extraordinary views of constitutional government, that the Governor was obliged to request him and his government to resign. His opinion may be summed up by saying that in his mind the Governor and the Queen were ciphers, whose only duty was to give a formal assent to the doings of himself and of his war minister, Mr. Merriman.

He refused to resign, and the Governor dismissed him. It is not within the scope of this book to criticise his conduct. They are a part of the history of the colony; but, with regard to Mr. Merriman, with whom circumstances brought me into closer contact, I may say a few words. I do not desire to impugn his private character-that is no business of mine. It is only with regard to his public acts that I have a right to make these observations. He was a man of talent and energy, but his thirst for power almost amounted to a mania. Most efficient as a Commissioner of Public Works, he was totally incompetent to conduct the Colonial War Department. His ignorance of military matters was only surpassed by the obstinacy of his determination not to learn the principles of The vote of credit which the Cape Colony gave to the Government that succeeded that of which he was a member, has marked the public judgment upon his acts; for all the skill in debate he showed in his speech in the House of Assembly, and all his ready ingenuity in casting the blame due to himself upon others, were not sufficient to save his party.

war.

When the question of the expenses of this war comes to be considered by Parliament at home, I must say that I hope that the British taxpayer, burdened as he must naturally be by all the important enterprises he has now in hand, will refuse to any considerable extent to defray the cost of a war which the late Cape Government brought upon the colony. I am sorry for the colony, and especially for the most unjustly abused settlers on the frontier and in the east; but it seems only fair that they should suffer for the misdeeds of their own cabinet.

XL.]

WHO IS TO PAY?

371

The following observations by the British Secretary of State for War sum up this subject in a few words:

Besides, there is the increased expenditure required for the additional men sent to the Cape. I hope this sum will be repaid by the Cape Colony; but I am bound to say that is a colony which is not very satisfactory in regard to these repayments, and I think it is time for the House to take into consideration this question as to the sending out of troops to a colony like the Cape, which is really able to pay a great deal. I say this more especially as we have seen from the newspapers what has occurred there, and that the attempt has been made to separate the colonial forces from the regular troops, thus giving the Commander-in-Chief all the responsibility, with none of the control, of the colonial forces. That is a state of things which it would be degrading to the country to submit to (hear, hear); and therefore I think we should only be doing our duty in withdrawing our troops from the frontier of that colony and employing them for the original purposes for which they were sent there-namely, in taking care of Simon's Bay and the neighbouring coast. Natal, of course, is in different circumstances. I do not mince matters; I think the Cape colonists ought to pay, as they are able to do, something of this expenditure (hear, hear), and I am sure that they will never organise any military force for themselves if we undertake to fight for them and pay also.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE FIGHT AT QUINTANA.

ON the 7th of February Kreli gathered his strength for one last attempt. Colonel Glyn, it will be remembered, had been left in command of the troops in the Transkei. I had, with the advice of Captain Nixon, R.E., selected Quintana as a position for a defensive post, and shelter-trenches had been constructed there. It was known that Kreli and Sandilli were close by, but it was uncertain whether they would attack our head position at Ibeka or the post at Quintana. Finally intelligence was received that the Kafirs intended to attack Quintana. Due preparation was therefore made to receive them. The troops under Captain Upcher were stationed at the now partly completed post which stands on a spur, round the foot of which runs a small stream. The infantry was formed into a square, with a gun at each corner, and the waggons collected into a laager close by. Kreli, with his Galekas, advanced from the south; and Sandilli, with the Gaikas, from the north-west. Captains Rainsforth and Carrington were ordered to advance and fire, and then make a feigned retreat. This they did, and the Kafirs approached within range. Then followed an engagement, with the cannon and rifles on our side and with muskets on the part of the Kafirs.

In about twenty minutes the Kaffirs discovered that we were too strong for them, and broke, when they were pursued