would serve to confirm the conclusion at which we have on other premises arrived. Thus, in Great Britain, damage which occurs consequentially in the case of a fire, by reason of confusion of mind, as in throwing fragile objects out of the window, or by sudden terror from alarm, as in leaving open the top of a barrel, and thus wasting the contents, is held to be loss by fire, according to the usages of insurance offices or established legal principle. Beaumont on Ins. 41. So it is in the case of a beam, cornice, or coving, removed to prevent the spread of conflagration. Ibid. We understand the same to be the rule, in the case, for instance, of a fire in the upper story of a building, and the destruction or damage of goods in a lower story, not by fire, but by the water thrown into or upon the building for the purpose of extinguishing the fire. All these are fit illustrations of the question of merely consequential damage. In the hypothesis that fire is to be regarded as causa proxima in the present case we can see but one supposable defect; namely, the suggestion that, though it be conceded that the explosion of burning gunpowder, and its effects, are the action of fire, yet this particular effect on the building is not exhibited in the form of igneous action. The cases above supposed, of the shrivelling of some masterpiece of pictorial art, the cracking or discoloration of a rich vase or gem, the bursting of a cask of wine through the expansion of its contents, these, it may be said, are distinctly cases of damage, without ignition it is true, but by the direct and specific action of heat as such; while it is denied that such is the fact in the present case of the blowing up of a dwelling-house by the ignition of gunpowder. We do not think the premises of this argument are sustained by the physical facts which occurred. If they were so, then the nearest analogy would be of damage by smoke; that is, the moisture thrown off by burning wood, and carrying with it ashes, empyreumatic oil, and other constituent parts of the wood, either in their natural condition, or transformed by the process of combustion. Now it is obvious that mere smoke, without any direct action of heat, may do great damage to many kinds of merchandise, such as delicate textile fabrics, esculent vegetables, articles of taste, and other numerous objects; and if a dwelling or a magazine take fire, and some parts of it only be consumed, but the contents of apartments, to which the actual fire does not extend, are nevertheless damaged by the smoke penetrating into and filling them, can it be doubted that the damage thus done is a loss within the ordinary conditions of a fire policy? Semble, per Gibbs, Chief Justice, arguendo, in Austin v. Drew, Holt N. P. 127. Yet, incontestably, damage by smoke is an effect, which is not in itself igneous action, though it be the result thereof; while, as we conceive, the explosion of gunpowder is igneous action. In conclusion, we think the rule, which we propose for the present case, reconciles all the conditions involved in the question; is conformable to the nature of things; and constitutes a coherent and consistent doctrine, namely, that where the effects produced are the immediate results of the action of a burning substance in contact with a building, it is immaterial whether these results manifest themselves in the form of combustion, or of explosion, or of both combined. In either case, the damage occurring is by the action of fire, and covered by the ordinary terms of a policy against loss by fire. Judgment for the plaintiff. SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND, 1883. LYONS v. PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INS. CO. (14 R. I. 110.) Location, when material. CARPENTER, J.-The plaintiff proved in the trial of this case in the Court of Common Pleas that she procured from the defendant a policy of insurance against fire, on certain articles of furniture and wearing apparel, described in the policy as " All contained in house No.-, McMillen Street, Providence, R. I.; that at the time of the fire the articles had been removed and were in a house on Power Street, where the fire occurred; that the defendants had never been informed of the removal; that she never told them of the removal, and did not think it was necessary to tell them, and that at the time she procured the policy of insurance she owned the house on McMillen Street, in which the articles insured then were. In this state of the proof the defendant requested the presiding justice to instruct the jury that the permanent removal of the goods insured from the house on McMillen Street to the house on Power Street, without the knowledge and assent of the defendant corporation, terminated the contract of insurance, and that the plaintiff could not recover. The presiding justice refused such instruction, whereupon a verdict was returned for the plaintiff, and the defendant brings this bill of exceptions. There seems to be no doubt that if this question were to be decided on authority, it must be taken as the general rule that all the material statements of the policy of insurance, including statements as to the place in which the insured property is situate, are warranties, and that such warranties must be true and must continue to be true during the whole life of the policy as the condition of any recovery thereunder. Eddy Street Iron Foundry v. Hampden Stock and Mutual Ins. Co., 1 Cliff. 300; Shertzer v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford County, 46 Md. 506; Wall v. East River Mutual Ins. Co., 3 Seld. 370; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Farrish, 73 Ill. 166. The plaintiff, however, contends that this case comes within an exception to the general rule. The argument is, that inasmuch as the insured property is household and personal effects, and inasmuch as it is matter of common knowledge that certain persons do at times change their place of abode, carrying with them such of their effects as are of the kind here insured, therefore, it is to be presumed that the defendant issued the policy in suit with the knowledge and expectation that the plaintiff might make such removal during the term of the insurance, and with the implied agreement that she might make such removal without vitiating the policy. There is, indeed, to be deduced from the cases an exception to the general rule as above stated; but we do not think that, either in reason or on authority, it goes to the extent claimed by the plaintiff. Briefly stated, the rule seems to be that the temporary removal of property, whether occasional or habitual, in pursuance of a use which is a "certain necessary consequence" arising from the character of the property, without any change in the ordinary place of keeping, will be no defense to an action on the policy. The reasoning of Lord Mansfield, although in case of marine insurance, applies exactly to this question. Pelly v. Governor & Company of the Royal Exchange Assur ance, 1 Burr. 341; Holbrook v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 25 Minn. 229. The plaintiff further contends that the general rule above laid down is not founded in justice and sound reason, and ought not to be adopted in this case. The argument is, that no person not learned in the purport of judicial decisions could know or infer that the words of the policy above quoted, which are in appearance merely descriptive, imported a warranty; and that, therefore, they should not now be so construed. We cannot agree with this argument. We must assume that the words of a written instrument conveyed to the minds of the parties to that instrument the meaning and effect which have been imputed to those words by well-established judicial determinations. Undoubtedly such determinations, if they are to remain as authority, must appear to be based on the words themselves, or on something in the nature, circumstances, or relations of the parties or of the contract. We think the interpretation of the words of this policy as a warranty is well drawn from the nature of the contract of insurance. It must be evident to any person who at all considers the nature of that contract, that the amount to be charged for premium must vary on consideration of the location of the property to be insured; and but small reflection would be necessary to perceive that the removal of the property to another place might be greatly to the disadvantage of the insurer, although such new place of deposit might not be in itself more exposed to damage from fire, since the result of such removals, if permitted to a considerable extent, might be to expose an undue proportion of his capital to the risks of a single conflagration. Exceptions sustained. 29 CHAPTER XII. CLAUSES OF THE NEW YORK STANDARD FIRE POLICY-CONTINUED. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, 1881. LANDERS v. WATERTOWN FIRE INS. CO. Other insurance, valid or invalid. ANDREWS, J.-The policy on which this action is brought, was issued on or about August 1, 1873, and contains a condition that, "if the assured shall have, or shall hereafter make, any other insurance on the property hereby insured, not indorsed hereon, or consented to by this company or its authorized agent, in writing, this policy shall be void." The answer avers a breach of this condition, and alleges that, at the time the policy was issued, the house insured was covered by a prior policy, issued to the plaintiff in the Glens Falls Insurance Company, for $800, terminating May 1, 1874, the existence of which was not communicated to, or known by the defendant. It was proved that the plaintiff, in May, 1871, procured an insurance on the house, in the Glens Falls Insurance Company, for $800, for the term of three years from May 1, 1871, not indorsed on the policy in suit, or consented to by the defendant, or its authorized agent, in writing. The policy in the Glens Falls Company contained a condition, that, if the insured premises should become vacant, and unoccupied, or the risk should be increased, by the erection or occupation of neighboring buildings, or by any means whatever, without the consent of the insurer, indorsed on the policy, it should be void. The answer made on the trial to the defense of prior insur ance was, that, after the policy in the Glens Falls Company was issued, the house remained vacant for several months |