which they endeavoured to support and improve. They both of them seem to have believed in general that there would be a difference made in a future state between good and bad men, and that the one should be in a greater or less degree rewarded, and the other punished. But they greatly weakened and obscured that doctrine, by mixing with it that of the transmigration of souls and other fictions, as well as by sometimes talking very waveringly and uncertainly about it. And it is remarkable, that though there were several sects of philosophers, which professed to derive their original from Socrates, scarce any of them taught the immortality of the soul as the doctrine of their schools, except Plato and his disciples, and many even of these treated it as absolutely uncertain. That great man, Cicero, was a mighty admirer of Plato, and may be justly reckoned among the most eminent of those philosophers, who argued for the immortality of the soul. For though, according to the custom of the new academy, of which sect he was, he disputed pro and con upon every subject, yet it appears, from several passages in his works, that his judgment strongly inclined him to that opinion,* as at least more probable than the contrary. He does not merely mention this in some single detached passages, but he argues the matter at large, in one of the finest pieces antiquity has left us. He argues from the nature of the soul, and its uncompounded and indivisible essence, of a quite different kind from these common elementary natures; from its wonderful powers and faculties, which have something divine in them, * The learned Dr. Middleton, in his Life of Cicero, observes, that "he held "the immortality of the soul, and its separate existence after death, in a state of "happiness or misery." But in the latter part of this assertion, that ingenious writer seems to be mistaken: for Cicero did not hold that any separate soul was in a state of misery after death. His whole argument, in the first book of his Tusculan Disputations, turns upon this point, that either the soul shall be extinguished at death; or, if it survives, which is what he endeavours to prove, it shall be happy. Future misery and torments he entirely rejects. But this shall be considered more particularly afterwards. 66 re; and incompatible with sluggish matter; from the ardent thirst after immortality, natural to the human mind, but which is most conspicuous in the most exalted souls; and from some other topics, which the reader may see in the first book of his Tusculan Disputations. He speaks to the same purpose in his Cato Major, and in his Somnium Scipionis, and on several other occasions. It is true, there are two or three passages in his epistles to his 'friends, in which he seems to express himself in a different strain. In an epistle to Torquatus, he comforts himself with this thought: "Whilst I shall “exist, I shall not be troubled at any thing, since I have no "fault to charge myself with; and, if I shall not exist, I shall "be deprived of all sense.-Nec enim dum ero, angar ulla cùm omni caream culpâ ; et si non ero, sensu omni "carebo."* In another epistle to the same Torquatus, he tells him, that, "if he was called to depart out of this life, he "should not be snatched from that republic he would desire "to continue in, especially since he should then be without "any sense.-Deinde quod mihi ad consolandum commune "tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab eâ republi"câ avellar quâ carendum esse doleam, præsertim cum id "sine ullo sensu sit futurum." And, in an epistle to L. Mescinius, he says, death ought to be despised, or even wished for, because it will be void of all sense. "Propterea quòd "nullum sensum esset habitura." And, in an epistle to Toranius, he gives it as a reason for bearing with moderation whatsoever should happen, that death is the end of all things. "Una ratio videtur, quicquid evenerit ferre mode"ratè, præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum."‡ But I think it would be carrying it too far to conclude, from a few short hints thrown out occasionally in letters written in haste, that Cicero's real opinion was, that the soul died with the body, when he had so often given his reasons for the contrary, in books where he professedly treats on that subject. * Cic. Epist. lib. vi. epist. 3. ↑ Ibid. lib. vi. epist. 4. Ibid. lib. vi. epist. 21. The persons he wrote to were probably Epicureans; such was Torquatus; and the same may be supposed of the rest, it being then the fashionable opinion among the gentlemen of Rome. The letters were written in a political way, relating to the then melancholy state of the republic, and it would have been absurd, whatever Cicero's private opinion might have been, to have offered consolations to Epicureans, drawn from the hope of a happy existence after death. But though I think it cannot be absolutely concluded from those passages that Cicero was, in his real sentiments, against the immortality of the soul, yet it is not probable that he would have expressed himself in the manner he has done in those letters, if he had been uniform and steady in the belief of it. It may well be granted, that he had doubts in his mind concerning it, and therefore, in the uncertainty he was under, expressed himself differently at different times. There is another philosopher of great note, whom I shall here mention, though he lived after Christianity had made some progress in the world, and therefore does not come so properly under our present consideration; and that is Plutarch, who was extremely well versed in the writings of the philosophers who had flourished before his time. He not only represents the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and a future state as a matter of ancient tradition, and which was countenanced by the laws, from which we ought not to recede ;* but he produces reasons for it, especially in his excellent treatise, De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ. He gives it as the sum of his discourse, that the Deity exerciseth an inspection over us, and distributeth to us according to our deserts: and that from thence it follows, that souls are altogether incorruptible and immortal, or that they remain for some time after death. He adds, that it would suppose God to be meanly and idly employed in concerning himself so much about us, if we had nothing divine within, or which resembleth his own perfections, nothing that is stable and firm, but were * Plut. Consol. ad Uxorem, Oper. tom. II. p. 612. edit. Xyl. only like leaves which, as Homer speaks, wither and fall in a short time. And he represents it as absurd to imagine that souls are made only to blossom and flourish for a day, in a tender and delicate body of flesh, and then to be immediately extinguished on every slight occasion.* He argues further, that if the deceased vanish like clouds or smoke, the oracle of Apollo would never have appointed propitiations to be made for the dead, and honours to be rendered to them. And he declares that the same reasons confirm the providence of God, and the permanency of the human soul; and that the one of these cannot be maintained, if the other be denied. Εἰς ἔτι λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν ἅμα καὶ τὴν διαμονὴν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς βεβαιῶν, καὶ θάτερον οὐκ ἔςιν ἀπολιπεῖν ἀναιρέντα θάτε gov. He adds, "Now then, since the soul existeth after "death, it is probable that it partakes both of rewards and "punishments: for in this life the soul is in a state of conflict, "like a wrestler, but when it has finished its conflict, it re❝ceives suitable retributions." Yet, in what follows, he intimates that these things were not commonly believed. And, indeed, he himself is far from being consistent and uniform on this head; for though the passages now produced from him have a fair aspect, there are other passages in his works which have a contrary appearance, as I shall have occasion to show. * Plut. Consol. ad Uxorem, Oper. tom. II. p. 560. B. C. + Plut. de Sera Numinis Vind. Oper. tom. II. p. 560. D. F. edit. Xyl. CHAP. V. Those of the ancient philosophers who argued for the immortality of the soul, placed it on wrong foundations, and mixed things with it which weakened the belief of it. Some of them asserted that the soul is immortal, as being a portion of the Divine Essence. They universally held the pre-existence of the hu man soul, and laid the chief stress upon this for proving its immortality. Their doctrine of the transmigration of souls was a great corruption of the true doctrine of a future state. Those who said the highest things of future happiness, considered it as confined chiefly to persons of eminence, or to those of philosophical minds, and afforded small encouragement to the common kind of pious and virtuous persons. The rewards of Elysium were but temporary, and of a short duration and even the happiness of those privileged souls, who were supposed to be admitted not merely into Elysium, but into heaven, was not everlasting, in the strict and proper sense. The gospel doctrine of eternal life to all good and righteous persons, was not taught by the ancient Pagan philosophers. HAVING endeavoured to lay before the reader the sentiments of those Pagan philosophers, who are generally looked upon as having been the ablest assertors of the immortality of the soul and a future state, I shall now make some observations, by which it may appear how far their instructions were to be depended upon, and were of real service to mankind, with regard to this important article. And the first thing I would observe is, that the best of those philosophers placed it on wrong foundations, or mixed things with it which tended greatly to weaken the belief or defeat the influence of it. This appears partly from what has been already observed. Some of them, as the Pythagoreans, argued for the soul's immortality, because the divine nature from which it is taken, and of which it is a detached part or portion immersed in a human body, is immortal. This certainly was putting it on a false foundation, and building it upon a notion absurd in itself, and which, if pursued to its just consequences, tends to the subversion of all religion, by confounding God and the creature, and making them both of the same nature and essence. A celebrated author has argued, from the notion which the Pythagoreans and many |