Its bigotry. Its use of unconsti tutional methods. enforcement of a hypocritical austerity', and by its arbitrary interference with the ordinary course of law. It prided itself on being a constitutional authority, and it violated every constitutional maxim. It made use of spies and secret intelligence. It gagged press and pulpit. It banished its subjects. It imprisoned on suspicion and tampered with the administration of justice. It mortgaged the revenue, and fed its members with the spoil of the enemy. It interfered with commerce. It interfered with the government of the universities. It attempted to repress petitions. It employed the press gang. It was the apparent author of harsh taxation and of still harsher confiscation. The glory of its victory had faded from it, and it remained the embodiment of all that was tyrannical, unjust, and revolutionary. Finally it quarrelled with its only supporter, and it fell unpitied by all men, except a few doctrinaire politicians. "And no sort of people expressed any offence that they were cast out, though all save the army and sectaries, held him to be a traitor that did it2." "And so far as I could discern, when they were dissolved, there was not so much as the barking of a dog, or any general and visible repining at it," said Cromwell afterwards. It was probably of the Parliament of 1649 that Harrington was thinking when he wrote his definition of an oligarchy, "which is a single Council both debating and resolving, dividing and choosing," 1 Scobell, May 19, 1650, June 28, 1650. Whitelock, 434. 2 Life of Baxter (ed. Calamy), p. 70. 3 Carlyle, Iv. 49. And cf. Whitelock, 530-532. and likened it to the Athenian Thirty who "killed more men in eight months than the Lacedemonians had done in ten years; oppressing the people [to use Sir Walter Raleigh's words] with all base and intolerable slavery'." neither The Parliament had fallen, generally because it was wholly unfitted for the difficult work it was called upon to do, but specially because it did not rest on a sufficient foundation. A government in civilized countries succeeds either by preserving a delicate balance of interests, or by strengthening and broadening its own basis. Had the Parliament possessed the skill required to play off the rival parties It could one against the other, it might have succeeded in hold the maintaining its position. This is what Cromwell balance, afterwards did, but the quickness and secrecy required for such a fine operation are rarely to be found in a mixed assembly. And the Parliament was fatally incapable of strengthening its basis by a generous admission of support. It could not trust any one. Its appointments were all made for very basis. short periods, and in a manner which shewed their temporary character. As a consequence no one cared to prevent its fall. It was an object of interest only to its members. And when it committed the absurd mistake of quarrelling with its only supporter, its fate was sealed. It is generally assumed that its ideal was the Dutch Republic, and there is some evidence to support the hypothesis. But if it thought itself a realization of its ideal, it was deceived. The States-General were not a sovereign 1 Oceana, p. 70. nor strengthen its own body, possessing unlimited authority in all matters. They were a federal council founded on a strong local government, and with strictly limited powers. The Dutch Republic was what Milton had in his eye when he wrote his Ready and Easy Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth', but any one can see how different is his plan from that of the Parliament. In fact the House of Commons in 1653 had lost all the essential character of the old House of Commons. It was no longer a House of Communes, a body representing the local interests of the kingdom. It had become strictly a Senate, probably not at all a wise one. And, whether wise or foolish, a Senate, unsupported by a popular body or an independent executive, is a singularly weak government. Works, 11. 783. CHAPTER III. THE PROTECTORATE. THE coup d'état of April 1653 was the work of Cromwell left sole Cromwell and his Council of Officers. Its completion authority. naturally left the supreme authority in their hands. In fact Cromwell was the only constitutional as well as the chief revolutionary power. He had been appointed by Parliament Captain-General of the forces in England and Ireland, and he had therefore a considerable legal position. His proceedings were marked by great frankness. The names of his Cromwell's first Council were published in the newspapers', and, as Council. we shall see, the most important acts of government were done in his name. The Council consisted of eight officers,-Major-Generals Lambert, Harrison, Desborough, and Tomlinson, Colonels Stapley, Bennet, Sydenhamn, and Jones, and four civiliansSir Gilbert Pickering, Strickland, Cary and Moyer. The subordinate officials, and even the commissioners appointed by the Parliament, recognized its authority. The Council chose Lambert its first weekly Lambert president, and began its regular sittings on April April president. Cromwell determines to call an 291. Monk, Blake, and Fleetwood, the only three officers of the first rank not included in it, were absent from London. Monk was in Scotland, and though he returned in September, having been chosen to sit in the Little Parliament, he seems to have accepted the situation. Blake was fighting the Dutch, and appears to have soon come to that famous resolution of his, to abandon politics and fight only for England's glory. Fleetwood was in Ireland, Lord Deputy on Cromwell's appointment. Cromwell was far too wise to suppose that England could be governed by a Council of thirteen. But he was equally convinced that the country was not yet sufficiently calm for an election. He recognized that there were essential prerequisites of a parliamentary representation which did not then exist. Anxious, much too anxious, as he was to have the support of a Parliament, the facts were too strong for him as yet. The political interest and intelligence necessary to a satisfactory election were there in abundance, but the equally essential temper of compromise, the willingness to abide by the decision of the vote, to observe the rules of the game, was wanting. And parliamentary machinery is only workable on these terms. So Cromwell determined to call a Great Council, similar in idea to the pre-parliamentary Councils. Assembly of the Angevin kings, but summoned on a different principle. The Councils of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had been feudal assemblies, founded on 1 Calendar, v. 300, 301. 2 Cromwelliana, p. 130. |