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had argued that Job must be a sinner and his afflictions must be punishments. Whereas in truth the afflictions were not punishments, nor was he who suffered them a sinner. The friends had attempted to justify God by shutting their eyes to the facts of life and then denying their existence. Such a procedure does not add to God's glory; it takes away from it. Only Truth glorifies God. The lesson read to the friends is a lesson for hasty defenders of religions and religion in all ages and among all creeds.

In spite of all that they had said against him, Job prays for his friends as God had ordered. Only after he has thus shown his humble obedience and forgiveness does God proceed to 'restore his prosperity.' Is this reading too much into the simple narrative? I am not sure. Professor Hoffmann and other great scholars are quite confident that the order of the sentences and events shows conclusively that the author intended to express thereby this final triumphant exhibition of Job's virtue, or, as Professor Budde says, this successful proof of his purification. I hope they are right.

And it was so, that after the Lord had spoken these words unto Job, the Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, 'My wrath is kindled against thee, and against thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath. Therefore take unto you now seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt offering; and my servant Job shall pray for you: for him only will I accept: lest I inflict disgrace upon you, in that ye have not spoken of me the thing which is right, like my servant Job.' So Eliphaz the Temanite and Bildad the Shuhite and Zophar the Naamathite went, and did according as the Lord commanded them: and the Lord accepted Job.

And the Lord restored the prosperity of Job, when he prayed for his friends: and the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before. Then came there unto him all his brethren, and all his sisters, and all they that had been of his acquaintance before, and did eat bread with him in his house: and they bemoaned him, and comforted him over all the evil that the Lord had brought upon him: every man also gave him a piece of money, and every one an earring of gold.

So the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning: for he had fourteen thousand sheep, and six

thousand camels, and a thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand she asses. He had also seven sons and three daughters. And he called the name of the first, Jemima (i. e. Dove); and the name of the second, Kezia (i. e. Cassia); and the name of the third, Keren-happuch (i. e. Horn of eyepaint). And in all the land were no women found so fair as the daughters of Job: and their father gave them inheritance among their brethren.

After this lived Job an hundred and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons' sons, even four generations. Then Job died, being old and full of days.

§ 37. Human solidarity.—It is not necessary to add many words to those which have already been said by way of introduction and comment. The great Book of Job may be left to speak for itself and to win its own way to the reader's heart.

One difficulty in the story must not be pressed too far. We must all feel that whatever the just motive for Job's afflictions may have been, it was not just that these afflictions should have included the death of his servants and his sons. Why should they die and leave sorrowing wives and children in order forsooth that Job may be 'purified'? This difficulty did not probably occur to the author. Job's afflictions must be regarded for the purpose of the poem as affecting himself alone. But the very raising of the difficulty clearly shows that no individual can be either punished' or 'rewarded,' just as no individual can act either well or ill, without others being affected as well as he. They will profit through his prosperity or welldoing, they will suffer through his adversity or sin. Hence the law of tit for tat is for individuals absolutely unworkable. If the supposed 'punishment' is just for A, it is probably unjust for B, and yet by falling upon A, it will often quite inevitably fall upon B also. Nevertheless this solidarity and interconnexion of individuals with one another is a wholesome and elevating law. It certainly gives to life an added responsibility and interest. When we remember that many others, and especially others near and dear to us, will share for good or for evil in our welldoing and our sins, we are thereby given a lofty motive for struggling onward in the strait path of purity and rectitude.

§ 38. The great problem and its palliatives.—I pointed out in my introductory remarks that the problem of evil and even of suffering as a whole is as insoluble now as it was insoluble two

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thousand two hundred years ago. Some forms of suffering can be shot through with explanatory and ennobling light that makes them bearable and even good; but other forms remain pretty nearly as dark to us as they were to the author of Job. The sufferings of sentient animals, and more especially the sufferings inflicted upon them by thoughtless or cruel men, remain a hopeless puzzle. Then again, among mankind there are phenomena such as idiocy, madness and moral degradation which are beyond explanation. There are problems respecting the relation of civilized to uncivilized races; there are problems respecting the endless individuals who have lived and died without any approach to that mental and moral stature of which mankind is capable. There is not merely the strange difference which oppressed the mind of Job between the happiness of this man and that; but we ask, and ask in vain, what can be the meaning of that suffering and squalor which do not ennoble or purify, but lead in many cases almost inevitably to sin and depravity? To these and many similar problems no answer can be given; we, no less than Job, must simply trust in the infinite wisdom and righteousness of God.

On the other hand, for certain aspects of suffering there are, as I have said, ennobling alleviations. Some of these have been indicated to us in the Book of Job. We have there heard it suggested that suffering may be and often is a warning and a discipline. Elihu has argued that it is often a purification. The story of Job himself shows how it may be a stimulus for calling out some of the noblest qualities of man. This use of suffering may be expanded almost indefinitely. We all of us have seen how in times of trial and trouble people are frequently at their best. Unexpected reserves of goodness and self-sacrifice are then displayed. The brave endurance of misery at home, the ardent struggle to relieve it abroad, and the good fight against degradation and sin have provided and still provide the noblest opportunities for the exhibition of human patience, human pity and human love. A world in which there was no wrong to redress, no evil to conquer, no misery to heal, would destroy some of the best possibilities for human greatness at a blow. Where would be the opportunity for compassion, for sacrifice, for love?

Besides these alleviations' which are suggested, whether directly or indirectly, by the Book of Job, there are a few others which were not indicated by the author of that book but yet deserve our notice. With some remarks about them I will bring this long chapter to a close.

§ 39. The alleviations' of the Platonic philosophy.—The first of these other alleviations' may be summed up in the statement

that moral and mental excellence are entirely incommensurate with all outward prosperity or adversity. The one true good is righteousness; the one true evil is sin. Hence the prosperity of the wicked is no more a problem.' For if they be wicked, then they possess in their wickedness the greatest evil.

Hence too

a rigorous Stoic would say that the afflictions of the righteous constitute no problem. For if he be righteous, he possesses in himself the greatest good. If punishment is calculated to cure a man of his wickedness, the most severe misfortune that can befall a wicked man is that he should not be punished. For then, ex hypothesi, he will still continue to possess in himself the greatest evil. And if righteousness be the greatest good-unique and sui generis-then it does not materially add to the good fortune of a righteous man whether he meet with so-called 'prosperity' or so-called 'adversity,' for in either case he already possesses in himself the greatest good.

Put thus boldly these assertions are paradoxical, yet every one must see that there is contained in them some element of ennobling truth. And in fact these paradoxes have had a great influence for hope and comfort in the history of the world.

By no other author are these alleviations' of our problem more admirably expressed than by the great Greek philosopher Plato. I will here quote a few characteristic passages from a large number in many of his dialogues.

(1) Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows: you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery . . . For the goods of which the many speak are not really good first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as, for example, to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all, including even health, the greatest of evil. For in truth to have sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so great, if the bad man lives only a very short time.' (Laws, 661.)

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(2) Come, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. "Sweet Sir," we will say to him, "what think you of things esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which subjects the man to the beast." He can hardly avoid saying Yes-can he now?' 'Not if he has any regard for my opinion.'

'But, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: "Then how would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he was to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man who sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them into the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might be the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable caitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most godless and detestable ? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her husband's life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse ruin.”'

'Yes,' said Glaucon, 'far worse-I will answer for him. . .' 'From what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is profited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a worse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness ?'

'From no point of view at all.'

'What shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is undetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the brutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is liberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of justice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving gifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more honourable than the body.' (Republic, 589, 591.) (3) No one, as I may say, ever considers that which is declared to be the greatest penalty of evildoing-namely, to grow into the likeness of bad men.' (Laws, 728.)

(4) 'In my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is miserable in any case-more miserable, however, if he be not punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meet with retribution at the hands of gods and men.' (Gorgias, 472.)

(5)Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death for the gods have a care of any one whose desire