recited, for the maintenance of the prerogative, that the law was with the Queen. Godb. 289. 61. Where a person is an accountant to the Crown, Tit. 1. § 68 and sells his lands, not being indebted to the Crown at the time of the sale, yet if he afterwards becomes indebted to the Crown, in his situation of accountant, his lands may be seised by the Crown, in the hands of the purchaser, in consequence of the statute 13 Eliz. 62. Sir C. Hatton being remembrancer, and col- Coke's case, lector of the first fruits, for his life, after the death or surrender of one Godfrey, who then held that office in possession; and being seised in fee of divers manors, settled them to the use of himself for life, remainder to his son in tail. He afterwards became indebted to the Crown by reason of his office; and the question was, whether the lands thus settled could be extended for the debt. It was resolved that although Sir C. 10 Rep. 55. b. Hatton was not indebted to the Crown at the time when he made the settlement, yet having become indebted to the Crown ten years after, the lands comprised in the settlement were liable, by reason of the retrospect of the words in the statute, 13 Eliz. " as if the same treasurer, receiver &c. had, the day he first became accountant, stood bound by writing obligatory, having the effect of a statute staple to her Majesty, her heirs or successors, for payment of the same." Moo. 126. 63. An alienation bonâ fide, prior to the acceptance Coxhead's case, of an office, which renders the person accepting an accountant of the crown, is good; and it was said arguendo, in a subsequent case, that if a man is a receiver to the King, and not indebted, but clear; and Att. General sells his land, and ceases to be a receiver; and after- 2 Mod. 247. wards is appointed to be a receiver again; and then becomes indebted to the Crown, the sale is good. v. Alston, entitled to a 64. It has been stated that an assignment of a term The Crown for years, by a person indebted to the Crown, before term to attend. any execution awarded, is good. This doctrine does not, however, apply to terms for years, which are at- Tit 8. c. 2. § 20, Nichols v. 2 Vern. 389. Rex v. Smith, t. 12. c. 2. Tit. 12. c. 3. tendant on the inheritance; for in that case, if the King extends the inheritance, he will become entitled to the term. 65. Colonel Montresor being seised in fee of a freehold estate, and there being an old term for years in the lands outstanding, which was assigned to attend the inheritance, sold the estate in 1795, to Mr. Smith; and the term was assigned to a trustee for him. At the time of this sale Colonel M. was indebted to the Crown, but Smith had no notice of that circumstance when he purchased. The Crown issued an extent against Col. M., and the sheriff seised the lands purchased by Smith. A question arose in the Exchequer, whether the outstanding term, which was held in trust for Smith, should protect him against the claim of the Crown. The Lord Ch. Baron said, that the case which came nearest to this was that of the Attorney General v. Sands, where it was resolved, that as the inheritance was not forfeited, the term was not forfeited; for being a term attendant, it was but an accessary to the inheritance. If the converse of this case was considered, it would make it still more clear; if the inheritance had been forfeited, the term must have been forfeited also. In deciding according to the course of the common law, he thought it clear that an outstanding term could not defeat the King's process by extent. In courts of equity, it was said, a purchaser without notice was a person favoured: perhaps it might be a sufficient answer to say, that in this case they were not in a court of equity. The question was, what ought to be the decision of a court according to the common law. This question could not be decided in a court of equity; they could not sue for a decree. When a court of equity was resorted to, and this was the situation of the parties, the Court did nothing but stand neuter between such parties; and leave them to make the most of it. He thought, Now that being so, on the whole, the land was chargeable that had been CHAP. XXVII. What Deeds are void as to Creditors and Purchasers. favour of credi By the statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. § 2. made perpetual by Statutes in stat. 29 Eliz. c. 5. it is enacted that all and every tors and purfeoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain, and con chasers. What deeds are void by these statutes. Ante, c. 2. Deeds made to defraud credi tors. veyance of lands, tenements, and hereditaments, goods and chattels, or of any lease, rent, or other profit or charge out of the same, shall be deemed and taken, only as against person or persons, their heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns, whose actions, by such covinous or fraudulent devices, shall be in anywise disturbed, hindered, or defrauded, to be void and of none effect; any pretence, colour, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or other matter or thing to the contrary. 2. By the statute 27 Eliz. c. 4. § 2. made perpetual by the statute 30 Eliz. c. 18. it is enacted, "That all and every conveyance, grant, charge, lease, estate, incumbrance, and limitation of use or uses, of, in, or out of any lands, tenements, or other hereditaments whatsoever, for the intent and purpose to defraud and deceive such person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, as shall purchase the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any rent, profit, or commodity in or out of the same, shall be deemed and taken, only as against that person and persons, bodies politic or corporate, his and their heirs, successors, executors, administrators, and assigns, and against all and every other person and persons lawfully having or claiming by, from, or under them which shall so purchase, for money or other good consideration, the same lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any rent, profit, or commodity in or out of the same, to be utterly void, frustrate, and of none effect." 3. With respect to the deeds which are rendered void by these statutes, as against creditors or purchasers, they are of two sorts: 1. Deeds made with an express intent to defraud creditors, or subsequent purchasers. II. Deeds made upon good, but not valuable considerations; which are usually voluntary conveyances. 4. As to deeds made with an express intent to defraud creditors, no doubt can arise respecting their nullity, under the statute 13 Eliz., whenever such an intent can be proved, even though they should be made upon a valuable consideration. 5. In a case determined in 44 Eliz. the following cir- Twine's case, cumstances were held to be badges of fraud:-1. The 3 Rep. 80. gift was general, of all the donor's goods and chattels, real and personal, without exception of his apparel. 11. The donor continued in possession, and used them as his own; and by reason thereof, he traded and Stone Grubtrafficked with others, and defrauded and deceived Rep. 3. them. III. There was a trust between the parties. ham, 1 Roll. 6. A. conveyed his estate to the use of himself for Tarback v. Marbury, life, with power to mortgage such part as he should 2 Vern. 310. think fit, remainder to trustees, to sell and pay all his debts; but continued in possession, and kept the deed afterwards, A. became indebted by judgment and bond. It was decreed that this conveyance was fraudulent, as against the creditors by bond and judgment; who not having notice of the settlement, should not come in on an average only with the other creditors. Cailland, 7. It was determined in a modern case, that where Estwick v. a person, having several creditors, conveyed part of 5 Term R. 420. his real and personal estate to a trustee, in trust to pay half the rents and profits to the grantor, for his own use, and the residue among certain creditors named in a schedule; without any intention of fraudulently delaying his other creditors; the deed was not void, within the statute 13 Eliz.: and Lord Kenyon said it was neither illegal nor immoral to prefer one set of creditors to another. 8. No creditor can avoid a fraudulent conveyance, unless his debt is of such a nature as to affect the land; so that he must obtain a judgment for it. 9. With respect to deeds made with an express in- Or to defraud purchasers. tent to defraud purchasers, the statute 27 Eliz. was particularly necessary; for it is said by Yelverton in 37 Eliz. that at common law no fraud was remedied Cro. Eliz. 445. |