His intentions. vessel, saw, basket, hatchet, and spade. For it was necessary that he should be a woodman and navvy as well as a soldier. No Roman army ever halted for the night without constructing a camp fortified with trench, rampart, and palisade. The column was of course accompanied by a host of non-combatants. Each legion required at least five or six hundred horses and mules to carry its baggage;1 and the drivers, with the slaves who waited on the officers, formed a numerous body. Among the camp-followers were also dealers who supplied the wants of the army, and were ready to buy booty of every kind.2 What line of policy Caesar intended to follow, he has not told us. While he was going forth to govern a distant land, the government of his own was lapsing into anarchy. He must have seen that the Germans would soon overrun Gaul unless the Romans prevented them; and that the presence of the Germans would revive the peril from which Marius had delivered Rome. We may feel sure that he had determined to teach them, by a rough lesson if necessary, that they must advance no further into Gaul, nor venture to cross the boundaries of the Province or of Italy. Confident in himself and supported by his fellow triumvirs, Pompey and Crassus, 1 Caesar nowhere mentions that he used wagons or carts during the Gallic war, though it seems certain that he must have used some, to carry artillery and material for mantlets and the like. See Bell. Afr., 9, § 1; B. C., iii, 42, § 4. The larger pieces of artillery were of course not conveyed entire, but in parts, which were put together as occasion required. 2 There is no evidence that there was any medical staff in Caesar's army or under the republic at all, though it may perhaps be inferred from a passage in Suetonius (Divus Augustus, 11) that wealthy officers were attended by their private surgeons. Moreover, as Long remarks (D. R. R., ii, 19), 'it is hardly possible that there were no surgeons or physicians in a Roman army [in Caesar's time] when they were employed to look after the health and wounds of gladiators.' he was prepared to act without waiting for senatorial sanction; and it can hardly be doubted that he dreamed of adding a new province to the empire, which should round off its frontier and add to its wealth. But whether he had definitely resolved to attempt a conquest of such magnitude, or merely intended to follow, as they appeared, the indications of fortune, it would be idle to conjecture. The greatest statesman is, in a sense, an opportunist. When Caesar should find himself in Gaul, he would know best how to shape his ends. AN EPITOME OF THE PRECEDING COMMENTARIES THIS book cannot be properly understood without some knowledge of the principal events described in the preceding Commentaries. In 58 B. C. the Helvetii (see p. xlviii) emigrated from Switzerland, accompanied by their allies, the Boi, Latobrigi, Rauraci, and Tulingi, with the intention of establishing themselves in the country of the Santoni in Western Gaul. Caesar, who already had four legions, resolved to expel them, and raised two more legions in Cisalpine Gaul. About one-fourth of the emigrants were destroyed or dispersed while they were trying to cross the Saône a little above Lyons. The rest were followed by Caesar, who ultimately defeated them near Toulon-sur-Arroux, and compelled all the survivors except the Boi, whom the Aedui, with his consent, welcomed as dependants, to return to Switzerland. A considerable number of the Gauls, influenced by the Aeduan chieftain, Dumnorix (see p. xlix), had favoured the enterprise of the Helvetii: but most of the tribal leaders were glad to be rid of such intruders; and they were so impressed by Caesar's victory that deputies from many of the central states came to congratulate him, and virtually acknowledged him as the master of Gaul. They were anxious to be quit also of the German king, Ariovistus, whose achievements have been described in the Introduction (p. xlvii); and Caesar, for his part, determined to expel him from Gaul if he could not secure guarantees for his good behaviour. After fruitless negotiations Caesar defeated him in the plain of Alsace and drove the remnant of his army across the Rhine. Thus Gaul and Rome were relieved from the presence of two formidable invaders. The other permanent results of these two campaigns were that the Aedui, who had been humbled by Ariovistus, were restored to their former position as the leading state of the Celtae (see p. xxix); that Diviciacus, Dumnorix's brother and Caesar's subservient tool, regained his former influence; and that Caesar gained possession of the fortress of Vesontio (Besançon), from which he could advance in any direction and to which, in case of need, he could retreat. Instead of withdrawing his legions into the Roman Province, Caesar quartered them for the winter in the country of the Sequani-probably in Vesontio-and thus made it evident that his purpose was nothing less than the conquest of Gaul. During the winter Caesar, who was in Northern Italy (see the second note on 1, § 1), was informed that the Belgae, fearing that he would first conquer the rest of Gaul and then conquer them, were conspiring against him. He determined to take the initiative, raised two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and reached the Belgic frontier early in the summer of 57 B. C., before the preparations of the confederates were complete. One important tribe, the Remi, who had hitherto been under the overlordship of their neighbours, the Suessiones, saw a chance of shaking off the yoke, and, instead of joining the league, placed themselves under the protection of Caesar. He first encountered the Belgic host on the river Aisne, north of which he entrenched himself. Their supplies were soon exhausted, and, after trying in vain to turn Caesar's rear, they were forced to disperse. He then mastered them in detail, the Suessiones, Bellovaci, and Ambiani surrendering one after the other. The Nervii, supported by the Atrebates and the Viromandui, resolved, however, to resist, and Caesar only defeated them after a desperate battle on the left bank of the upper Sambre, near Maubeuge. He then marched against the Atuatuci, who 56 B. C. concentrated in their principal stronghold, probably |