strongest, may lie dead for want of the means of improvement; and a favage may have been born with as good faculties as a Bacon or a Newton. The amazing difference that appears in advanced life, is owing to this, that the talent of one was buried, being never put to use, while that of the other was cultivated to the best advantage.

It may

likewise be observed, that the chief mean of improving our rational power, is the vigorous exercise of it, in various ways, and in different fubjects, by which the habit is acquired of exercifing it properly. Without fuch exercise, and good sense over and above, a man who has studied logic all his life may, after all, be only a petulant wrangler, without true judgement, or skill of reafoning, in any. fcience.

I take this to be Locke's meaning, when, in his Thoughts on Education, he says, "If you would have your fon to reason well, "let him read Chillingworth." The ftate of things is much altered fince Locke wrote. Logic has been much improved, chiefly by his writings; and yet much less stress is laid upon it, and lefs time confumed in it. His counfel, therefore, was judicious and feasonable; to wit, That the improvement of our reafoning power is to be expected much more from an intimate acquaintance, with the authors who reafon beft, than from studying voluminous fyftems of logic. But if he had meant, that the study of logic was of no ufe, nor deferved any attention, he furely would not have taken the pains to have made fo confiderable an addition to it, by his Essay on the Human Understanding, and by his Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding. Nor would he have remitted his pupil to Chillingworth, the acutest logician, as well as the best reafoner, of his age; and one who, in innumerable places of his excellent book, without pedantry even in that pedantic age,

makes

makes the happiest application of the rules of logic, for unraveling the sophistical reasoning of his antagonist.

Our reasoning power makes no appearance in infancy; but as we grow up, it unfolds itself by degrees, like the bud of a tree. When a child first draws an inference, or perceives the force of an inference drawn by another perfon, we may call this the birth of his reafon but it is yet like a new-born babe, weak and tender ; it must be cherished, and carried in arms, and have food of easy digestion, till it gathers strength.

I believe no man remembers this birth of his reafon; but it is probable that his decifions will at first be weak and wavering; and, compared with that steady conviction which he acquires in ripe years, will be like the dawn of the morning compared with noon-day. We see that the reason of children yields to authority, as a reed to the wind; nay, that it clings to it, and leans upon it, as if conscious of its own weakness.

may

When reafon acquires fuch ftrength as to stand on its own bottom, without the aid of authority, or even in oppofition to authority, this be called its manly age. But in most men, it hardly ever arrives at this period. Many, by their fituation in life, have not the opportunity of cultivating their rational powers. Many, from the habit they have acquired, of fubmitting their opinions to the authority of others, or from fome other principle which operates more powerfully than the love of truth, fuffer their judgement to be carried along, to the end of their days, either by the authority of a leader, or of a party, or of the multitude, or by their own paffions. Such perfons, however learned, however acute, may be faid to be all their days children in understanding. They reason, they difpute, and perhaps write; but it is not that they may find the truth; but that they may defend opinions which have defcended to them by inheritance, or into which they have fallen by accident, or been led by affection.

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