: ous man is not impressed by any thing without him that he accounteth the death of mortals, the overturning of his city, or any public calamities, no great matter: nor can the captivity of himself, or his nearest friends and relations, in the least diminish his felicity.* That he is void of all fear, trusting in himself, πιστεύσας ἑαυτῳ, that no evil shall ever touch him. It may help to let us into the pride of his character, that when Amelius invited him to assist in a sacrifice, which he intended to offer to the gods at a solemn festival, he answered, "It is for them to come to me, not for me to go to "them."+ Some learned persons have denied that humility, either as to name or thing, is to be found in the writings of the Pagans; and it must be owned, that humility is of a bad sound among the philosophers, and among the Stoics it is always taken for a vice; but the word "humble" sometimes occurs in the Pagan writers in a good sense, nor were they altogether strangers to the virtue intended by it. But if we take humility, as it implies a deep sense of our own unworthiness and insufficiency in ourselves, and of the manifold defects of our obedience and righteousness, accompanied with a true contrition of heart for our sins, and which carrieth us to acknowledge, that if God should enter into strict judgment with us we could not be justified in his sight; this humility, which is opposed to self-confidence, and self-dependence, and which causeth us to place our whole trust in the infinite grace and 'mercy of God for salvation, seems not to enter into the Pagan systems of piety and morality, especially that of the Stoics. § There is a spiritual pride and self-sufficiency run * Plotin. Ennead. I. lib. iv. cap. 7. † Ibid. cap. 14, 15. Porphyry's Life of Plotinus, prefixed to his works, p. 8. B. The same vain-glorious spirit animated the Indian Brahmins. When Apollonius asked them what they were? Iarchas, the chief of them, answered, that they thought themselves gods. § It is true, that the Stoics seemed to require, that a man, as a preparative for philosophy, should have a consciousness of his own weakness and inability: see a passage to this purpose in Epictetus, cited above, p. 139. But the design of ning through their whole scheme, scarce reconcilable to that humble frame of spirit which our Lord insists upon as a necessary ingredient in the piety and virtue of such imperfect creatures as we are in this present state. Here then is a remarkable instance of an evangelical precept relating to a temper of mind, which is represented as of great importance to our acceptance with God, and which yet is not to be found in the Pagan moralists. their philosophy, when once a man was engaged in it, was to inspire him with a confidence in his own strength, and the absolute sufficiency of his own virtue. CHAP. X. The Stoics gave excellent precepts with regard to the duties men owe to one another. Yet they carried their doctrine of apathy so far, as to be in some instances not properly consistent with a humane disposition and a charitable sympathy. They said fine things concerning forgiving injuries and bearing with other men's faults. But in several respects they carried this to an extreme, and placed it on wrong foundations, or enforced it by improper motives. This is particularly shown with regard to those two eminent philosophers, Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus. The most ancient Stoics did not allow pardoning mercy to be an ingredient in a perfect character. THE Stoics were particularly remarkable for the precepts and directions they gave with regard to the duties men owe to one another. They taught that men were born to be helpful to each other in all the offices of mutual assistance and benevolence, and that they are united by the strongest ties, as all belonging to one common city of gods and men.* Many of their precepts tended to set the obligations we are under to love and do good to one another, and to all mankind, in a strong and affecting light. Yet it must be acknowledged, that some parts of their scheme were little consistent with that humanity and mutual benevolence, which it was the design of many of their precepts to recommend. To support their vain-glorious scheme of self-sufficiency and independency, they prescribed an unnatural apathy. Their wise man was to be devoid of passions, of fear and grief, of sorrow and joy. He must not be grieved for the loss of wife, children, or friends, or for any calamity which can befall himself or them, or even for the public distresses and calamities of his country. There is a fragment of a treatise in Plutarch to show that the Stoics speak greater improbabilities than the poets: and he produces as an instance of it, their asserting, that their wise man continues fearless and invincible in the subversion of the walls of his city, and in other *Cicero de Finib. lib. iii. cap. 19. p. 258. Seneca says, in his great calamities of a public nature.* 74th epistle, that "a wise man is not afflicted at the loss of "his friends or children.-Non affligitur sapiens libero❝rum amissione aut amicorum." And in the same epistle, among the things which should not grieve nor disturb him, he reckons "the besieging of his country, the death of his "children, and the slavery of his parents.-Obsidio pa "triæ, liberorum mors, parentum servitus." Nor is this merely an extravagant rant of Seneca, who often gave into an hyperbolical way of expression. Epictetus, one of the gravest and most judicious authors among the Stoics, and who adhered very closely to the principles of their philosophy, expresseth himself to the same purpose. It is true that he says, "I am not to be undisturbed by passion, in the "same sense that a statue is, but as one who preserves the "natural and acquired relations, as a private person, as a 66 son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen." And he allows a man "to preserve an affectionate temper, as becomes a noble spirited and happy person."§ It is usual with the Stoics to throw in every now and then some hints, which seem to correct and soften their extravagant maxims, and reduce them within the bounds of nature and humanity. But that great philosopher himself has several passages which it is very difficult for the most candid censurer to interpret in a favourable sense. Having mentioned those which he says are called "great events," viz. wars and seditions, the de struction of numbers of men, and the overthrow of cities, he asks, "What great matter is there in all this? Nothing. "What great matter is there in the death of numerous oxen, "numbers of sheep, or in the burning or pulling down num"bers of nests of storks or swallows? He affirms, that 66 ✦ Plutarch, Opera, tom. II. p. 1057, 1058. edit. Xyl. Francof. 1620. + Sen. epist. 74. Plotinus expresses himself to the same purpose. See above, p. 141. Epict. Dissert. book iii. chap. 2. sect. 3. § Ibid. chap. 24. sect. 4. 1 food bis 2 "these cases are perfectly alike: the bodies of men are de "stroyed, and the bodies of sheep and oxen: the houses of "men are burnt, and the houses or nests of storks. What "is there great and dreadful in all this?" He owns afterwards, that there is a difference between a man and a stork: but not in body.* To talk with such indifference of great public calamities, is more a proof of the want of humanity than of a real greatness of mind; and is not well consistent with a true benevolence towards mankind, or with a generous patriotism or love to our country, which yet the Stoics made great profession of. To the same purpose he expresses himself in another remarkable passage, the design of which is to signify, that the slaughter of armies is an indifferent matter; and that it ought not to have given Agamemnon concern, if the Greeks were routed and slain by the Trojans.+ The note of the ingenious translator before mentioned upon this passage appears to me to be a just one. "As the Stoical "doctrine all along forbids pity and compassion, it will have "even a king look upon the welfare of his people, and a ge"neral upon the preservation of his soldiers, as a matter "quite foreign and indifferent to him."‡ With respect to crosses and adverse events of a private nature, Epictetus every where treats them as if they were nothing to us at all. I shall mention one passage of this kind among many others that might be produced. "A son is "dead (saith he). What hath happened? A son is dead. "Nothing more? Nothing.A ship is lost. What hath "happened? A ship is lost.He is carried to prison. "What hath happened? He is carried to prison.—That "he is unhappy, is an addition that every one makes of his ❝ own." Epictetus adds, that "Jupiter hath made these things to be no evils: and that he has opened you the "door whenever they do not suit you: Go out, man, and do "not complain."§ The reader cannot but observe, that 66 |