mon root, and that mankind in the beginning was inftructed by one common master.

This matter might be in fome measure confirmed by divers ufages, customs and opinions of a civil, and others of an indifferent nature, which have generally obtained in most nations of the world, and yet have either but very little or no foundation in nature, befides ancient and univerfal practice, or tacit agreement to follow what was once begun. Of this kind, fome have taken notice of the manner of counting by decades; which though it have a manifeft convenience, making it fit to be continued and farther improved, yet it may be doubted, whether there be any thing. in nature leading directly to it, fince other ways have also been traditionally followed, though not fo univerfally: The general agreement in the ancient number and order, and, near upon, in the fame names of Letters: The compofition of Days into Weeks or Hebdomads, of which the reafon, fetch'd from the feven Planets, feems to be an invention of Idolaters, long after the thing it self was settled in practice, but the true reafon of it loft: Some circumstances relating to Marriage and Affinity, and to Funerals, and a decent interrment, and the like, which I fhall not in

fift upon. I shall but just mention one thing more of this kind, of which I think neither any account can be given from the nature of the thing, nor any inftance to contradict the univerfality of its prevailing, and that is, The respect or preference given to the Right hand above the Left, which as there can be no fatisfactory reason given for it, befides the usage of the first men, fo there being neither intereft nor convenience to induce men to change it, I make no question but it will always continue.

Now the refult of all that I have faid, under this head, of one original Inftruction, derived into the several ages and nations of men by tradition, is this, That though all tradition, by length of time and depravation of manners, be liable to great variation and corruption, yet where there appears fomething in it that has always continued in substance the fame, notwithstanding all the mixtures and additions which time and the corrupt manners of men have made to it, there we may justly suppose, that the firft foundation of it, which has fo continued, was laid in truth: And applying this to the fundamental principles of Religion, we may well conclude them to be true. And this ground both Plato

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and

and Tully, and other eminent Heathen Authors frequently infift upon. But then if fome of the things above-mentioned be compared with the first records of our Religion, which justly pretend to be the most ancient writings in the world, the argument will receive much greater strength. And it has accordingly been largely treated of to very good purpose by divers excellent Authors, and particularly by Bishop Stilling fleet in his Origines Sacra. I proceed now to mention,

II. The second way by which this univerfal belief of the first principles of Religion, and more especially of the Being of God, may in fome measure arife, and that is from the natural Frame and make of man's Mind, dif pofing him clearly to apprehend the truth and certainty of it upon the first propofing. I do not here intend to enter into the controverfy about innate Ideas, or whether our Idea of God be innate. Only I must observe, that there are fome truths fo very obvious to the Mind of man, upon his first turning his thoughts towards them, that he cannot, without violence to his own mind, refufe his affent to them. And these coming fo readily to be embraced by all men, without any previous reasonings,

reafonings, or any obfervable deductions of one conclufion from another, in the way of argument, have made fome men believe them innate. And that the notion of God is of the fame kind with those other truths, which are thus fancied by fome to be originally in the mind, we have the plain confeffion of that Sect of Philofophers, who would very willingly have argued against any Being of God at all, if they could, I mean the difciples of Epicurus; whofe argument is thus reprefented by Tully, in the perfon of Velleius, (as I formerly obferved Sermon the IV.) That fince this opinion is founded not upon any institution, or custom, or law, and yet all to a man agree in it: We must of neceffity believe that there are Gods, because we have implanted, or rather innate notions of them. And what the nature of all men agrees in muft neceffarily be true: The Existence of God must therefore be acknowledged.

I will not undertake entirely to vindicate this argument, in the manner especially as the Epicureans made use of it. All that I would infer from it, is this, That the thing was so obvious to their minds, that they could not well either avoid or deny it; and they knew not well how to account for it otherwise

k

than by fuppofing it innate. But now, though we do not fuppofe the notion of God to be innate, in this ftrict fenfe, yet if every man be naturally difpofed to receive it, as foon as it is proposed to his understanding, if it break in upon his mind as foon as he comes to the exercife of his reafon, like light to the eyes, as foon as they are open and capable of admitting it, as fome ancient authors have exprefs'd the nature of it, then it may justly be called natural to the mind of man. And that it really is fo, we have this plain evidence, that it is, in fact, more difficult for a man to divest himself wholly of this belief, and to fubdue all the apprehenfions of it, than it is to conquer any other of those common inclinations or averfions which no man fcruples to call natural.

There are two things, I know, which are by fome thought to be confiderable objections against this notion of God's Existence being fo natural or evident to the mind of man as is pretended. One is, That there are in the world fome nations of men, which have no notion of God or Religion at all. And the

other

* Οὕτω Διατεθέμθμοι τὰς ψυχὰς πρὸς αυτό, ὥασες· οἶμαι weg's To pag sa Chémovra. Julian. Orat. 7. ad Heraclium, pag. 209.