respecting credulity; seeing plainly that 'to disbelieve is to believe.' If one man believes that there is a God, and another that there is no God, whichever holds the less reasonable of these two opinions is chargeable with credulity. For, the only way to avoid credulity and incredulity—the two necessarily going together-is to listen to, and yield to, the best evidence, and to believe and disbelieve on good grounds.

And however imperfectly and indistinctly we may understand the attributes of God-of the Eternal Being who made and who governs all things-the mind of this universal frame,' the proof of the existence of a Being possessed of them is most clear and full; being, in fact, the very same evidence on which we believe in the existence of one another. How do we know that men exist? (that is, not merely Beings having a certain visible bodily form-for that is not what we chiefly imply by the word Man,—but rational agents, such as we call men). Surely not by the immediate evidence of our senses (since mind is not an object of sight), but by observing the things performed the manifest result of rational contrivance. If we land in a strange country, doubting whether it be inhabited, as soon as we find, for instance, a boat, or a house, we are as perfectly certain that a man has been there, as if he had appeared before our eyes. Yet the atheist believes that this universal frame is without a mind;' that it was the production of chance; that the particles of matter of which the world consists moved about at random, and accidentally fell into the shape it now bears. Surely the atheist has little reason to make a boast of his 'incredulity,' while believing anything so strange and absurd as that an army of infinitely small portions or seeds, unplaced, should have produced this order and beauty without a divine marshal.'

In that phenomenon in language, that both in the Greek and Latin, nouns of the neuter gender, denoting things, invariably had the nominative and the accusative the same, or rather, had an accusative only, employed as a nominative when required,— may there not be traced an indistinct consciousness of the persuasion that a mere thing is not capable of being an agent, which a person only can really be; and that the possession of power, strictly so called, by physical causes, is not conceivable, or their capacity to maintain, any more than to produce at first,

the system of the Universe ?-whose continued existence, as well as its origin, seems to depend on the continued operation of the great Creator. May there not be in this an admission that the laws of nature presuppose an agent, and are incapable of being the cause of their own observance ?

'Epicurus is charged, that he did but dissemble for his credit's sake, when he affirmed there were Blessed Natures . wherein they say he did but temporize, though in secret he thought there was no God. But certainly he is traduced.'

It is remarkable that Bacon, like many others very conversant with ancient Mythology, failed to perceive that the pagan nations were in reality atheists. They mistake altogether the real character of the pagan religions. They imagine that all men, in every age and country, had always designed to worship one Supreme God, the Maker of all things; and that the error of the Pagans consisted merely in the false accounts. they gave of him, and in their worshipping other inferior gods besides. But this is altogether a mistake. Bacon was, in this, misled by words, as so many have been,―the very delusion he so earnestly warns men against. The Pagans used the word which is translated 'God;' but in a different sense from us. For by the word God, we understand an Eternal Being, who made and who governs all things. And if any one should deny that there is any such Being, we should say that he was an atheist; even though he might believe that there do exist Beings

1 See Lessons on Religious Worship, L. ii.

2 See Pope's Universal Prayer :

Father of all, in every age,

In every clime adored;

By saint, by savage, and by sage,
Jehovah, Jove, or Lord.'

See also Rowe's Tragedy of Tamerlane, Act 3, Sc. ii.—
Look round how Providence bestows alike

Sunshine and rain to bless the fruitful year,
On different nations, all of different faiths;
And (tho' by several names and titles worshipp'd)
Heaven takes the various tribute of their praise;
Since all agree to own, at least to mean,

One best, one greatest, only Lord of all.

Thus when he viewed the many forms of Nature

He said that all was good, and bless'd the fair variety.'

superior to Man, such as the Fairies and Genii, in whom the uneducated in many parts of Europe still believe.

Accordingly, the Apostle Paul (Ephes. ii. 12) expressly calls the ancient Pagans atheists (a0eot), though he well knew that they worshipped certain supposed superior Beings which they called gods. But he says in the Epistle to the Romans, that 'they worshipped the creature more than1 (that is, instead of) the Creator.' And at Lystra (Acts xiv. 15), when the people were going to do sacrifice to him and Barnabas, mistaking them for two of their gods, he told them to turn from those vanities, to serve the living God who made heaven and earth.'

This is what is declared in the first sentence of the Book of Genesis. And so far were the ancient Pagans from believing that 'in the beginning God made the heavens and the earth,' that, on the contrary, the heavens, and the earth, and the sea, and many other natural objects, were among the very gods they adored. They did, indeed, believe such extravagant fables as Bacon alludes to, and which he declares to be less incredible than that this universal frame is without a mind;' and yet they did also believe that it is without a mind; that is, without what he evidently means by a mind'—an eternal, intelligent Maker and Ruler. Most men would understand by an atheist' one who disbelieves the existence of any such personal agent; though believing (as every one must) that there is some kind of cause for everything that takes place.

2

It may be added, that, as the pagan-worship has been generally of evil Beings, so, the religions have been usually of a corresponding character. We read of the ancient Canaanites that every abomination which the Lord hateth, have these nations done, unto their gods.' And among the Hindus, the foulest impurities, and the most revolting cruelties, are not merely permitted by their religion, but are a part of their worship. Yet one may hear it said, not unfrequently, that 'any religion is better than none.' And a celebrated writer, in an article in a Review (afterwards republished by himself), deriding the attempt to convert the Hindus, represents their religion as being (though absurd) on the whole beneficial; because it is better that a man should look for reward

1 Παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα.

2 See Lessons on Religious Worship, L. ii.

or punishment from a deity with a hundred arms, than that he should look for none at all.' But he forgot to take into account the question, 'rewarded or punished FOR WHAT?' The hundred-armed deity makes it an unpardonable sin to put into the mouth a cartridge greased with beef-fat, but a meritorious act to slaughter, with circumstances of unspeakable horror, men, women, and children, of Christians! 1

'A custom of profane scoffing in holy matters.'

In reference to the profane scoffing in holy matters,' it is to be observed that jests on sacred subjects are, when men are so disposed, the most easily produced of any; because the contrast between the dignified and a low image, exhibited in combination (in which the whole force of the ludicrous consists), is, in this case, the most striking. It is commonly said, that there is no wit in profane jests; but it would be hard to frame any definition of wit that should exclude them. It would be more correct to say (and I really believe that is what is really meant) that the practice displays no great powers of wit, because the subject matter renders it so particularly easy; and that (for the very same reason) it affords the least gratification (apart from all higher considerations) to judges of good taste; since a great part of the pleasure afforded by wit results from a perception of skill displayed, and difficulty surmounted.

I have said, 'apart from all higher considerations;' for surely, there is something very shocking to a well-disposed mind in such jests, as those, for instance, so frequently heard, in connexion with Satan and his agency. Suppose a rational Being -an inhabitant of some other planet-could visit this, our earth, and witness the gaiety of heart with which Satan, and his agents, and his victims, and the dreadful doom reserved for them, and everything relating to the subject, are, by many persons, talked of and laughed at, and resorted to as a source of amusement; what inference would he be likely to draw?

Doubtless he would, at first, conclude that no one believed anything of all this, but that we regarded the whole as a string of fables, like the heathen mythology, or the nursery tales of fairies and enchanters, which are told to amuse children. But when he came to learn that these things are not only true, but

1 See Lecture on Egypt.

are actually believed by the far greater part of those who, nevertheless, treat them as a subject of mirth, what would he think of us then? He would surely regard this as a most astounding proof of the great art, and of the great influence of that Evil Being who can have so far blinded men's understandings, and so depraved their moral sentiments, and so hardened their hearts, as to lead them, not merely to regard with careless apathy their spiritual Enemy, and the dangers they are exposed to from him, and the final ruin of his victims, but even to find amusement in a subject of such surpassing horror, and to introduce allusions to it by way of a jest! Surely, generally speaking, right-minded persons are accustomed to regard wickedness and misery as most unfit subjects for jesting. They would be shocked at any one who should find amusement in the ravages and slaughter perpetrated by a licentious soldiery in a conquered country; or in the lingering tortures inflicted by wild Indians on their prisoners; or in the burning of heretics under the Inquisition. Nay, the very Inquisitors themselves, who have thought it their duty to practise such cruelties, would have been ashamed to be thought so brutal as to regard the sufferings of their victims as a subject of mirth. And any one who should treat as a jest the crimes and cruelties of the French Revolution, would generally be deemed more depraved than even the perpetrators themselves.1

It is, however, to be observed, that we are not to be offended as if sacred matters were laughed at, when some folly that has been forced into connexion with them is exposed. When things really ridiculous are mixed up with religion, who is to be blamed? Not he who shows that they are ridiculous, and no parts of religion, but those who disfigure truth by blending falsehood with it. It is true, indeed, that to attack even error in religion with mere ridicule is no wise act; because good things may be ridiculed as well as bad. But it surely cannot be our duty to abstain from showing plainly that absurd things are absurd, merely because people cannot help smiling at them. A tree is not injured by being cleared of moss and lichens; nor truth, by having folly or sophistry torn away from around it.2

1 See Lectures on Good and Evil Angels.

See Cautions for the Times.