xiv

ΑΛΛΩΣ.

Τὸν ἐπὶ Κολωνῷ Οἰδίποδα ἐπὶ τετελευτηκότι τῷ πάππῳ Σοφοκλῆς ὁ ὑϊδοῦς ἐδίδαξεν, υἱὸς ὢν ̓Αρίστωνος, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Μίκωνος*, ὃς τέταρτος ἀπὸ Καλλίου, ἐφ' οὗ φασιν οἱ πλείους τὸν Σοφοκλέα τελευτῆσαι. σαφὲς δὲ τοῦτ ̓ ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν ὁ μὲν ̓Αριστοφάνης ἐν τοῖς Βατράχοις ἐπὶ Καλλίου ἀνάγει τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ὑπὲρ γῆς, ὁ δὲ Φρύνιχος ἐν Μούσαις, ἃς συγκαθῆκε τοῖς Βατράχοις, φησὶν οὕτως·

μάκαρ Σοφοκλέης, ὃς πολὺν χρόνον βιοὺς
ἀπέθανεν, εὐδαίμων ἀνὴρ καὶ δεξιός,

πολλὰς ποιήσας καὶ καλὰς τραγῳδίας,

καλῶς ἐτελεύτησ ̓, οὐδὲν ὑπομείνας κακόν.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἱππίῳ Κολωνῷ τὸ δράμα κεῖται. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἕτερος Κολωνὸς ἀγοραῖος πρὸς τῷ Εὐρυσακείῳ, πρὸς ᾧ οἱ μισθαρνοῦντες προεστή κεισαν, ὥστε καὶ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐπὶ τοῖς καθυστερίζουσι τῶν καιρῶν διαδοθῆναι

ὄψ' ἦλθες, ἀλλ ̓ εἰς τὸν Κολωνὸν ἵεσο.

μνημονεύει τῶν δυεῖν Κολωνῶν Φερεκράτης ἐν Πετάλῃ διὰ τούτων οὗτος, πόθεν ἦλθες; Εἰς Κολωνὸν ὠχόμην,

οὐ τὸν ἀγοραῖον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν ἱππέων.

Ol. XOIV. 2.

ΣΟΦΟΚΛΕΟΥΣ

ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ ΕΠΙ ΚΟΛΩΝΩΙ.

ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ.

Τέκνον τυφλοῦ γέροντος Αντιγόνη, τίνας
χώρους ἀφίγμεθ', ἢ τίνων ἀνδρῶν πόλιν;
τίς τὸν πλανήτην Οἰδίπουν καθ' ἡμέραν
τὴν νῦν σπανιστοῖς δέξεται δωρήμασι,
σμικρὸν μὲν ἐξαιτοῦντα, τοῦ σμικροῦ δ ̓ ἔτι
μεῖον φέροντα, καὶ τόδ ̓ ἐξαρκοῦν ἐμοί·
στέργειν γὰρ αἱ πάθαι με χω χρόνος ξυνων
μακρὸς διδάσκει καὶ τὸ γενναῖον τρίτον.
ἀλλ ̓, ὦ τέκνον, θάκοισιν εἴ τινα βλέπεις

9.
All the MSS. and the Schol.
θάκοισιν. Almost all modern edi-
tors except Elmsley have rejected
this word, and substituted for it,
θάκησιν, which is considered to be
"undoubtedly right," and which
Hermann calls, "elegantissimam
conjecturam Seidleri." The objec-
tion which the critics have taken
to θάκοισιν has arisen solely from
a misconception of its meaning in
this place. It has been supposed
to mean literally, prepared seats
to sit upon, or chairs. “Εί θάκοι-
σιν legitur, pluralis ille facit ut de
pluribus cogitet sedibus lector, qua-
si locum aliquem dicat Edipus de
industria ad consessus aliquos com-
paratum.” Herm.

Though the literal meaning of θάκος is a seat to sit upon, yet in poetry it is oftener used in its se

5

or

condary sense, of a residence abode, a sitting-place, or restingplace. In the same manner ἕδρα literally signifies a seat, a chair, or stool or bench to sit upon, yet in poetry it is much oftener used in its secondary sense, vv. 36, 45, 90. As the poet was about to speak of ἄλσεσιν θεῶν, the groves of the Gods, he puts in opposition to them, θάκοισιν βεβήλοις, abodes which were accessible to all. Thus An. 999 : ἐς γὰρ παλαιὸν θᾶκον ὀρνιθοσκόπον ΐζων. Eurip. Phoeniss. 840: θάκοισιν ἐν ἱεροῖσιν οὗ μαντεύομαι.—Bacche, 347: ἐλθὼν δὲ θάκους τούσδ', ἵν ̓ οἰωνοσκοπεῖ.—Eurip. Hel. 1108: σὲ τὴν ἐναυλείοις ὑπὸ δενδροκόμοις μουσεῖα καὶ θάκους ἐνίζουσαν ἀναβοάσω. In all these places the word does not mean literally a seat to sit upon, but comprises the whole place

Ι

ἢ πρὸς βεβήλοις ἢ πρὸς ἄλσεσιν θεῶν,

which the person spoken of is said
to resort to, or to make his tem-
porary abode. This is particularly
seen in the last-quoted passage,
where the nightingale is said to
make her abode under the shade of
the trees, that is to say, of any of
the trees of the wood. The whole
grove or coppice is his resting-place,
his Oakos. Liddell and Scott right-
ly say,
σε θάκος = θῶκος a sitting-
place, abode," and I am glad to be
supported by their authority in this
matter, but under the word Okos
they are rather unfortunate in their
references, namely, Esch. Prom.
831, and Od. XII. 318, to prove
what is an undoubted truth, that
Ookos means literally, a seat, a
chair. In Esch. Prom. 831, μav-
τεῖα θῶκός τ ̓ ἐστὶ Θεσπρωτοῦ Διὸς,
it would be quite ridiculous to sup-
pose that it means a chair to sit
down upon.

It evidently means
the whole of the grove or conse-
crated réuevos, which is there call-
ed, the oracular abode of Thespro-
tian Jove. And in Od. XII. 318,
ἔνθα δ' ἔσαν Νυμφέων καλοὶ χοροὶ ἠδὲ
Oówkol, it means, their sittings to-
gether, that is, their assemblies. As
far as the word there refers to any
place, it means the whole cavern
spoken of in the preceding verse,
to which the Nymphs were sup-
posed to resort, to have their sport-
ive dances and their sittings.
Kos is a generic term, signifying
literally any kind of seat, and
hence it is that it takes the se-
condary meaning of an abode, or
resting-place, as seat in English,
and sedes in Latin sometimes do. It
appears that Elmsley and Schæfer
fell into the same mistake as all the
other critics about the meaning of
the word fákoliv, for they weakly
defend the retention of it in the

66

ΙΟ

text, on the ground that âκov is to be understood, "e Tiva, scil. Oakov," Schaef.: "if at the seats you see any seat," which is nonsense. The new-coined word, áknow, has been hammered out for the express purpose of suiting this place, and so pleased are the critics with the production that it never seems to have occurred to them that it should rather signify the act of sitting, than the seat itself, inasmuch as almost all nouns terminating in -os, denote the act of doing a thing. The coining has been thought to be quite legitimate by reason of the use of the compound vláknous, in Phil. 18, but here again a mistake has been made. It does not mean 66 a place to sit," as Liddell and Scott have inconsiderately said; but it means a sitting-in, or an in-sitting," that is to say, the act of sitting in, or resting on a thing. It is a question whether it means a sitting in the sun, or a resting of the sun on the cave. either way of taking it, it is an act of sitting and not a seat. The latter notion of a resting of the sun on the cave, which has been communicated to me by one whose opinion is entitled to the greatest weight, commends itself to my own mind as the true meaning of the phrase, ev. λ., for many reasons: Ist, such a word as évláknois easily admits of a subjective genitive, but it is as difficult to imagine an objective genitive, as it is of the English expression, an in-sitting. We might say, a splitting of wood, where wood is the object of the action, but we could only say, an in-sitting of the sun, where the sun is the subject. 2nd, this notion agrees better with the passage. Ulysses did not know whether Philoctetes

In

ws

στῆσόν με καξίδρυσον, ὡς πυθοίμεθα
ὅπου ποτ ̓ ἐσμέν. μανθάνειν γὰρ ἥκομεν

were dead or alive, but he had known
the cave years before, and so could
well describe its favourable position
with regard to the sun.
3rd, this
forms the proper antithesis to the
concluding clause. He describes
the cave itself, and says, that as the
sun shines into the two entrances
of it, and makes it warm in winter,
so in the summer, by reason of an
entrance at either end, a cooling
current of air steals through it,
and invites to sleep. With Oákov
the passage may be construed: "If,
my child, thou seest any one either
by the common haunts accessible to
all, or by the groves of the Gods, stop
me, and seat me down, that we may
inquire of him," &c. Thus the ob-
ject of his sitting down is such as
was likely to be attained, namely,
that he might converse at his leisure
with the stranger; but it would be
quite a non sequitur, that he should
be able to inquire what he wished
to be informed about any better by
his sitting down, than by proceed-
ing to the city, before they had
seen any one from whom they
might inquire. Thus in Eurip.
El. 107: ἀλλ ̓ εἰσορῶ γὰρ τήνδε
προσπόλων τινὰ, πηγαῖον ἄχθος
ἐγκεκαρμένῳ κάρᾳ, φέρουσαν· ἑζώ-
μεσθα κἀκπυθώμεθα δούλης γυναι-
κὸς, ἤν τι δεξώμεσθ ̓ ἔπος ἐφ ̓ οἶσι,
Πυλάδη, τήνδ' ἀφίγμεθα χθόνα. The
only difference in the two pas-
sages is this, that in Eurip. El.
107, Orestes actually sees some
one, and in consequence thereof
"Let us sit and inquire;"
whereas Edipus says, "If you see
any one, then let us sit and in-
quire." No difficulty is antici-
pated in either case as to finding a
convenient seat to sit upon. The

says,

bare ground, or a grassy sward, or almost any place would answer the purpose. Accordingly Antigone replies, "As you have had a long journey for an old man, you had better not delay your sitting down till you meet with some one, but seat yourself down at once, here upon this unhewn stone:" TOUS ἐπ ̓ ἀξέστου πέτρου.

II. All the MSS. πυθοίμεθα. Almost all the critics have conjectured Tuboμela. According to πυθώμεθα. Dawes's canon an optative is subjoined only to verbs of past time. If any reliance however is to be placed on MSS., there are exceptions to this general rule, some of which may be explained, whilst in others the reason for the optative is not so apparent. El. 57, oπws— φέροιμεν. One MS. Γ. φέρωμεν. Εl. 160, ὅπως—ἐκλάχοι. Aug. b. Jen. Ekλáxn, which the critics have adopted, as they have also pépwμεν. Ar. Ranc, 24: ἵνα μὴ ταλαι TwpоîTO. Here the reason for the πωροῖτο. optative is very obvious, and is rightly explained in Jelf, 807, y. Ar. Aves, 1324, ἵνα εἰσάγοιντο, which has been changed to εἰσάγωνται. Here the optative seems to be used because the speaker is mentioning the thoughts and design of others. This is also the case at El. 760. Æsch. Supp. 670, ως πόλις εὖ νέμοιτο, where the optative has been made independent of the verb by the device of changing us to Tws. Eurip. Ion, 1603, ἵνα—ἔχουσ ̓ εἴης, where εἴης has been changed by some critics to ins. Iph. in Taur. 1209: μn συναντῷεν. Ι. ΧΧIII. 487 : ἵνα γνοίης ἀποτίνων. Οd. II. 53: ὡς κ ̓ αὐτὸς ἐεδνώσαιτο θύγατρα, Od. XXII. 392 :

ξένοι πρὸς ἀστῶν, χἂν ἀκούσωμεν τελεῖν.

ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΗ.

πάτερ ταλαίπωρ ̓ Οἰδίπους, πύργοι μὲν, οἳ
πόλιν στέγουσιν, ὡς ἀπ ̓ ὀμμάτων πρόσω·

ὄφρα ἔπος εἴποιμι. Wolf, Dind.
and others wμ. So in Il. XVIII.
63, oppa idom, they have conjec-
tured dwu, and in other places,
as in Il. IX. 414, they have intro-
duced the ancient termination in

-ωμι, of the conj. active. Il. VII. 340: oppa di avτáwv izπηλaσín odòs ein. Dindorf and others en. It is to be observed that Homer never anywhere else uses the lengthened form en for en, whereas he continually uses the optative εἴην, εἴη, as well as the form ἔην, en. Plat. Rep. p. 410B: iva-eραπεύοιντο. These last two cases, as well as that of E. C. 11, Jelf, 807, ß, explains as partaking of the character of the oratio obliqua, because the speaker introduces the aim of another person. This explanation will include El. 57. Matthiæ, 518, 4, says, that the optative subjoined to a verb of the present or future time, sometimes expresses something which is only probable, but which the speaker wishes. This I think is the case at v. II, and that the optative may here be accounted for on the same principle as when an optative is subjoined to an optative. εἴ τινα Bλées, connected as it is with the verse that follows it, is in reality the expression of an earnest wish, and os v0oíuela, though depending, with respect to the construction, on the two imperatives στῆσόν με καξίδρυσον, is subjoined in thought to e Tiva Bλées. If so, it is with respect to the meaning of the sentence, as if two optatives had been used: "Oh that

.

15

you might see some one, no matter where, whether on profane ground or sacred to the Gods, that having seated me we might inquire of him where we are.' This appears to be beyond all doubt the right explanation of the use of the optative in Esch. Supp. 670, but Elmsley thought that there was an important difference in the two

cases.

"In Eschyli loco imperativi φλεγόντων et γεμόντων, pro optativis positi, non male optativorum constructionem habent. In Sophoclis autem versu, orσóv μe καξίδρυσαν re vera imperativi sunt.” Elms. That is very true with respect to the imperatives, but with respect to the train of thought it is, I think, no less true, that e τινα βλέπεις stands in the place of an optative, and os voíμela depends on it.

15. All the MSS. στέγουσιν, which has been fastidiously objected to by some critics. Dindorf, Wunder, and others, have substituted for it the conjecture of Wakefield,σrépovσιν. στέγω is a very ordinary word, signifying the same as tego, to cover, and hence by a natural sequence to enclose, contain, protect, conceal. Esch. Sept. ad Theb. 803: orÉYEL Sè Túpyos. Dindorf denies the similarity of the two cases, because, he says, that in Eschylus the word is used with respect to protecting from enemies; but though it there bears the meaning of protecting from enemies, the primary meaning is not lost sight of. So in Ovid, Met. III. 542, "galeaque tegi non fronde decebat," the primary idea remains