nearly brought to perfection, and is so glorious to his reign, will not be ruined by a single indiscretion of ours. And, certainly, the whole edifice sinks to the ground immediately, if you refuse on that account to give us any further assistance. It is not possible for any one to be more sensible than I am, of what I and every American owe to the king, for the many and great benefits and favours he has bestowed upon us. All my letters to America are proofs of this, all tending to make the same impressions on the minds of my countrymen, that I felt in my own. And I believe that no prince was ever more beloved and respected by his own subjects, than the king is by the people of the United States. The English, I just now learn, flatter themselves they have already divided us. I hope this little misunderstanding will, therefore, be kept a perfect secret, and that they will find themselves totally mistaken."

This direct deviation from positive instructions, this apparent ingratitude and perfidy to a faithful and valuable ally, is susceptible of a full and ready explanation. Early in '82, it was foreseen that England was not the only country, that would present obstacles to a peace, safe and satisfactory to the United States. America, now independent, found herself compelled to resist Spain, claiming territory on the one hand, and France seeking an exclusive possession of the fisheries on the other. She had succeeded to the rights, the advantageous position, and a portion of the commerce of the mother country in the new world; and undoubtedly France and Spain were well aware, that the United States would become dangerous neighbours on the land, and troublesome competitors on the ocean. The American colonies had always been so, even while their trade was subject to the control and prohibition of Great Britain. But France and Spain did not anticipate, that America would either claim, or be able to maintain all the former rights of the colonies. They entered into the negotiation of '82 with the intention and expectation of extorting from England, to the injury of the United States, some portion of her territory, and a part of one of

her most valuable privileges. Both those countries had a heavy balance to settle with Great Britain in the new world; and they remembered, with bitterness and mortification, the provisions of the two treaties of Utrecht and Paris.

Spain was the first court that advanced pretensions incompatible with the just and undoubted boundaries of the United States. At the time of Mr. Jay's negotiation in that country, in '80, the Spanish minister, Count d'Aranda, intimated an intention, on the part of his government, of excluding America from territory to the westward of the Alleghany. The pretension was in every way ill-founded; but Spain was a powerful nation, governed by a Bourbon, in close alliance with France, firmly united to that country by a family compact, and an uncommon identity of views and policy. They had been engaged in the general war with England, and were engaged in the general negotiation at Paris. The ministers of the two Bourbon princes acted upon all occasions in exact concert, and would mutually contribute either to depress England, or to abridge the new and unconfirmed powers and rights of the United States. In truth, to consult France concerning boundaries, was indirectly obtaining the approbation of Spain; and the commissioners had every reason to suppose that latter country would never consent to the western frontier, marked out in the preliminary articles. The apprehension of meeting with obstacles in securing this most valuable, nay, indispensable boundary, acted as a powerful inducement not only to hasten the progress of the preliminaries, but as a very justifiable pretence for withholding the knowledge of them from the court of France. These considerations rendered it inexpedient to communicate, at any period of the negotiation, the separate article on the conditional boundaries of West Florida. The boundaries America sought, were the legitimate boundaries of her country; at least, it ill became Spain to contest them. No other country in Europe, but England, could possibly claim a right to dictate to the United States on the western quarter; for England, in her original capacity,

actually owned as far as the Mississippi. The negotiation had taken at this time a very unexpected turn. America and England became parties to oppose the aspiring spirit of the house of Bourbon. Circumstances produced a sudden coalition between two nations, engaged for seven years in cruel warfare, and which had ended in the final discomfiture of one of them. It was for the benefit of both to conclude a peace as speedily as possible, England to lessen the number of her enemies, and America to prevent her former allies from despoiling her of those rights, her recent enemy had consented to resign.

On the side of France, America had much more to fear. She was disposed to curtail her fishing rights and privileges, to maintain Spain in her pretentions respecting boundaries, and to aid England in exacting a compensation for the loyalists. A letter written by M. de Marbois, secretary of the French legation, from Philadelphia, dated March 13th, '82, intercepted and decyphered at the time, if it did not give the first intimation of similar designs in the French court, strengthened, at least, the suspicions before entertained. M. de Marbois advised M. de Vergennes to cause it to be intimated to the American ministers, "his surprise that the Newfoundland fisheries have been included in the additional instructions. That the United States set forth pretensions therein, without paying regard to the king's (French) rights, and without considering the impossibility they are under of making conquests, and of keeping what belongs to Great Britain.* It will be better to have it declared at an early period to the Americans, that their pretensions to the fisheries of the great Bank are not founded, and that his majesty does not mean support them." These extracts, taken in connexion with the obvious policy of the French court, could leave few doubts

* Mr. Ralph Izzard, of South Carolina, suggested to Mr. Adams, in April '78, that France had formed a design to deprive America of the fisheries.

concerning its designs. The commissioners had received very precise and positive instructions, on no account to surrender the fisheries.* The importance of this branch of com

* This remark requires an explanation. In the instructions to conclude a treaty of peace, an equal common right to the fisheries," was not made an ultimatum. But on the subject of a "treaty of commerce," the following directions were given to the commissioners :~~ "In order that you may be the better able to act with propriety on this occasion, it is necessary for you to know, that we have determined, 1st. That the common right of fishing shall in no case be given up. 2d. That it is essential to the welfare of all these United States, that the inhabitants thereof at the expiration of the war, should continue to enjoy the free and undisturbed exercise of their common right to fish on the banks of Newfoundland, and the other fishing banks and seas of North America, preserving inviolate the treaties between France and the said states. 3d. That application shall be made to his most Christian Majesty to agree to some article or articles for the better securing to these states a share in the said fisheries. 4th. That if, after a treaty of peace with Great Britain, she shall molest the citizens or inhabitants of any of the United States, in taking fish on the banks and places hereinafter described, such molestation, being in our opinion a direct violation and breach of the peace, shall be a common cause of the said states, and the force of the Union be exerted to obtain redress for the parties injured; and 5th. That our faith be pledged to the several states, that without their unanimous consent, no treaty of commerce shall be entered into, nor any trade or commerce carried on with Great Britain, without the explicit stipulation hereinafter mentioned. You are, therefore, not to consent to any treaty of commerce with Great Britain, without an explicit stipulation on her part, not to molest or disturb the inhabitants of the United States of America in taking fish on the banks of Newfoundland, and other fisheries in the American seas, any where, excepting within the distance of three leagues of the shores of the territories remaining to Great Britain at the close of the war, if a nearer distance cannot be obtained by negotiation. And in the negotiation, you are to exert your most strenuous endeavours to obtain a nearer distance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and particularly along the shores of Nova Scotia, as to which latter we are desirous that even the shores may be occasionally used for the purpose of carrying on the fisheries, by the inhabitants of these states." The parties in Congress on the fisheries, appear to

merce was well known to them. They saw it was in jeopardy, and they believed it to be more for the interest of the country to adhere to this portion of their instructions, than to disobey those that related to the communication of the preliminaries.*

The French minister was also disposed to unite with England in insisting upon a compensation to the loyalists. France did not join in the war for the sake of supporting the cause of liberty; nor could the French government regard the principles of the American revolution with kindness or confidence. It was natural France should feel a greater sympathy for monarchical governments, and individuals that maintained monarchical principles. When she assisted America, it is not at all likely she looked to the kind of government that would be established; but it is most likely she would have preferred the establishment of any other than a republican one; at any rate, there appears to be no inconsistency in supposing that France might be desirous that the United States should succeed against England, and at the same time, think it extremely just that a compensation should be given to that portion of the people who had been faithful to their king. The preliminaries signed with England contained nothing unfavourable to France. England ceded to the United States nothing that either France or Spain could under any reasonable pretence claim. And it was made a condition of the preliminaries that the definitive treaty should not be concluded till peace was made between England and France. The commissioners may have been guilty of a neglect of

have been equally divided; at least, the struggle was very long. One party could not obtain a majority to induce Congress to give them up, nor the other to make them an ultimatum of peace.

* Congress directed the commissioners to communicate every step to the French minister, " ultimately to govern themselves by the advice and instruction of the French court." This arrangement actually made M. de Vergennes minister plenipotentiary for the United States. It committed their independence and interests to his control.