ing the settlement made on her marriage, and a new settlement is made, it will be good; though a better provision is given to the wife and children than was contained in the original settlement.

62. Sir R. Bell, on his marriage, settled certain Scott v. Bell, lands on himself for life, remainder to his wife for her 2 Lev. 70. jointure, remainder to the first and other sons of the marriage, &c. Sir R. Bell having afterwards contracted debts, and there being no issue, his wife joined him in a fine of the settled estates, and they were sold. Sir R. B. covenanted to stand seised of other estates to the same uses as those contained in the settlement. It was resolved by Lord Hale and the other Judges, that the second settlement was good, and valid against subsequent creditors; for the old settlement being destroyed, and the new one made the same day, an agreement by the husband to make the new settlement, in consideration of the wife's having joined in the fine, to destroy the old settlement, would be presumed. And this consideration should extend to all the limitations in the new settlement; although the estates comprised in the new settlement were nearly double the value of those contained in the old one.

Olive,

63. Lord Kenyon, when Master of the Rolls, held Stephens v. that where a husband, after marriage, conveyed an 2 Bro. R. 90. estate to trustees, for the separate use of his wife; the covenants by the trustees to indemnify the husband against the debts which his wife might contract after the separation, was a valuable consideration; and therefore that the settlement, though made after the debt due to the plaintiff was contracted, was good against him.

64. It was determined in the following case, that a settlement made before marriage, in consideration of such marriage, and of a marriage portion, by a person who was indebted at the time, was good against creditors.

Cadogan v.
Kennett.
Cowp. 432.

65. Lord Montfort by a settlement made before his marriage, in consideration of such marriage, conveyed a real estate and assigned over all his household goods to trustees, in strict settlement. It was proved that at the time of the settlement, it was known that Lord Montfort was in debt; but he thought the fortune of the lady he was to marry, which amounted to 10,000l., was amply sufficient to pay all the debts he owed at that time; and had no idea of disappointing any creditor. Kennett, who was a judgment creditor of Lord Montfort, at the time of his marriage, took those goods in execution; and the trustees in the settlement brought an action of trover against him for them.

Lord Mansfield.-"The question in this case is, whether the plaintiffs, who are trustees under the marriage settlement of Lord Montfort, by which the household goods in question are settled as heir looms, with the house, in strict settlement, and specifically enumerated in a schedule annexed to the settlement, so as to avoid any fraud by the addition or purchase of new, are entitled to the possession of these goods, against the defendant Kennett.

"The defendant has taken the goods in execution, and it is not disputed that he is a fair creditor; but the plaintiffs bring this action as trustees under the marriage settlement; and the question is whether they are, against the defendant, entitled to the possession of these goods, for the purpose of the trust.

"I have thought much of this case, since the trial, and in every light in which I have considered it, I have not been able to raise a doubt.

"The principles and rules of the common law, as now universally known and understood, are so strong against fraud in every shape, that the common law would have attained every end proposed by the statutes 13 Eliz. c. 5. and 27 Eliz. c. 4. The former of these statutes relates to creditors only, the latter to

purchasers. These statutes cannot receive too liberal a construction, or be too much extended in suppression of fraud.

I

"The statute 13 Eliz. c. 5. which relates to creditors, directs that no act whatsoever, done to defraud a creditor or creditors, shall be of any effect against such creditor or creditors; but then such a construction is not to be made, in support of creditors, as will make third persons sufferers. Therefore, the statute doth not militate against any transaction bona fide, and where there is no imagination of fraud; and so is the common law. But if the transaction be not bonâ fide, the circumstance of its being done for a valuable consideration will not alone take it out of the statute. have known several cases where persons have given a fair and full price for goods, and when the possession was actually changed, yet being done for the purpose of defeating creditors, the transaction has been held fraudulent, and therefore void. One case was where there had been a decree in the Court of Chancery, and a sequestration; a person, with knowledge of the decree, bought the house and goods of the defendant, and gave a full price for them. The Court said that the purchase being with a manifest view to defeat the creditor, was fraudulent; and therefore, notwithstanding a valuable consideration, void. So if a man knows of a judgment and execution, and with a view to defeat it, purchases the debtor's goods, it is void; because the purpose is iniquitous, it is assisting one man to cheat another, which the law will never allow. There are many things which are considered as circumstances of fraud. The statute says not a word of possession; but the law says, if after a sale of goods, the vendor continue in possession, and appear as the visible owner, it is evidence of fraud, because goods pass by delivery; but it is not so in the case of a lease, because that does not pass by delivery.

The statute 13 Eliz. c. 4. does not go to voluntary

Ante, § 18.

conveyances, merely as being voluntary, but to such
as are fraudulent. A fair voluntary conveyance may
be good against creditors, notwithstanding its being
voluntary. The circumstance of a man's being in-
debted, at the time of making a voluntary convey-
ance, is an argument of fraud. The question, there-
fore, in every case is, whether the act done is a bond
fide transaction, or whether it is a trick and contrivance
to defeat creditors. If there be a conveyance to a
trustee for the benefit of the debtor, it is fraudulent.
The question then is, whether this settlement is of
that sort. It is a settlement which is very common
in great families. In wills of great estates nothing is
so frequent as devises of part of the personal estate,
to go as heir looms. For instance, the devise of the
Duke of Bridgewater's library; the old Duke of New-
castle's plate; so in marriage settlements, it is very
common for libraries and plate to be thus settled; and
for chattels and leases to go along with the land. If
the husband grows extravagant, there never was an
idea that these could be afterwards overturned.
this Court were to determine that they should, the
parties would resort to Chancery. We come then to
the circumstances of the present case, which are very
strong. There is not a suggestion of any intention to
defraud, or the most distant view of disappointing
any creditor. The very object of the marriage set-
tlement was, that the lady's fortune might be applied
to discharge all Lord Montfort's debts; the amount
of this fortune was 10,000l., and was thought fully
sufficient for that purpose. Besides, this is a settle-
ment approved by a Master in Chancery. Most
clearly the Master in Chancery and the Great Seal
could have no fraudulent view: but it appears further
that the reason why the goods were inserted was, be-
cause the settlement of the real estate alone was
deemed inadequate without them; clearly, therefore,
it was no contrivance to defeat creditors, but meant as

If

a provision for the lady, if she survived, and heir looms for the son.

"An argument however is drawn from the possession, as a strong circumstance of fraud; but it does not hold in this case. It is a part of the trust that the goods shall continue in the house, and for a very obvious reason,-because the furniture of one house will not suit another; and it was the business of the trustees to see the goods were not removed. If Lord Montfort had let his house with the furniture, or if the rent could be apportioned, the creditors would be entitled to the rent; but they have no right to take the goods themselves, the possession of them belongs to the trustees, and the absolute property of them is now vested in the eldest son.

"I expected an authority, but though such settlements are frequent, no case has been cited to show they are fraudulent. How common are settlements of chattels, and money in the stocks. Can there be a doubt but they are good? yet the creditors would be entitled to the dividends during the interest of the debtor. Here there was clearly no intention to defraud, and there is a good consideration. Therefore, I am of opinion it could not be left to a jury to find the settlement fraudulent, merely because there were creditors. The goods must now be kept in the house for the benefit of the son."

consideration of

66. In the case of settlements made before marriage, How far the there has been a considerable difference of opinion marriage exrespecting the extent to which the consideration of tends. marriage ought to be carried; it being settled that a deed may be fraudulent as to one person, and good as to another. In some cases it has been held that the consideration of marriage extends, not only to the estates limited to the husband and wife, and their issue, but also to the estates limited to any branch of the husband's family.

67, Thus where a person, in consideration of the