PART III.-THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Constitution of House of Representatives. 24. The House of Representatives 108 shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth104, and the number of such members shall be, as nearly as practicable105, twice the number of the senators 106. The number of members chosen in the several States shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people107, and shall, until the Parliament otherwise provides 108 be determined, whenever necessary100, in the following manner : (i.) A quota shall be ascertained110 by dividing the number of the people of the Commonwealth, as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, by twice the number of the senators: (ii) The number of members to be chosen in each State shall be determined by dividing the 111 number of the people of the State, as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, by the quota; and if on such division there is a remainder greater than one-half of the quotal, one more member shall be chosen in the State. But notwithstanding anything in this section, five members at least 113 shall be chosen in each Original State. UNITED STATES.-The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative.-Id. Art. I, sec. 2, sub-sec. 3; and see Amendment xiv. CANADA. The House of Commons shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, consist of one hundred and eighty-one members, of whom eighty-two shall be elected for Ontario, sixtyfive for Quebec, nineteen for Nova Scotia, and fifteen for New Brunswick.-B.N.A. Act, 1867, sec. 37. On the completion of the census in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one, and 2.) There shall be assigned to each of the other Provinces such a number of members (3.) In the computation of the number of members for a Province a fractional part not (4.) On any such readjustment the number of members for a Province shall not be SWITZERLAND.-The National Council is composed of representatives of the Swiss people, HISTORICAL NOTE.-Chapter I. of the Commonwealth Bill of 1891 contained the following clauses : 24. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every three years by the people of the several States, according to their respective numbers; and until the Parliament of the Commonwealth otherwise provides, each State shall have one Representative for every 30,000 of its people. "Provided that in the case of any of the existing colonies of New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, and the province of South Australia, until the number of the people is such as to entitle the State to four Representatives, it shall have four Representatives." 27. "When upon the apportionment of Representatives it is found that after dividing the number of the people of a State by the number in respect of which a State is entitled to one Representative there remains a surplus greater than one-half of such number, the State shall have an additional Representative. 29. "A fresh apportionment of Representatives to the States shall be made after each census of the people of the Commonwealth, which shall be taken at intervals not longer than ten years. But a fresh apportionment shall not take effect until the then next general election." In Committee, the question of apportionment was shortly discussed. (Conv. Deb., Syd., 1891, pp. 612-3, 639.) At the Adelaide session, 1897, the Bill as introduced provided for a quota based on a "two to one ratio" of the Houses, the clause being as follows: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the several States, according to their respective numbers; as nearly as practicable there shall be two members of the House of Representatives for every one member of the Senate. "Until the Parliament otherwise provides, each State shall have one member for each quota of its people. The quota shall, whenever necessary, be ascertained by dividing the population of the Commonwealth as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth by twice the number of the members of the senate; and the number of members to which each State is entitled shall be determined by dividing the population of the State, as shown by the latest statistics of the Commonwealth, by the quota. But each of the existing colonies of New South Wales, New Zealand, Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, and the province of South Australia, shall be entitled to five Representatives at the least." 66 The "apportionment" clause of the Bill of 1891 was also introduced verbatim. On the motion to go into Committee, the new provision was explained by Mr. Barton. (Conv. Deb., Adel., pp. 435-7.) In Committee, it was explained again by Mr. O'Connor. Sir Geo. Turner objected to the clause, both as being too rigidly mechanical, and as checking the due increase of representatives with the increase in population. Mr. Glynn approved of it, as the alternative of a fixed quota would soon lead to so large a House that the provision for a minimum representation of the smaller States would become valueless. Mr. Higgins argued that there was no possible connection between the numbers of the two Houses, and opposed the scheme because it seemed to be leading up to a proposal for a joint sitting. Mr. Reid approved of it for the same reason, and also because it would tend to prevent an inordinate growth of the size of the House. Mr. Isaacs' objection was that the States where the growth of population was least would suffer a decrease in their representation. Mr. O'Connor pointed out that the numbers of the House of Representatives might be increased at any time by increasing the number of senators for each State. Sir John Downer supported the clause as preventing the effacement of the Senate by an undue expansion of the House of Representatives. Mr. Deakin thought the ratio excellent to begin with, but thought that the clause might prove unduly rigid, and suggested that the words "Until the Parliament otherwise provides" should be placed at the beginning. Sir Geo. Turner accordingly moved to insert those words before the words "as nearly as practicable," but this was negatived by 26 votes to 9. Mr. Solomon then proposed that representation in the House of Representatives should be upon a sliding scale, instead of according to popula tion ; but this was not taken seriously and was negatived without division. Mr. Reid proposed to reduce the minimum from "five" to "four," but subsequently withdrew the amendment. (Conv. Deb., Adel., pp. 683-715.) At a later stage the clause was verbally amended. (Id. p. 1191.) At the Sydney session, a suggestion by the Legislative Assemblies of New South Wales and Victoria, to omit the "two to one ratio," and insert a provision that, until the Parliament otherwise provides, each State shall have one representative for every 30,000 of its people, was negatived, after considerable debate, by 26 votes to 17. A verbal correction was made. (Conv. Deb., Syd. [1897], pp. 420-53.) At the Melbourne session, before the first report, the clause was verbally amended. After the first report, an amendment was carried, on Mr. O'Connor's motion, by which the words "chosen by the people of the Commonwealth" were substituted for "chosen by the people of the several States;" and the quota and re-apportionment provisions were recast into a separate clause, 24A, but in substantially their present form. Sir George Turner then proposed again to omit the "two to one ratio," and substitute a provision that until the Parliament otherwise provides, each State shall have one Representative for every 50,000 of its people. This was negatived, after debate, by 25 votes to 10. The re-apportionment clause was then struck out, being provided for in the quota clause. (Conv. Deb., Melb., pp. 1827-38.) After the fourth report, the two clauses (24 and 24A) were condensed into one, with verbal alterations. § 103. "The House of Representatives." As the Senate is the legislative organ representing the States, so the House of Representatives is the legislative organ representing the nation. This appears from the exact words of the Constitution. The Senate is composed of an equal number of senators "for each State,” directly chosen by the people of the State (sec. 7). The House of Representatives is composed of members directly "chosen by the people of the Com. monwealth," and the number of members chosen in the several States is required to be in proportion to the respective numbers of the people. In one chamber the States are equally represented. In the other chamber the people are proportionately represented. The Senate represents the States as political units. The House represents the people as individual units. In declaring that the House of Representatives is chosen by the "people of the Commonwealth," the Constitution follows the precedent of Switzerland, which declares that the National Council represents "the Swiss people;" whereas the House of Representatives in the United States is "chosen by the people of the several States "a phrase which does not so clearly express its national element. In our review of the meaning of the phrase," Federal Commonwealth" (Note, § 27 supra), we have seen that the Commonwealth is a community created on the model of a national State with a federal structure;-National in uniting the people, Federal in uniting the States, and, for certain purposes, maintaining the autonomy and individuality of each State, and assigning to each State a share in the dual system of government. It is hardly necessary once more to emphasize the principle that the Commonwealth as a political State should not be confused with the Federal Government. The Federal Government, consisting of three divisions-the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary is charged with the duty of exercising certain defined powers and functions, assigned to it by the Commonwealth in and through the Constitution. The Federal Government is only one part of the dual system of government by which the people are ruled; the other parts of the dual system are the State Governments, charged with the duty of exercising the residuary powers and functions of government, reserved to them by the Commonwealth in and through the Constitution. The House of Representatives is one of the two Chambers of the legislative organization of the Federal Government. It gives particular force and expression to what may be described as the national principle of the Commonwealth. In that great assembly the national principle will find full scope and representation. Its operation and tendency will be in the direction of the unification and consolidation of the people of the Commonwealth into one integrated whole, irrespective of State boundaries. In its constitution it represents "the people of the Commonwealth," as distinguished from "the people of the States." The natural bent and inclination of its policy will, therefore, be to regard its constituents as one united people; one in community of rights and interests; one in their title to the equal protection of the law; one in the claim to fair and beneficent treatment; one in destiny. On the other hand, the Senate, as well as the High Court, will tend to check any unconstitutional encroachments on the reserved realm of provincial autonomy. If in both chambers the people had been represented in proportion to their numbers, the practical result would have been the establishment of a unified government, in which the States, as political entities, would have been absolutely unrecognized, and would have been soon reduced to a subordinate position. The Convention was entrusted with no such duty, under the Enabling Acts by which it was called into existence; its mandate was to draft a Constitution in which the federal, as well as the national elements, were recognized. The House of Representatives is not only the national chamber; it is the democratic chamber; it is the grand depository and embodiment of the liberal principles of government which pervade the entire constitutional fabric. It is the chamber in which the progressive instincts and popular aspirations of the people will be most likely to make themselves first felt. This characteristic is not founded on any difference in the franchise of the House of Representatives from that of the Senate, because both franchises are the same; it arises from the fact that, by the Constitution, it is expressly intended to be such a House, and that by its organization and functions it is best fitted to be the arena in which national progress will find room for development. The House of Representatives of the Commonwealth bears a close resemblance to the House of Representatives of the United States of America, and occupies the corresponding position in the scheme of government. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMPARED.-We will now proceed to draw attention to certain features in the constitution and functions of the House of Representatives in which it resembles the House of Commons, and certain other features and functions in which it differs from that historic Chamber :: Resemblance. The members of both the House of Commons and the House of Representatives are elected by the people, voting in national constituencies, and consequently they represent national elements. They both exercise supreme supervision over the finances. This is secured by the exclusive power of originating proposed laws appropriating public money and imposing taxation, and in the inability of the House of Lords in all cases, and of the Senate with certain exceptions, to amend such proposed laws. This control of the finances will tend to carry with it the predominant control of the Executive, and hence the system known as Responsible Government. Differences.-The House of Commons is the National Chamber of the Empire, exercising in conjunction with the other branches of the Imperial Parliament unlimited, unchallengeable sovereign authority. The House of Representatives is the National Chamber of the Commonwealth, which is merely an outlying portion of the Empire, the Parliament of which is endowed only with restricted and enumerated powers, delegated to it through the Federal Constitution by the parent Parliament. The House of Representatives is a division of a subordinate law-making body, whose mandates are of the nature of by-laws, valid whilst within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution, but invalid if they go beyond the limits of such jurisdiction. (Dicey, Law of the Const. p. 137.) Another important point of difference between the House of Commons and the House of Representatives has been pointed out by Dr. Burgess. Since the reform and revolution of 1832, the House of Commons, he says, has occupied a double position in the English system. It is one branch of the legislature, and it is also the sovereign organization of the State. In the former capacity it has no more power than the House of Lords; in the latter it is supreme over the King and the Lords. The great result of the reform movement of 1832 is, he contends, that the people became politically organized in the House of Commons. In other words, the organization of the State, within the Constitution, is now the same as was its organization back of the Constitution. The House of Commons, newly elected after a dissolution on a particular principle, or measure, is the political people organized through their representatives in that House. There is thus, he says, a correspondence between the revolutionary organization of the State, back of the Constitution, and its continuing organization within the Constitution. (Burgess, Political Sci. vol. i. p. 95; vol. ii. pp. 38-9.) At the beginning of its constitutional career, the House of Representatives will not occupy such a commanding relative position as the House of Commons, for the reason previously stated that its powers are limited by the Constitution. Its capacity to initiate reforms with a view to the acquisition of further power is, however, with the exceptions mentioned in sec. 128, unbounded. It cannot, like the House of Commons, through ministers having its confidence, intimidate or coerce the Upper House and the Crown to agree to a proposed amendment of the Constitution; the ultimate determination of all such constitu tional proposals is vested in a body of persons, defined by the Constitution as a majority of the electors of the Commonwealth voting, including majorities in more than half the States. Such majorities constitute the quasi-sovereign organization of the Commonwealth, considered as a political State. But the House of Representatives can originate such constitutional proposals, and cause them to be submitted to the Federal electors for their decision; and it cannot be doubted that the influence of the members of such a strong chamber in securing an affirmative vote in favour of its proposals will be very powerful indeed. § 104. "The People of the Commonwealth." Attention may be drawn to the above expression "the people of the Commonwealth " for the purpose of contrasting of it with another, to be found in section 7, "the people of the States." (Note, § 68, supra.) A federation is, as we have already seen, defined by some authorities as a State having a dual system of government; (see "Federal," § 27, supra); hence, in a federation it is said there is a dual citizenship. It follows that each natural-born or naturalized subject of the Queen permanently residing within the limits of the Commonwealth is entitled to be considered as a citizen of the Commonwealth, and, at the same time, a citizen of the State in which he resides. Every such person thus owes a double duty, and can claim a double right; a duty to the Commonwealth, as the great community embracing all the people, to yield obedience to its laws, to assist in its defence, and to take part in promoting its interests; a right to claim from the Commonwealth the equal protection of its laws, and to share in the honour and advantage of its rule. Such a person also owes a duty to the particular State in which he resides, regarding that State as a part of the Commonwealth, guaranteed to possess and enjoy certain privileges and immunities; a duty to obey its laws, and at the same time to assist in |