tanism, was bent on preserving it. "A nobleman, a gentleman, a yeoman,” said he, in often-quoted words, "that is a good interest of the Nation and a great one1." The peers who adopted the Parliament cause retained their titles even in the House of Commons. Vane and Haselrig were large landowners. And the sternest of the Republicans, Scot, Nevil, and Ludlow, confined their republicanism strictly to politics. As a consequence, though there was fearful bloodshed, there was little bloodthirstiness, and therefore always a possibility of reconciliation. That the number of executions after 1649 was so marvellously small, must by his most grudging critics be attributed mainly to the magnanimous mercy of Cromwell, of whom his bitter enemy, Clarendon, admits, that he "could bear ill language and reproaches with less disturbance and concernment, than any Person in Authority had ever done?" He struck terribly hard in the heat of battle, but oceans of blood shed on the field of battle do not leave the vengeful memories of rivulets on the scaffold. But in justice to the Parliament it must be said, that, with rare exceptions, they also were honourably distinguished by their tenderness of human life. There were no Héberts or Fouquier-Tinvilles in the English Revolution; there was no Terror. And therefore there was no period of insane frenzy, no paralysis of law and order.

1 Carlyle, iv. 23. The intense conservatism of Cromwell's nature is often overlooked. He was a true Tory squire.

2 Clarendon, III. 392.

CHAPTER II.

THE REPUBLIC.

to recon

ment.

THE position of 1649 is unique in English history. Attempts Not only was the country brought, for the first time, struct the face to face with the problem of Constitution-making, Governbut it was entirely in doubt who should undertake the solution. Three authorities, the Parliament, the congregations, and the army, in turn attempted the task, and all, apparently, failed.

The plans of two of the three rival powers are recorded with remarkable definiteness in printed documents. The plan of the Parliament, which was first tried, can be gathered from its action.

the army.

On December 10, 1648, the army had published Plan of a pamphlet entitled Foundations of Freedom; or an Agreement of the People: proposed as a Rule for Agreement future Government in the Establishment of a firm and People. lasting Peace'. The essential demands of this scheme were as follows:

1. The immediate summoning of a new "Representative" of 300 members upon a basis of household

1 Copy in T. P. xxxviii.

of the

suffrage, with an exclusion of royalists for seven years, and a selection of candidates for fourteen years from active supporters of the parliamentary cause.

2. The appointment by each "Representative" of a Council of State, to last till the meeting of the succeeding Representative. (Councillors, officers on pay, and revenue officers, were not to be eligible as candidates for a Representative.)

3. A Representative to be elected every year1. But in cases of emergency the Council of State was to have power to summon a new Representative to last not more than 40 days, and to be dissolved not less than two months before the day for the meeting of the next regular Representative.

4. The power of the Representative to be unlimited; except that it should not extend to

e.

Derogate from the Agreement, or "levell estates, destroy propriety, or make all things common."

5. No member of the Representative to be capable of election to office, except to membership of the Council of State.

This plan was afterwards, on January 20, 1649, published in an amended form, the only material alteration being that by the later scheme the number

1 Oddly enough, the length of time for which Parliaments were to sit does not appear to have been fixed by the document. 2 Copy in Camb. Lib. x. 28, 43.

of the Representative is increased to 400. Several reforms were indicated in the pamphlet as pressingly needed, but it was specially declared that the framers of the scheme would not regard these as essentials.

army's

The obvious criticism upon this plan is that it Criticism does more credit to the army's morality than to its of the wisdom. The total absence of stipulations for the plan. satisfaction of its own just claims may well excite our admiration for this magnanimous body. But as a constitution the scheme was unworkable. It would have rendered the Council of State the sovereign power, for the first Representative and its Council would have been unanimous. But with the dissolution of the Representative the popular influence over the executive would have vanished, and its successor would have had before it the embarrassing alternative of continuing in power a body of outsiders, or of breaking the continuity of government by appointing a new Council of untried men. In the intervals between the Representatives the Council would have been engaged in strengthening its interest in the country, and while by excluding Councillors from election to the Representative the scheme denied the electorate an admirable opportunity of criticizing their conduct in office, it left them free to exercise any amount of indirect influence to secure the election of their nominees. This was Compared precisely the fate of the Swedish constitution of 1720, a scheme which resembled the army's plan Constitution of in its main outlines. The post of Councillor of State 1720. became the chief object of political ambition, and the position, once gained, was used as a means of

with the

The plan

gregations.

unblushing corruption. The meetings of the Estates were simply an arena in which the rival parties, the Hats and the Caps, fought their battles for place and power.

The scheme of the congregations was embodied of the con- in a tract written by the notorious John Lilburne, entitled England's New Chains Discovered, published on February 26, 1649'. It is in avowed opposition to the plan of the army, which it censures as obscure in vital points. It demands

Criticism of the scheme.

1. Annual Parliaments, with no interval.

2.

Enforcement of the Self-denying Ordinance. 3. Dissolution of the existing Council of State. Preservation of the existing Parliament until the election of a new one.

4.

The meaning of this plan is clear. It is animated throughout by a jealousy of any individual exercise of power, but more especially of any exercise by the army officers. It is the extreme democratic ideal of government by majorities, which grudges even the existence of a Council, though it be, as the existing Council was, merely a committee of the popular assembly. It is needless to point out how utterly impossible the scheme was. For a large assembly of experienced and firmly seated men to exercise every petty duty of government without delegation of its powers would be well-nigh impracticable, but for an assembly elected only for a year, and liable to complete re-construction in a fit of popular enthusiasm, to attempt government on such terms, would be simply to invite anarchy.

1 T. P. XVII. 534.