sary that we should compare one philosophical doctrine with analogous ones, whether contemporary or posterior ; that we should determine with care its points of approximation and divergency; that we should investigate its place in the general system of its author, and the manner in which he appears to have been led to this doctrine; in which particular, care must be taken to distinguish between internal principles and external causes.

24. The management of the materials thus critically analyzed, demands a particular care in the choice of expression; particularly in the case of technical terms, which it is necessary to render with perspicuity; without, however, giving them too foreign an air and character, e. g. the s, habitus, of Chrysippus. For the connection of these materials, it will result from that chronological and systematic dependency of which we have spoken (§ 2), and especially from their joint relation to the final object and end of the understanding (§ 3).

Observation. The particular ends contemplated in such a work may justify a certain diversity in the manner and method of it and may help to resolve the question (according to circumstances), whether it should be accompanied or not by criticism.

25. In combining these materials into a whole it is necessary to direct an earnest and constant attention to the development of reason, and to the progressive advancement of science. With this view we should establish points of repose, consisting in divisions and subdivisions, which ought, not merely to enable the reader the better to glance over the work, but should offer a clearer view of the whole, and of the mutual relation of its parts.

Observation. The ethnographical method, which prevailed up to the time of Tiedemann, is useful for a collection of the materials proper for a general or special history of philosophy; but will not form such a history itself.

26. Assuming the above principle, it is required to

constitute distinct epochs: 1st. That a sensible progress should have taken place in the improvement of reason, and that new lights and new principles should have been introduced into philosophy itself, influencing the scientific combination of acquired knowledge. 2dly. That great external events should have had a powerful and lasting influence over philosophy d.

27. Three principal periods may be defined in the history of philosophy. First period: Comprising an account of the efforts of the understanding to acquire a knowledge of first principles, and the laws of nature, and freedom of will and action; without a clear consciousness of the method most conducive to such knowledge :Greek and Roman philosophy. Second period: Efforts of the understanding towards the same end, but under the influence of a principle superior to itself, derived from Revelation; subsequently an impulse to free itself from any imposed restraint; followed by a fresh subjugation to another arbitrary formulary; a spirit exclusively dialectic:-Philosophy of the Middle Ages. Third period: Fresh and independent exertions towards the discovery of first principles; with the purpose of arranging all human knowledge in a more complete and systematic form; an epoch remarkable for the manner. in which it has contributed to investigate, found, and define the principles of philosophy as a science.-Modern Philosophy.

KRUG, in his History of Ancient Philosophy, p. 28, admits only two divisions, that of ancient and modern philosophy. He assumes as the line of demarcation the decline of government, manners, arts, and sciences, during the first five or six centuries of the Christian era.

IV. Importance of this History.

FR. ANT. ZIMMERMANN, Dissertation on the Utility of the History of Philosophy, Heidelb. 1785, 4to.

d DAN. BOETHIUS, De præcipuis Philosophiæ epochis. Lond. 1800, 4to.

† GEO. GUST. FULLEBORN, Some general Deductions from the Hist. of Philosophy in his Collection, Fasc. iv, and, On certain Advantages resulting from the History of Ancient Philosophy, Fasc xi.

+ H. RITTER, On the Advancement of Philosophy through the History of Philosophy (a supplement to his work, On the Influence of Descartes), Leips. 1816, 8vo.

28. If philosophy may claim the highest interest, as the most elevated of human sciences, its history, for the same reason, ought to possess a great importance. Whoever is interested in philosophy ought not to be ignorant of its history, and progress.

29. The history of philosophy, besides, possesses a scientific merit peculiar to itself; it disposes the mind to a free employment of its powers, furnishes it with useful results, respecting the proper method to be followed, renders it more sensible to its aberrations, with their causes and consequences, and thereby furnishes a valuable assistance towards establishing rules for a right conduct of the understanding, in order to the attainment of new lights, and discovery of fresh paths: sources of information indispensable to philosophy, so long as it must be considered as in a progressive state, and not yet fully matured.

30. The history of philosophy has a connection with all the other sciences and their history; more especially with the history of Religion and of Mankind, because Reason is the basis of all knowledge, and embraces the ultimate end of all theoretical and all practical employment of our faculties.

31. As a department of study, such history may materially improve the understanding, all the powers of which it exercises in the research and exposition of the different systems. Nor is it less calculated to influence the habits of the mind, inasmuch as it teaches the renunciation of prejudices, modesty in forming an opinion, and tolerance of the opinions of others: its

tendency is to secure the mind from exaggerated admiration, and to moderate attachment to opinions received on the faith of authority.

Observation. On the other hand, has not the study of the history of philosophy its disadvantages? What are they, and how do they present themselves?--Indecision, and hesitation of judgment, indifference to the truth and the value of every rational research, can only be effects of a light and superficial study, where the diversity of opinions is the only thing contemplated, without regard had to their principles: where the difference of doctrines is the only thing attended to, without ascending to the points of union which they have in common. Here may be applied what Bacon says of philosophy.

V. Different ways in which the History of Philosophy may be treated.

32. The history of philosophy divides itself into universal and particular, according to the extent of the objects which it may be the author's design to embrace. The first is the statement, by facts, of the progress of philosophy, considered as Science in general, in its principal directions, and its most conspicuous results. This sort of history embraces a consideration of the principles of all philosophy; the most distinguished systems of philosophers; and the progress which they have enabled the philosophical sciences to make in their several departments. The second is employed about instances of the progress of the understanding confined within certain limits of time and place; and limited to certain particular directions, or certain special objects of philosophy.

Observation. + CARUS, Thoughts on the History of Philosophy, p. 106, defines the universal history of philosophy as, " the natural history of human reason, its pursuits and productions." But he takes this definition in so loose a sense, that he gives us, instead of historic facts, nothing but a meagre and barren abstract of general conclusions. This way of viewing the matter does not answer the true end of a history of philosophy; the second chapter of this general introduction contains the substance of it.

33. The universal history of philosophy, may be presented in an abridged or a detailed form. The principle of a good abridgment is to present a review, as complete as possible, of all the essential subjects of discussion, with a due regard to perspicuity and brevity. Truth, impartiality, and conciseness are of course requisite.

34. Agreeably to what has been laid down (§ 32) we may define many kinds of particular histories of philosophy; such as, 1st. (From a relation to certain times or places;) histories of the philosophy of particular epochs; e. g. of the ancients, of the middle ages, or of the moderns; with numerous subdivisions, embracing histories of the philosophy of this or that particular nation. 2dly. (From a relation to certain particular pursuits or special objects of philosophy;) histories of systems or schools, or literary questions, taken separately; of different philosophical methods; of the technical language of philosophy; histories of certain branches of philosophy; histories of certain philosophical notions, principles, or theories. If a particular philosophical history be limited to one single object, we have then a special history—a monography.

35. There is an intimate relation between particular and universal history. The first supplies the other with useful and various materials; but the latter, in its turn, develops general views, and affords lights for the examination and exposition of the particular details. Consequently they can only become perfect when united.

VI. Various Histories of Philosophy.

36. The history of philosophy has not been separately treated, as a distinct science, by the ancient philosophers. They have touched upon the subject only while occupied with the statement of their own doctrines, and only so far as the points they adverted to bore a relation to what