sense of depth, which undoubtedly the passage requires, is here to be looked for in the kataποντισθῇ:-πόντος, which indeed does not itself occur in the N. T., being connected with Bálos, Béveos, perhaps the same word as this last, and implying the sea in its perpendicular depth, as Téλayos (=' æquor maris'), the same in its horizontal dimensions and extent.

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§ xiv.—σκληρός, αὐστηρός.

IN the parable of the Talents (Matt. xxv.), the slothful servant charges his master with being σκληρός, OKλnpós," an hard man" (ver. 24); while in the corresponding parable of St. Luke it is avoτnpós, 99 an austere man (xix. 21), which he accuses him of being. It follows that the words are to a certain degree interchangeable: but not that their meanings run exactly parallel throughout. They will be found, on the contrary, very capable of discrimination and distinction, however the distinction may not affect the interpretation of these parables.

Σκληρός, derived from σκέλλω, σκλῆναι, “ arefacio,' is properly an epithet expressing that which through lack of moisture is hard and dry, and thus rough and disagreeable to the touch; nay more, warped and intractable. It is then transferred to the region of ethics, in which is by far its most frequent use; and where it expresses the roughness, harshness, and intractability in the

moral nature of a man. Thus it is an epithet applied to Nabal (1 Sam. xxv. 3), and no other could better express the evil conditions of that churl. Looking to the company which oλnpós keeps, we find it associated with such words as the following: avxunpós (Plato, Symp. 195 d); ἀντίτυπος (Theæt. 155 α); ἀμετάστροφος (Crat. 407 d); äypios (Aristotle, Ethic. iv. 8; Plutarch, Cons. ad Apoll. 3); τpaɣús (Plutarch, De Lib. Ed. 18); άтρеπтоя (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 64, 117); πονηρός (1 Sam. xxv. 3); ἀπαίδευτος. It is set over against evŋlikós (Plato, Charm. 175 d); μaλakós (Protag. 331 d); paλbaкós (Symp. 195 d).

AvoTηpós, which in the N. T. only appears in the single passage already referred to, and never in the Septuagint, is in its primary meaning applied to such things as draw together and contract the tongue, which are, as we say, harsh and stringent to the palate, as new wine, not yet mellowed by age, unripe fruit, and the like. Thus, when the poet Cowper describes himself, when a boy, as gathering from the hedgerows "sloes austere," he uses the word with exactest propriety. But just as we have transferred 'strict' (from stringo') to the region of ethics, so the Greeks transferred avoτnpós, the image here being borrowed from the taste, as in oxλnpós it is derived from the touch. Neither does this word set out anything amiable or attractive in him to whom it is applied. We find it in such company as the following; joined with andýs (Plato, Pol. iii. 398 a); åкpatos and ȧvýsuvтos (Plutarch, Conj. Præc. 29);

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1

ἀνήδυστος (Phoc. 5); αὐθέκαστος (De Adul. et Am. 14). We find, further, Aristotle (Ethic. Eudem. vii. 5) contrasting the αὐστηρός with the εὐτράTEλos, which last word he uses in a good sense.

At the same time it will be observed that in none of the epithets with which we have thus found avoτηpós associated, is there that deep moral perversity which lies in those with which okλnpós is linked; and, moreover, it is met not seldom in more honorable company; thus it is joined with ooopwv continually (Plutarch, Conj. Præc. 7, 29; Quæst. Gr. 40); while the Stoics were wont to affirm all good men to be austere (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 1. 64, 117): καὶ αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν, μήτε παρ ̓ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν πроodéxeolαι: cf. Plutarch, Præc. Conj. 27. Latin, austerus' is predominantly an epithet of honor (Döderlein, Lat. Synon. vol. iii. p. 232); the 'austerus' is one earnest and severe, opposed to all levity; needing, it may very well be, to watch against harshness, rigour, or moroseness, into which his character might easily degenerate—(' non austeritas ejus tristis, non dissoluta sit comitas,' Quintilian, ii. 2. 5)—but as yet not charged with these.

In

We may distinguish, then, between σêλŋpós and αὐστηρός as follows: σκληρός, applied to any, conveys always a reproach and a severe one, indicates

1 In Plutarch this word is used in an ill sense, as selfwilled, 'eigensinnig;' being one of the many, in all languages, which, beginning with a good sense (Aristotle, Ethic. Nic. iv. 7), ended with a bad.

a character harsh, inhuman, and (in the earlier use of the word) uncivil; avoτnpós, on the contrary, does not always convey a reproach at all, any more than the German streng,' which is very different from hart;' and even where it does, yet one of comparatively a milder and less opprobrious description.

§ xv.—εἰκών, ὁμοίωσις, ὁμοίωμα.

THERE is a double theological interest attending the distinction between eirov and the two words. which are here brought into comparison with it; the first belonging to the Arian controversy, and turning on the fitness or unfitness of the words before us to set forth the relation of the Son to the Father; while the other is an interest that, seeming at first sight remote from any controversy, has yet contrived to insinuate itself into more than one, namely, whether there be a distinction, and if so what it is, between the image (eikúv) of God, in which, and the likeness (óμolwois) of God, after which man at the first is declared to have been created (Gen. i. 26).

And first, for the distinction drawn between the words during the course of the long Arian debate. It is evident that εἰκών (from ἔοικα) and ὁμοίωμα might often be used as equivalent, and in many positions it would be indifferent whether of the two were employed. Thus they are convertibly used by Plato (Phædr. 250 b), óμoiμaтa and

Eikóves alike, to set forth the earthly patterns and resemblances of the archetypal things in the heavens. When, however, the Church found it necessary to raise up bulwarks against Arian error and Arian equivocation, it drew a strong distinction between these words, one not arbitrary, but having essential difference for its ground. Eikov (= 'imago,' 'imitago') always supposes a prototype, that which it not merely resembles, but from which it is drawn. It is the German' Abbild,' which invariably presumes a 'Vorbild;' Gregory Nazianzene (Orat. 36): αὕτη γὰρ εἰκόνος φύσις, μίμημα εἶναι τοῦ ἀρχετύπου. (Petavius, De Trin. vi. 5, 6.) Thus, the monarch's head on the coin is Eikov (Matt. xxii. 20); the reflection of the sun in the water is its cikov (Plato, Phædo, 99 d); the statue in stone or other material is elkov (Rev. xiii. 14); the child is eμvxos eixóv of his parents. But in the ὁμοίωμα οι ὁμοίωσις, while there is resemblance, it by no means follows that it has been gotten in this way, that it is derived: it may be accidental, as one egg is like another, as there may exist a resemblance between two men who are not in any way akin to one another. Thus, as Augustine in an instructive passage brings out (Quæst. lxxxiii. 74), the 'imago' (= cikóv) includes and involves the 'similitudo,' but the 'similitudo' (=oμoiwois) does not involve the ‘imago.' The reason will at once be manifest why elkóv is applied to the Son, as representing his relation to the Father (1 Cor. xi. 7; Col. i. 15; cf. Wisd. vii. 26); while among all the words of the family