DISCOURSE LX.

PART I.

2 CORINTHIANS iv. 18.

For the things which are feen are temporal; but the things which are not feen are eternal.

THE motives to obedience in all religions are thus far the fame, that they depend upon the belief of another invifible world, and the different state and condition of good and bad men in it for though it has been maintained, with fome fhew of reason, that virtue is its own reward, and that man's chief happiness would consist in the practice of it, though there were no other rewards annexed to it, yet this, fuppofing it to be true, is by much too narrow a foundation to build religion on; for this could influence only men of abftracted thought and reason, who are in comparison a very inconfiderable part of mankind. The generality of the world live by fenfe, and take their measures of happiness not from the remote conclufions of reason, but from their prefent feeling, from the impreffions which are made on them by the things which they deal and converfe with every day; and the rewards and punishments of religion are calculated to this

sense and feeling, excepting only that they are distant, and not capable of being made the prefent objects of fense: for the punishments denounced in the Gospel against the unrighteoufnefs of men, are fuch as nature recoils at; fuch as, according to the fenfe the world has of mifery and pain, are infupportable evils; and the only reafon why they operate so weakly upon the minds and affections of men is this, that they are not feen. The fame may be faid of the rewards of the Gofpel: they contain the very happiness that nature thirfts after, which is life and pleasure for evermore: but neither can our eyes fee thefe rewards; and therefore they fall fhort of raifing men to that degree of virtue and holinefs which in reafon they ought to do.

The advantage which the things of this world. have in this refpect is not to be diffembled: they play and sport before the fenfes: the man of thought and reflection cannot but fee them; and the man of no thought fees nothing else. This advantage the Apoftle feems to acknowledge, by ftyling the things of this world the things which are feen, and the rewards of the Gofpel the things which are not feen. In this lies all the force and ftrength of worldly temptations and pleasures; for, were the enjoyments of this world and the next equally remote, there could be no competition between them. This most men would find to be true, would they but obferve a little what paffes in themselves and others. There are few but would be well content that that part of their life which is paft and gone had been spent in virtue and fobriety: they find no comfort in recol

lecting the lewd frolics and extravagant vices of their youth; yet ftill they cannot refift the present temptations of pleasure, but go on adding to the account of their folly and fin. And is not this a decifion of the question? Does not reason determine against the world and the enjoyments of it? And is it not mere fenfe that turns the fcale of the world's fide? If it be true now, that you do wifely in preferring the pleasures of life to the hopes and expectations of futurity, it will then be true fifty years hence, that you did wifely in choosing this world, and renouncing the pretences to heaven; for truth is always the fame: and yet, if you live to see that time, it is great odds but that you judge otherwife, and condemn yourself of folly and indifcretion for all your past vices and finful pleasures. This is a judgment which we see men make every day: they purfue the things that are prefent; but no fooner are they gone, but they condemn themselves, wishing they could recall the time, that they might apply it to better purposes. And whence arifes this difference, but from hence; that in one cafe reason is excluded by fense and the prevailing power of prefent objects, but in the other cafe is free and unreftrained, and judges from the truth and nature of things? Throw out fenfe and appetite, and let the cause be heard at the bar of reafon; and the queftion then, between the things which are feen, and the things which are not feen, will be reduced to these two points:

First, Whether we can have fuch fufficient evidence for the existence of the things not feen, as may make them capable of being brought into competi

tion with the things which are seen, the existence of which, in this queftion, is out of doubt?

Secondly, Whether the value of the things that are not feen be fo great, that we ought in prudence to forego the enjoyment of the things which are prefent with us?

There are feveral ways by which we fatisfy ourfelves of the existence of things without us: the chief of these is sense. This evidence extends to this world and the things of it: and though fome have taken great pains to doubt of the existence of things which they faw and felt, yet it may well be queftioned, whether ever any man did indeed arrive to that perfection of fcepticism? This evidence may be styled the strongest in one refpect, as it moft univerfally affects mankind, who much more readily receive the reports of fenfe, than the conclufions of reafon. Not but that the evidence of reason in fome cafes is altogether as ftrong and conclufive for the existence of things not feen, as fenfe is for the things which are feen. This is manifeft in the proof of a first Cause; where, from the visible works of the creation, the being of an eternal Caufe is proved to a demonstration, from fuch principles as fense and reason cannot refift. So likewife, from the testimony and credit of others, we arrive to a certainty of the existence of some things which they have seen, but we have not; which evidence is properly the evidence of faith, and may be fo circumftantiated as to admit no doubt or fcruple. Upon this evidence men act in their deareft concerns in this world; and are as well fatisfied of the existence of fome perfons and places which they never faw, as