Railway, The Chester and Holyhead Page Sampson, Roberts v. ... 174 Sayers v. Bachelor, Segrave v. Barber, ... (E. C.) 74 Shea, Reg v. ... . 190 244 139 109 295 Railway, Waterford and Limerick, McNamara v. Sheehan v. Prendergast, Shirley v. Shirley, Alston & Others, 127 125 9 Railway, Midland Great Western, Kilroy v. Simpson, Kelly v. Smith v. O'Connell, 54 303 Railway, East Kent Company, in the matter of the, John Sadleir and Others, Smith v. Gurley, Smith v. Hornsby, Smith v. Codrington, Railway, Waterford and Limerick Company, Leamy v. 82 Soden, Chambers v. Spong v. Kenealy, 357 Railway Company, Chester and Holyhead, Byrne v. St. Giorgie v. Young, Stephens and Gibson v. Doyle, 511 ... 140 Stewart, McKeown v. Railway, Dublin and Belfast Junc Stack, Jackson v. 126 295 tion, Wm. Evans, a Bankrupt, Boylan and Murphy Assignee of v ... ... Sufferin and Another v. Dunbar, ... 309 188 19 Raymond, Gunn v. ... 76 103 Reade v. Adams, ... 449 254 Reg. v. Mary Shea, Thompson, Wilson v. ... 244 122 Trench, in re Estate, Tyrrell, McDougall v. Works in Ireland, Tyrrell, White v. ... 126, 258, 262 138 Reid, McClorey v. 140 Reid v. Mangan, 111 Vaughan, in re, 152 132 ... Reeves, Davis v. Reynolds, Doolan v. ... ... 240 Richardson v. Corcoran, 305 Waterson, Fulton v. 364 Whitcroft, Gurly v. 153 White v. Tyrrell, ex ... 98 Roberts v. Sampson 10 Roche, Doyle v. 78 Rochford, a Married Woman, ... ... 330 parte, Rogers v. Curtin 317 Rorke, Errington v. ... 334 Ross, Faris v. ... 360 Rush v. Monks, ... Ryan and Sullivan, Payne v. Powerscourt, Lord Viscount v. Acton and Others, Prosser v. Cuddy, Prendergast, Sheehan v. ... Purcell, Cronin v. ... 50 Williams, Langley v. 469 Williamson v. Gallagher, 430 Wilson v. Thompson, 109, 137 Wilson, Hornsby v. 303 Woodrooffe, Abbott v. ... 330 ... 50 ... ... 187 ... 204 ... ... ... ... ... 50 295 155 27 82 Young, St. Giorgie v. Sadleir John and Others, in the matter of the East Kent Railway Company, Reports of Cases DECIDED IN ALL THE COURTS OF EQUITY AND COMMON LAW IN IRELAND. vent; that by an indenture bearing date the 25th COURT OF CHANCERY.-1855. of October, 1848, and made between David Simp[Reported by JOHN BLACKHAM, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.] son of the first part, Thomas Sparks, solicitor, of FENELON V. BAKER AND WIFE.-June 8 and 9. the second part, and John T. Crooke of the third part, after reciting that David Simpson was inPolicy of insurance-Chose in action-Notice-debted to John Taylor Crooke in the sum of £300, Insolvency-Assignment-Order and disposition of insolvent-3 & 4 Vic. c. 107, s. 65. A., assigned a policy of assurance for £500, to B to secure a debt of £82; B., gave notice of the assignment to the company, and subsequently, at the request of A, deposited the policy with C, to secure a debt due by A to C. No notice of the deposit was given to the company. A., subsequently became insolvent, and, after the insolvency, assigned by deed the policy of assurance to C, to which assignment B was a party. Notice of this assignment was given to the company by C. It appeared that at the time of taking this assignment, Chad express notice of the insolvency. On petition by the Assignee in the insolvency matter against the personal representatives of C, and against the Assurance Company, claiming to be declared entitled to the sum secured by the policy. Held, that the notice served by B of the assignment to himself took the policy out of the order and disposition of the insolvent. and that said David Simpson had agreed to assign said policy as a security for the said debt; the said David Simpson, with the assent of the said Thomas Sparks, thereby assigned the said policy to the said John Taylor Crooke, his executors, administrators, and assigns, subject to the condition for re-assignment contained in said deed, on payment of said sum of £300. It appeared that this deed was approved of on the part of John Taylor Crooke by Mr. Fitzgerald as his solicitor, and it further appeared that shortly previous to the time of his approving of the above deed, he (Fitzgerald) being a creditor of David Simpson, had notice of the vesting order. It also appeared that this policy was not mentioned in the schedule filed in the Insolvent Court by David Simpson, nor was the debt due to John Taylor Crooke set forth thereon; but on the 16th day of February, 1849, the name of John Taylor Crooke, and at the same time the policy of assurance, and the assignment of it to John Taylor Crooke, were inserted by amendment in the schedule in the Insolvent Court. It also appeared that Simpson THIS was a suit instituted by the plaintiff as credi- died in September, 1852, when the policy became tors' assignee of David Simpson, an insolvent, pray- payable, and that John Taylor Crooke died about ing to be declared entitled to a sum of £500, secured the 1st day of December, 1851, intestate, and admiby a certain policy of assurance effected on the life nistration of his goods and effects was granted to of said David Simpson. It appeared that on the the respondent Mary Baker. It further appeared 3rd day of June, 1845, David Simpson effected an that by an indenture of assignment dated the 9th of insurance on his own life, with the National Assur-June, 1847, David Simpson assigned the same policy ance Company of Ireland for the sum of £500; of assurance, with another policy for the same that David Simpson was arrested for debt on the amount, to Thomas Sparks, to secure a sum of £82, 5th day of August, 1848, and on the 19th day of and that some time in the month of July, 1848, August in the same year filed his petition for re- Sparks, at the request of David Simpson, handed lief in the Court for the Relief of Insolvent Debt-the policy of insurance now in question to a person ors in Ireland; that on the same day a vesting order was made on said petition, thereby vesting the estate, interest, and effects of the insolvent in the provisional assignee that on the 31st day of October, 1851, the petitioner was appointed creditor's assignee of the estate and effects of said insol named Fitzhugh, who was the agent in Ireland of Crooke, for the purpose of securing moneys alleged to have been then due. It also appeared that Sparks had given notice to the assurance company of the assignment to himself, and that notice had also been given to the assurance company of the assignment to Crooke in October, 1818. No notice of the vesting order or proceedings in the Insolvent Court had been given to the Assurance Company by the provisional assignee or by the petitioner; but Crooke was proved to have had express notice of the arrest and insolvency of Simpson prior to the date of the assignment to him in October, 1848, but subsequent to the time of alleged deposit. The petition also prayed that an account should be taken of what was due to the respondents Baker and wife, should the court think them entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the policy of insurance. The assurance company having, at the hearing, undertaken to bring the amount of the policy into court, less their costs as respondents, the petition was dismissed as against them with costs. Christian, Q. C. with him Blackham, for the petitioner. It has been decided that the statutable notice of insolvency is not such a notice as will give priority to an assignee in insolvency over a subsequent assignee of a chose in action who has given express notice. Atkinson's trusts, (2 De Gex M N. & Gor. 140; s.c. 16 Jur. 1003); Battersby v. Rochfort, (8 Ir. Eq. Rep. 284; s. c. Dom. Proc. 14 Jur. 229.) The policy of these decisions is questionable, but they do not affect this case, as, at the time of the execution of the assignment, Crooke had express notice of the insolvency of Simpson, through Fitzhugh, and constructively through his solicitor, who approved of the deed. Majoribanks v. Hovenden, (1 Drury, 11; s. c. 6 Ir. Eq. Rep. 238); Frail v. Ellis, (16 Beav. 350); Richards v. Brereton, (5 Ir. Jur. 336.) The previous deposit will not give the respondents a title, the policy remaining in the order and disposition of the insolvent.-3 & 4 Vic. c. 107, s. 65*; Williams v. Thorp, (2 Sim. 257); West v. Reid, (2 Hare, 249); Thompson v. Spiers, (13 Sim. 469); Ex parte Wilkinson, (13 Sim. 675.) It cannot be said that the notice by Sparks of the assignment to himself can take the case out of the order and disposition of the insolvent. Sparks was merely a trustee for him, and as such delivered the policy at the request of the insolvent to the agent of Crooke, to whom the insolvent had actually disposed of it for value. Fitzgerald, Q. C. with him H. Ormsby for the respondents, Baker and wife.-Notice to the Assurance Company of the assignment by Simpson to Sparks has been pleaded. After the delivery of that notice no title to the policy could ever return to Simpson without notice of the assignment. The assignment to Sparks was complete as against Simpson, and the policy therefore was not in the order and disposition of the insolvent. Ex parte Barnett, (1 De Gex Bank. Cases, 194.) Martley, Q. C. and John Orpen for the National Assurance Company. Blackham replied. The LORD CHANCELLOR, in giving judgment, said, that the petitioner was entitled to priority so far as the deed of October, 1848, was in question; but,— there being nothing in the case to prove that there was mala fides in the transaction at the time of the deposit of the policy with Fitzhugh for Crooke,— the only question to be considered was, whether the policy was in the order and disposition of the insolvent; it was clear that if Sparks were now the claimant in this court he would be entitled to recover against Simpson as well as against the petitioner. The policy was not, at the time of the deposit, in the actual manual power and disposition of the insolvent, and in consequence of the notice served by Sparks on the Insurance Company no creditor making an inquiry could be misled, as to some disposition of the policy having been made. I will consider the matter and mention it in the morning. June 9.-The LORD CHANCELLOR said that he remained of the same opinion which he had expressed the previous day. The decision in Ex parte Barnett seemed to him to bear strongly on this case and to show that the notice by Sparks was sufficient to put persons on their guard, and that it took the policy out of the disposition of the insolvent. Let there be no costs up to and including this hearing, the petitioner to have an account if he desire it. WARING v. WARING.-Nov. 8 and 9. Several judgments to secure one debt-Judgment of revivor against one conusee— -Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, s. 40. Several judgments were entered against A and B on their joint and several bond, with warrant of attorney to enter a judgment or judgments; the judgment against A was revived, and judgment of revivor had thereon within twenty years before the bringing of this suit. Nothing had been done to save the judgment against B from the bar of the Statute of Limitations, excepting the revivor of the judgment against the co-contractor. Held, on bill filed to have this judgment paid out of the real estate of B, that the debt was barred ; inasmuch as the judgment of revivor against his cocontractor did not create in any person a present right to receive the amount due on the unrevived judgment. Kirkwood v. Lloyd, (12 Ir. Eq. Rep.585,) approved of. 3 & 4 Vic. cap. 107, sec. 65, enacts "that if any such prisoner shall, at the time of his arrest or other commenceTHIS case came before the court on exceptions to ment of his imprisonment by the consent and permission of the Master's report. The facts upon which this the true owners thereof have in his possession, order, or question arose were as follows:-On the 27th Jadisposition, any goods or chattels whereof such prisoner nuary, 1818, Samuel Waring, the elder, and Samuel was reputed owner, &c. the same shall be deemed to be the Waring, the younger, executed their joint and seveproperty of such prisoner, so as to become vested in the pro-ral bond to William Kenny, with warrant of attorvisional assignee of said court by the order made in pursuance of this Act." The statute upon which the cases above cited were decided is substantially the same as the Irish statute. ney to enter a judgment or judgments thereon in the penal sum of £400, to secure the sum of £200, and several judgments had been obtained thereon |