error.

which supplies its base, involving polytheistic In like manner ȧperý, the standing word in heathen ethics for virtue,' is of very rarest occurrence in the N. T.; it is found but once in all the writings of St. Paul (Phil. iv. 8); and where else (which is only in the Epistles of St. Peter), it is in quite different uses from those in which Aristotle employs it.' In the same way On, which gives us 'ethics,' occurs only on a single occasion, and, which indicates that its absence elsewhere is not accidental, this once is in a quotation from a heathen poet (1 Cor. xv. 33).

The same precision in maintaining these lines of demarcation is again strikingly manifested in the fact of the constant use of θυσιαστήριον for the altar of the true God, occurring as it does more than twenty times in the books of the New Covenant, while on the one occasion when an heathen altar has need to be named, the word is changed, and instead of OvotaσTηpiov ('altare '), Bouós ('ara') is used (Acts xvii. 23; cf. Numb. xxiii. 1; 2 Chron. xxxi. 1; Jer. xi. 13); the feeling which dictated the exclusion of Bapós long surviving in the church, so that, as altogether profane, it was quite shut out from Christian terminology (Augusti, Handbuch der Christlicher Archäologie, vol. i. p. 412).

In conformity with this same law of moral fitness in the selection and exclusion of words, we meet with πρоηтeveɩ as the constant word in the

1 Verbum nimium humile,'- -as Beza, accounting for its absence, says,' si cum donis S. S. comparatur.'

N. T. to express the prophesying by the Spirit of God: while directly a sacred writer has need to make mention of the lying art of heathen divination, he employs this word no longer, but μavTeveσOaι in preference (cf. 1 Sam. xxviii. 8; Deut. xviii. 10). What the essential difference between the two things, 'prophesying' and 'soothsaying,' 'weissagen' and 'wahrsagen' is, and why it was necessary to keep them distinct and apart by different terms used to designate the one and the other, we shall best perceive and understand, when we have considered the etymology of one, at least, of the words. Μαντεύομαι being from μάντις, is through it connected, as Plato has taught us, with μανία and μαίνομαι. It will follow from this, that the word has reference to the tumult of the mind, the fury, the temporary madness, under which those were, who were supposed to be possessed by the god, during the time that they delivered their oracles; this mantic fury of theirs displaying itself in the eyes rolling, the lips foaming, the hair flying, as in other tokens of a more than natural agitation.' It is quite possible that these

1 Cicero, who loves to bring out, where he can, superiorities of the Latin language over the Greek, claims, and I think with reason, such a superiority here, in that the Latin has divinatio,' a word embodying the divine character of prophecy, and the fact that it was a gift of the gods, where the Greek had only μavτiký, which, seizing not the thing itself at any central point, did no more than set forth one of the external signs which accompanied its giving. (De Divin. i. 1): Ut alia nos melius multa quam Græci, sic huic præstantissimæ rei nomen nostri a divis; Græci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt.'

symptoms were sometimes produced, as no doubt they were often heightened, in the seers, Pythonesses, Sibyls and the like, by the use of drugs, or by other artificial means. Yet no one who believes that real spiritual forces underlie all forms of idolatry, but will also believe that there was often much more in these manifestations than mere trickery of this kind; no one with any insight into the awful mystery of the false worships of the world, but will believe that these symptoms were the evidence and expression of an actual connexion in which these persons stood to a spiritual world -a spiritual world, indeed, which was not above them, but beneath.

Revelation, on the other hand, knows nothing of this mantic fury, except to condemn it. “ The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets (1 Cor. xiv. 32). The true prophet is, indeed, rapt out of himself; he is "in the Spirit" (Rev. i. 10); he is "in an ecstasy" (Acts xi. 5); he is ὑπὸ Πνεύματος Αγίου φερόμενος (2 Pet. i. 21), which is very much more than 'moved,' as we have rendered it; rather 'getrieben,' as De Wette; and we must not go so far in our opposition to heathen and Montanist error as to deny this, which some, especially of those engaged in controversy with the Montanists, St. Jerome for example, have done. But then he is not beside himself; he is lifted above, not set beside, his every-day self. It is not discord and disorder, but a higher harmony and a diviner order, which are introduced into his soul; so that he is not

as one overborne in the region of his lower life by forces stronger than his own, by an insurrection from beneath; but his spirit is lifted out of that region into a clearer atmosphere, a diviner day, than any in which at other times it is permitted him to breathe. All that he before had still remains his, only purged, exalted, quickened, by a power higher than his own, but yet not alien to his own; for man is most truly man, when he is most filled with the fulness of God.1 Even within the sphere of heathenism itself, the superior dignity of the προφήτης to the μάντις was recognised; and recognised on these very grounds. Thus there is a well-known and often cited passage in the Timæus of Plato (71 e, 72 a, b), where exactly for this reason, that the μávris is one in whom all discourse of reason is suspended, who, according to the derivation of the word, more or less rages, the line is drawn broadly and distinctly between him and the πpoþýτηs, the former is subordinated to the latter, and his utterances only allowed to pass after they have received the seal and approbation of the other. The truth which the best heathen philosophy had a glimpse of here, was permanently embodied by the Christian Church in the fact that, while it assumed the προφητεύειν to itself, it ascribed the μαντεύεσθαι to that heathenism which it was about to displace and overthrow.

1 See John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, On Prophecy : ch. 4. The difference of the true prophetical Spirit from all Enthusiastical Imposture.

§ vii.—τιμωρία, κόλασις.

Of these words the former occurs but once in the N. T. (Heb. x. 29), and the latter only twice (Matt. xxv. 46; 1 John iv. 1).

In Tiμwpía,

according to its classical use, the vindicative character of the punishment is the predominant thought; it is the Latin 'ultio;' punishment as satisfying the inflicter's sense of outraged justice, as defending his own honour, or that of the violated law; herein its meaning agrees with its etymology, being from τιμή, and οὖρος, ὁράω, the guardianship or protectorate of honour. In kóλaois, on the other hand, is more the notion of punishment as it has reference to the correction and bettering of him that endures it; it is 'castigatio,' and has naturally for the most part a milder use than Tiμopía. Thus we find Plato (Protag. 323 e), joining κολάσεις and νουθετήσεις together: and the whole passage to the end of the chapter is eminently instructive as to the distinction between the words: οὐδεὶς κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ὅτι ἠδίκησεν, ὅστις μὴ ὥσπερ θηρίον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται,... ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ αὖθις ἀδικήσῃ; the same change in the words which he employs, occurring again twice or thrice in the sentence; with all which may be compared an instructive chapter in Clement of Alexandria, Strom. iv. 24. And this is Aristotle's distinction (Rhet. i. 10): διαφέρει δὲ τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἕνεκά ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ τιμωρία, τοῦ