ability to think along psychological lines and to read and follow the future progress of psychology even if he carries his training no further.

In a book which is so full of factual material, we cannot hope in a review to discuss chapter and verse in any adequate way. Certain interesting points of view developed by the author, alone can be discussed. In the first place, Titchener's series of chapters on sensation is excellent-by far the best treatment we have. For, in addition to the full treatment of the ordinary laws and principles involved in sensation, we have the more recondite phenomena touched upon. Much additional material over that treated in the Outline appears. For example, we have a fuller treatment of colortheories; of the vestibular and ampullar senses; of the sensitivity of the abdominal tissue; of sensations arising from the digestive and urinary systems; and from the circulatory and respiratory system.

In discussing the attributes of sensation in general, the author tells us that there are four distinct attributes; quality, intensity, clearness and duration. The reviewer is puzzled by the attribute clearness. We all admit clearness as an attribute of complex conscious experience, but not as a fundamental aspect of the sensation-process-not in the sense in which duration and intensity are attributes. He says, "Clearness, again, is the attribute which gives the sensation its particular place in consciousness; the clearer sensation is dominant, independent, outstanding; the less clear sensation is subordinate, undistinguished in the background of consciousness. This is certainly to be admitted, but surely what Titchener is writing of here is an attention-state, in which a given "sensation" is focal, while others appear in what James calls the "fringe." In other words, clearness is one of the descriptive words which we apply to perceptual, ideational and other complex mental states. With this given as an attribute of sensation one would expect to find it taken account of somewhere along with the other attributes of sensation. But in his chapters on the special senses he speaks only of the usual attributes of each group, introducing certain changes in terminology, to be sure, as for example, he speaks now of the qualitative attributes of a color as being hue, tint and chroma. And further, in audition, he speaks of size and diffusion as an attribute of tone. It would seem in places that he means to use this attribute of clearness in the same sense as we should use clearness in describing a perceptual state; but this would carry with it the inference, it seems to me, that sensation is something more than an abstraction-something that can actually present itself. Futhermore, in order to realize the conditions for the appearance of clearness, we should have to have at least two such "sensation processes" attempting to run their courses simultaneoulsy. But this is certainly the process which we know as perception. The confusion, if I understand Titchener's statements, is similar to that found in James where sensation is at times discussed as an abstraction and at others as a process corelative with perception.

It is interesting to note that he treats of the sense-image under the general chapter heading of synæsthesia; since the image is the normal process, and synæsthesia the anomalous one, we should suppose that the traditional order of treatment were best. One would hardly begin a chapter on color vision for elementary students with a discussion of red-green blindness. His early discussion of imagery is rather disappointing. Only two pages are given over to it. One finds there few statements concerning the experimental mode of investigating the image, and very little of individual differences. This lack of emphasis of the image in an early place would seem to be a real limitation in the use of the book as a text. The average undergraduate rarely wakes up to real introspective interest in psychological problems until he has learned that he has imagery and can stand 1 His introduction of the words chroma and tint are of doubtful value, since the word saturation, now in common use, seems adequate,

off and look at it, as it were, in the absence of a perceptual world. A brief study of the image awakens him far more rapidly than does a much longer drill on sensation-processes. Later on in the book, however, the author completes the treatment of imagery under the headings, association, memory and imagination. Here the treatment is full and adequate.

Following the chapter on synæsthesia is one on the intensity of sensation, which includes a discussion of mental measurement, liminal and terminal stimuli, just noticeable differences, and Weber's law. The chapter is concise, but clear, and since these topics are valuable to the student, such a chapter is a real contribution on the pedagogical side.

Then follows the chapter on affection. He stands by his position stated in the Outline. "The writer holds that there is an elementary affective process; a feeling element. . "He holds further that there are only two kinds or qualities of affection, pleasantness and unpleasantness." Although the reviewer thinks he finds himself in another 'camp,' it gives him a sense of security to find a psychologist of Titchener's eminence who admits his position so frankly on such a vexed question as that of affection. On page 228, in a discussion of the relation between sensation and affection, he again enumerates the attributes of sensation-quality, intensity, clearness, duration. Those of affection on the other hand, are quality, intensity, duration. On page 231, he uses clearness as the distinguishing criterion between sensation and affection. "Pleasantness and unpleasantness may be intensive and lasting, but they are never clear." This is due, in short, the author says, to our inability to attend to an affection. "The lack of the attribute of clearness is sufficient in itself to differentiate affection from sensation.. Again, this attribute of clearness attaching to sensation and not to affection, and further the fact that we cannot attend to affection, make the author reject the view that affection is really a complex or fusion of the accompanying organic sensations. While there is no time to argue the question, I cannot see that Titchener makes his point against this latter view. If we should grant his premises, namely, that affection lacks clearness, and that it cannot be attended to, we should be forced to admit his point. But these are just the questions at issue.

He discusses two methods of investigating affection: that of "paired comparison," and the method of "expression." He devotes about six pages to the method of expression, but is in agreement with the majority of psychologists in denying any great usefulness to it. It seems like a useless luxury in a text-book to treat so at length of a method which has absolutely nothing to recommend it. The tridimensional theory of feeling is well and critically diccussed.

Space does not permit of even a brief review of further chapters; attention, perception, association, memory and imagination, action, emotion, and thought. The chapters on attention and on thought are striking and are both readable and teachable.

In the chapter on action it is with a shock that one again meets with his earlier expressed view that the first movements of organisms were conscious movements (agreeing thus with Wundt, Ward and Cope). According to this view, voluntary action degenerates into ideo-motor or sensory-motor action, and then into the reflex. But in animal life we find two kinds of responses, in every organism, beginning with the protozoa (as shown by the recent work of Gibbs and Smith, of Bentley and others): the one type being fixed and definite; the other diffuse, leading itself to habit-formation. Certainly I should agree with Titchener that consciousness is as old as life, but I should certainly connect consciousness with the diffuse type of response. I should say further that the very first organism started with both types of response. Surely nothing is gained, and confusion is introduced by the conception of Titchener that all movement was first a voluntary acquisition, and that only later do we begin to find fixity

in the responses of organisms. There is not a scintilla of evidence that fixed and automatic reactions do not appear with the first appearance of organisms. And there is abundant reason to say that each new species as it appears, e. g., by mutation (see the work of Tower et al.), gives evidence of a reflex repertoire and of a plastic repertoire. Titchener argues that the reason we do not see this complete plasticity (which would be called for on his theory) in the unicellular form to-day, is that the protozoa have travelled all the way from plasticity to fixity.

Looking at the book as a whole, it seems to the reviewer that in many places Titchener has adhered too rigidly to the introspective method. Surely in his treatment of meaning he could have leaned advantageously a little way toward the functional side, without giving up the guiding principles of the book. Nevertheless in this day when, if I can read the signs aright, the pendulum is swinging another way-toward a study of lifesituations as a whole, and the adequacy, permanency and different types of adjustment which such situations call forth-Titchener gives us an enviable example of a man unafraid of his own views of the problems of psychology, and of his own methods of solving them. JOHN B. WATSON The Johns Hopkins University

L'année psychologique, publ. par A. BINET, avec la collaboration de LARGUIER DES BANCELS et Dr. TH. SIMON, etc. Seizième année. Paris, Masson et Cie. 1910, pp. IX, 500.

The introduction reviews the progress of psychology in 1909, treating especially the work on thought and on pathological states, and the work in experimental pedagogy and judicial psychology. The first original contribution, by A. Binet, is entitled "The physical signs of intelligence in children." Greater or less degrees of correlation are found between intelligence and size of head, the so-called signs of degeneracy (abnormally shaped head, ears, etc.), facial expression, and hands. The habit of biting the finger-nails is found to be without significance in this respect. The correlations found hold in general only for the group, not always for the individual. The physical signs are useful for confirming, rather than for making, estimates of intellectual level. Next in order is an examination of the art of Rembrandt, by A. and A. Binet. The authors attempt to show how, by avoiding extremes of contrast and by accentuating unity of lighting, Rembrandt has succeeded in giving those impressions of distance, of unity, and of light which characterize his work. "Tachistoscopic Researches," by B. Bourdon, is an investigation of the times of choicereactions made by observers to whom colors, rectangles of different lengths and figures, have been tachistoscopically exposed. The writer measures the time of reactions involving judgments of resemblance, identification, localization, comparison, or combinations of these processes. The eight following papers, by A. Binet and Th. Simon, are concerned with defining the various mental derangements. Up to the present, the authors believe, definitions have been too inclusive and general, have failed to show the essential characteristic which marks off the disorder, and have been couched in terms only partly psychological. They themselves classify the derangements as (1) hysteria, (2) derangement with knowledge (fears, impulsions, etc.), (3) manic-depressive insanity, (4) systematized insanity (paranoia), (5) the dementias (general paresis, senile dementia, dementia præcox), and (6) subnormality. They consider the history of the conceptions of the various disorders, the theories propounded and the attempts at definition. They also review the characteristic mental states, symptoms, and attitudes of patients, both as reported by others, and as shown by the new data here published. They compare the special derangement under consideration with the other types of derangement, and finally arrive at a conclusion as to its essential character. Of hysteria, they find character

istic, separation; of derangement with knowledge, conflict; of manicdepressive insanity, domination; of paranoia, deviation; of the dementias, disorganization; of subnormality, arrest of development. The psychological significance of these terms is discussed and explained at length. and an attempt is made to bring them all into relation. "Judicial Diagnosis by the Association-method," by A. Binet, argues against unlimited confidence in the method for application in practice. The writer reviews the experiments of Henke and Eddy and of Yerkes and Berry, pointing out chances for error, and showing on both theoretical and practical grounds that the method, as used in the laboratory or classroom, is not suited to the conditions of the criminal court. The psychological literature of 1909 is reviewed by Beaunis, Binet, Bovet, Larguier des Bancels, Maigre, and Stern, under the headings of physiological psychology, sensations and movements, perceptions and illusions, associations, attention, memory and images, language, feelings, æsthetics, thought, suggestion, individual psychology, child psychology and pedagogy, animal psychology, judicial psychology, pathology, dreams, treatises and methods, and philosophical questions. W. S. FOSTER

Il sentimento giuridico. GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO. Seconda Edizione. Roma: Fratelli Bocca, 1908. pp. 26.

Professor del Vecchio, of the University of Sassari, who has previously published several articles on kindred topics,-L'etica evoluzionista (1903), Diritto e personalità umana nella storia del pensiero (1904),-discusses in the present monograph the "feeling (or sense) of justice" in man, its origin and development. From the time of Aristotle down this "sense of justice'' has been attributed to man, but the philosophers have disputed much as to its primary or derived character (these arguments the author briefly summarizes). According to Professor del Vecchio, "the origin and nature of the sense of justice is essentially a problem of the metaphysical order" (p. 12). This, however, does not prejudice in any way the analysis of the psychic datum and its proper functions. The "sense of justice'' is thus "primary and normal datum of the ethical conscience, an element or an aspect of it; and its nature is affective and, at the same time, ideological." A fundamental and distinctive characteristic of the "sense of justice" is its independence of all exterior sanction,-that is just, which is right independent of all positive historical sanction. Thus justice and law differ. No prescription of law can destroy this original faculty of conscience to oppose itself, as supreme principle, to the authority of constituted law (p. 23), this, Hobbes to the contrary notwithstanding. The philosophy of law is rooted in the "juridical vocation of conscience." The ''sense of justice" is "the anthropological exigence of law, its primary indication, and the psychic expression of its human necessity."

ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN

Os

Sulla Craniologia degli Herero. DOTT. SERGIO SERGI. Roma, 1908. pp. 10. (Estr. dal Boll. d. R. Accad. Med. di Roma, Anno XXXIV, Fasc. I). Contributo allo Studio del Lobo frontale et parietale nelle Razze umane. servazioni sul Cervello degli Herero. Pel DOTT. SERGIO SERGI. Roma: Fratelli Pallotta, 1908. p. 107, 1 pl.

In the first of these studies Professor S. Sergi gives the results of his examination (description, measurements) of 6 male crania of the Herero (a Bantu people of Damara Land, German Southwest Africa), now in the collection of the Anatomical Institute, Berlin. The skull-capacities range from 1,315 to 1,590 ccm. (4 are 1,500 or over); the cephalic indices from 67.5 to 72.9 (4 below 71). The Herero have a skull-capacity approaching that of the Kaffirs of the S. E. coast,-it is a curious fact that the Bantu peoples of the S. W. and S. E. coasts have a cranial capacity greater than that of those of Central Africa and the region of the upper Congo. The cephalic index of the Herero ranks them among the more dolichocephalic

Bantu. Previous to this paper, but two Herero skulls have been studied (one by Fritsch in 1872, the other by Virchow in 1895).

In his monograph on the brain of the Herero Professor Sergi treats in detail of 14 young adult brains (male 11, female 3) in the Anatomical Institute of the University of Berlin, with special reference to the frontal and parietal lobes. A few of these brains had been previously investigated in a general way by Waldeyer in 1906. Anatomical description and measurements are exhaustive: fissure of Sylvius, fissure of Rolando and the relative development of the frontal lobe, sulci of lateral surface of the frontal lobe, sulci of the orbital surface, fronto-parietal median sulci, sulci of the cranial surface of the parietal lobe, etc. Comparisons are made with similar data for other races, and the 8 figures in the accompanying plate demonstrate well the anatomical facts, by reference to the text-descriptions. The weights of the fresh brains range from 1,146 to 1,470 gr. (the 3 female are all below 1,200; 6 of the male below 1,300 and 2 above 1,400),-the Herero are said to average 1,800 mm. in stature, with head relatively small as compared with the body. Intellectually the Herero are inferior to the Hottentots, whose skeleton and musculature are of a finer structure (their average height is 1,700 mm.). Both Herero and Hottentots belong to the Bantu division of the Negro Race. Some of the facts brought out show how dangerous it is to generalize, e. g., for "all Negroes," as Parker does with respect to the direction of the Silvan fissure. In the method of termination of this fissure the Herero show 17 simple and 11 bifurcate, a proportion close to that of the Polish brains studied by Weinberg (Javanese, Swedish, Lett and Esthonian brains show a large majority the other way). The development of the upper and lower frontal lobe is more variable in males; and in both males and females more variable on the right than on the left. The absolute development of all the frontal lobe is greater in males than in females. The fissure of Rolando is more irregular on the right in male brains, on the left in female. In male brains left rami, in female right rami predominate. As has been shown for the Hylobates, the facts indicate, according to Professor Sergi, the existence in the human frontal lobes of two distinct zones, an upper and a lower, which follow different laws of development. Of these "the upper left has in female brains reached its proportional development with respect to the other parts of the brain, while in male brains has still a considerable evolution to undergo" (p. 40). In the greater frequency of the separation of the inferior frontal sulcus from the precentral and the less frequency of a close anastomosis between them, the Herero brains differ from those of all other races so far examined. In the Herero the upper and lower frontal sulcus shows more divisions than in the European. With respect to the varieties of disposition of the retrocentral sulcus the Herero brains "reveal neither a condition of ontogenetric arrest, nor a phylogenetic record" (p. 83). While not venturing to draw any dogmatic general conclusion from the facts recorded, the author feels authorized to make this statement (p. 103): "The more rational analytical method for the determination of the variability of the cerebral sulci is still in its infancy waiting for the aid of microscopic research; and at present it can be asserted that we do not know a single morphological characteristic of the cerebral sulcature, which belongs exclusively to a given human race. But the frequency of determinate variations indicates sometimes the tendency toward oscillations and divergences, which, with certain limits, seem to be proper to a given human group; but more noteworthy still is the tendency toward the persistence of certain morphological characteristics of the cerebral sulcature in relation to sex independently of all ethnic differences."

A complete analytic study of all the Herero brains here considered will be found in Professor Sergi's more extensive monograph Cerebra Hererica to appear in "Ergebnisse einer zoologischen Forschungsreise in Südafrika mit Unterstützung der Kgl. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin von Dr. Leonhard Schultze." Alexander F. ChambeRLAIN