of reflection; whenever neither one of these elements alone is present but both together are found in an expression, this, in distinction from either instinctive or reflective, is what we may term emotive. A man, for instance, may eat and sleep like an animal, instinctively, or he may think and talk reflectively, without giving any expression to what we mean by emotion. But as soon as he thinks and talks in connection with eating and sleeping, as is the case with a caterer or an upholsterer, an hotel-keeper or a housewife; or as soon as his instincts prompt and accentuate his thinking and talking, as is the case with an actor or a good story-teller, then, as a result of instinct made thoughtful, or of thought made instinctive, he begins to manifest his emotive nature, and the character of his emotion is represented by the degree in which the one or the other of the two tendencies influencing him is in

excess.

We may arrive at this same conclusion through a different method. That which blends and balances the instinctive or physical and the reflective or mental tendencies, is the soul, holding body and mind together, influencing and influenced by both. But as the intonations result from the blending and balancing of these same tendencies as manifested in language, we may say that the intonations represent not only the emotive nature, as has been shown, but also the soul. Is it, then, the same thing to put emotion into an expression and to put soul into it? Ninety-nine persons out of every hundred will acknowledge that, according to their ordinary conceptions, it is. And our line of thought here will show that, in this case, ordinary conceptions are right. No one can give expression to his emotive nature without representing a blended result of nerve and thought, of instinct and reflection.

Nor can he give material embodiment to all the possibilities of expression that move his soul, without doing the same.'

1 It may be asked here, very naturally, where, in this classification of tendencies, is the place for the expression of the will? The answer is that there is none, and that there needs to be none. What we mean by will is simply a force in the soul, emotive in its general character, which, swayed by the influence of some overbalancing tendency, ends in action. As this force, when operating in any direction, is constant or fitful, the will is said to be strong or weak. If it impel to action mainly in an instinctive direction, to the exclusion of reflective influences, the character is what is ordinarily termed wilful, and, under differing conditions, will be reckless, sensual, cruel, or, as influenced slightly by reflective tendencies, domineering, like that of a Napoleon. If the force impel to action mainly in a reflective direction to the exclusion of instinctive influences, the character, under differing conditions, will be too coldly speculative, chimerical, or, as influenced slightly by instinctive tendencies, calculating or hypocritical, like that of a Machiavelli or a Chesterfield. In case the instinctive and reflective tendencies are very evenly matched, and therefore both act, but act alternately, the character is ill-balanced and fickle, like that of many men of genius, whose susceptibility to widely separated influences is the source of their strength, but also of their weakness. In case the instinctive and reflective tendencies both act, and act simultaneously, with the reflective ruling, as is always the case when the two act together normally, the result is both natural and rational; we say that the character is "wellbalanced,” and the one possessing it is "level-headed,”—conditions which, at their best, produce a man like Washington. Were these facts with reference to the action of the will regarded, many faults both of opinion and training would be avoided. It would be recognized, for instance, that while there is such a thing as "converting a soul," by turning the control of its energies from its instinctive to its reflective nature, there is no such a thing as "breaking a will"; that the recklessness tending to sensuality and cruelty, or the opposite trait, tending to speculation and sometimes to hypocrisy, can neither of them be corrected, except by a careful cultivation of the tendencies that naturally balance them.

The three tendencies from which, in this work, the phenomena of expression are derived, are the same in general character as those upon which were based the principles of the "Orator's Manual," published several years ago. For the terms now used in order to refer to them, especially instinctive and emotive, as well as for certain ideas necessarily associated with these, I

It may be interesting to notice now how Herbert Spencer, in his "Essay on the Origin and Function of Music," confirms the most of what has just been said with seem to be about equally indebted to my friends Professor J. W. Churchill, of the Andover Theological Seminary, and Moses True Brown, of the Boston School of Oratory. But this division of expressional tendencies into the instinctive, reflective, and emotive, besides being made to accord with the results of the practical experience of instructors of this rank, can be made to accord also with the classifications of many different systems of philosophy. To mention a few of these, and to go back first to the subtlest of the most ancient of them, Plato,-according to the careful analyses of his theories made by my esteemed colleague, Professor S. S. Orris, of Princeton College,-in the "Timæus," as also in the fourth and ninth books of the "Republic," divides the soul into the sensuous, corresponding to what is called in this work the instinctive tendency, under which he classes the desires for sensuous pleasures and indulgences, all the way from carnality to lust for money; the rational, corresponding to what is here termed the reflective tendency; and the spirited, as translators term it, under which, as appears from the "Phædrus " and the eighth and ninth books of the "Republic,' he classes the emotions of wonder, reverence, ambition, emulation, indignation, love of honor, the beautiful, power, glory, etc. In the " Timæus," again, he locates the rational nature in the head, and the spirited in the thorax near by it, so that "it may obey the reasoning principle (the reflective), and in connection with it restrain the desires" (of the instinctive tend-ency), which duty, as will be seen, is also the most important of the functions assigned in this work to the emotive nature.

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The underlying philosophy of the writers of the New Testament, too,. seems to have been very similar to that of Plato. Paul says in I Thes. v., 23: "I pray God your whole spirit (πvεõμα) and soul (wvxn) and body (6μa) be preserved blameless unto the coming of the Lord Jesus Christ." Of the three tendencies thus mentioned-for it can hardly be supposed that they are meant to indicate separate entities—the former, the veμα, is generally taken to refer to the higher rational or reflective nature. It is represented as sometimes good and sometimes evil in character (Mark i., 23), but always as that which allies man to the divine Spirit, also described frequently as the Spirit of Truth (τò пvεõμa tñs àλndeias, John xiv., 17). The latter word, 6μα, is acknowledged to refer to the body, sometimes to the fleshly body, as in the expression "body of his flesh” (¿v tô óóóμarı tñs 6apиòs) in Col. i., 22, and sometimes to the body supposed to take the place of the fleshly in the next world, as in the expression, "It is sown a natural

reference to the representative character of the intonations. He asserts that these furnish "the commentary of the emotions upon the propositions of the intellect"; then, body, it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural body and there is a spiritual body," (ówμα пvɛvμatınóv) in 1 Cor. xiii., 43, 44. These statements would make the promptings of the 6ua correspond to what is meant in this book by the instinctive tendency; for while this has been represented to be the one most nearly allied to physical vitality, it is still a tendency of mind, otherwise it could not be a factor in linguistic expression; and though, during the presence of the physical form it manifests itself through it, we can conceive, were this form absent, of its manifesting itself through the form taking the place of it.

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The reflective tendency being traced to the vɛйμα and the instinctive to the dua, or, so far as concerns the present life, to this, as embodied in the flesh (бag), which we are told, in Gal. v., 17, "lusteth against the spirit," we have left the emotive tendency. Can this be traced to what Paul terms the soul (vvxn)? In other words, can the yuxn' represent the feeling connected with conscious life, either animal or rational? As for the soul's being the seat of emotion, it can only be said that usually, but not universally, it is the soul which in the Scriptures is represented as being pleased, Mat. xii., 18; or sorrowful, Mark xiv., 34; or troubled, John xii., 27; and this either spiritually or physically, as in Luke xii., 19, “Soul (bμxn`), eat, drink, and be merry." As for the same word's representing the principle of life in both the animal and rational natures, this seems more susceptible of proof. It is explicitly stated in I. Cor. xv., 43, 44, that when one dies his body "is sown a soul-body (6ua pextrov, translated in our version "a natural body") "and is raised a spiritual body. There is a spiritual body and there is a soul-body"; but it is implied just as plainly in Matt. xvi., 25, 26, that there is a soul connected with the ave ua or the rational part of man, existing after death. Otherwise what can this mean: "For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul (τns vxѧ)?” If these passages taken together, and others like them, can be made to mean that there is a soul or an emotive tendency which, at times, can act in connection either with the reflective (rveua) or the instinctive (6μa) tendency, then the philosophical theory implied in these statements corresponds exactly with what is said of the emotive tendency of the soul in this work. Possibly, too, theologians might derive a suggestion of value from the fact that the ux is the only mental element represented in the Scriptures as in danger of being lost. The trena and

making a physical explanation, says that "the muscles that move the chest, larynx, and vocal cords, contracting like other muscles in proportion to the intensity of the the 6μa appear to be always kept, but the question seems to be asked: What would either be without the yux, the seat of those emotions, from which man derives both the pleasures of existence and the power of balancing and harmonizing the tendencies of his nature toward “rationality,” "thought," "the ideal," on the one hand; and toward "body," "embodiment," "form," on the other?

The classification of modes of expression given here, will be recognized also as resembling, with some differences, those of the system of Delsarte, as represented both by L'Abbé Delaumosne in his printed work, and by pupils of the French elecutionist in this country. Delaumosne traces expression to eccentric, concentric, and normal motion, corresponding respectively to the sensitive, intellectual, and moral states of the mind. For normal motion, or the effects of it, Moses True Brown, in his lectures before the Boston School of Oratory, substitutes the word poise, an admirable term, which I have found full of suggestions, as I have other ideas of this lecturer; and he describes the states of the mind by using the terms vital, mental, and emotional. In the present work, an attempt has been made for the first time to analyze the tendencies of expression for the purpose of showing the relation between them and the effects of poetry. But, in connection with this, will be found also the first complete classification of these tendencies, as manifested in discoursive and dramatic elocution, through the elements of duration, force, pitch, and quality. As for the theory underlying these classifications, the acceptance of which, however, is not necessary to the acceptance of the classes themselves, it differs from the others mentioned, mainly, in recognizing, as a basis for æsthetic methods of expression, only two primary forms of motion, or of mental tendencies corresponding to them; and in considering the third as the resultant of these two. In this regard, this theory is sustained by the divisions into the subjective, the objective, and the relations between them, which underlie the entire philosophic systems both of Schelling and Hegel. Herbert Spencer, moreover, in his "Principles of Pyschology," while maintaining that "no definite separation can be effected between the phenomena of mind and those of vitality in general," also tries to "find a true generalization of mental phenomena by comparing them with the lower vital phenomena." Of course, it would follow from this, that there are certain mental tendencies allied to the vital nature, and others allied to what is higher than it; the former of which, being first manifested in instinct, may very properly be termed, as in this work, in