5. On 3rd of March 1841, the petitioner
obtained a conditional order for a re- 1.
ceiver under 5 & 6 W. 4, on a judgment
entered in 1828, by warrant of attorney,
against the respondent, who was then a
trader, and against whom a commission
of bankruptcy issued within two months
after the conditional order in this matter
was made absolute. On motion of the
assignee, Held, that this case was within
the 126th section of the Bankrupt Act
(6 W. 4, c. 14), and that the receiver
should be removed. Held also, that the
proceedings in this matter having been
within a year after the passing of the
3 & 4 Vic. c. 105, were not protected
by the 22nd section of that Act; and it
appearing that simple contract creditors
of the respondent, who were such before
the 1st of November 1840, had proved
under the commission. Held further,
that such creditors were entitled to the
benefit of the proviso, saving the rights
of "purchasers, mortgagees, and credi-
tors," and that the assignee was to be
considered as entitled in their right. R.
Burt v. Bernard
328

6. In Anderson v. Maltby (2 Ves. jun.
254), the Lord Chancellor says that the
assignee of a bankrupt has all the equity
which the creditors have, and may im-
peach transactions which the bankrupt
himself would be estopped from impeach-
ing. Per Sir M. O'Loghlen, M. R., in
ibid

333

BARRING ENTAILS.
See ESTATE, II.

BASTARD.

See PLEADING, 16.
CROWN, 2.

BEQUEST.

See CHARITABLE DEVISES AND
BEQUESTS.

LEGACIES AND LEGATEES.
WILL.

BILL.

See INSPECTION, PRODUCTION, AND
Execution of Deeds, 1, 2.
PLEADING.

BOG.

See also, DEEDS, 6, 7, 8.

I believe it cannot be disputed that bog, simply means the soil, and not a mere right of turbary. Per Pennefather, B., in Boyle v. Olpherts

:

249

2. There has been no authority cited, in which it has been decided that " bogs and turf-mosses have any particular signification but as to what is the plain meaning of those terms when uncontrolled by the context, I think it must be taken that they signify a description of land, such as is in the nature of bog or moss bearing turf; for I with agree the Counsel for the landlord, in holding that turf-moss means a moss capable of producing turf. By a grant of a bog, eo nomine, the party does not grant a mere right of turbary; it is a grant of soil and freehold. The only word I have found, bearing a similitude to the words here, is "heaths." In Co. Litt. 4 b., it is said "A man grants omnes brueras suas-all his heath-the soil where heath doth grow passeth, and may be demanded by that name in a precipe." Now that appears to me to resemble "bogs aud turf-mosses nearer than any other word in the books; and therefore, I am of opinion that by a grant of "bogs and turf-mosses," simply, the soil and freehold in both would pass; and certain acts of Parliament have been referred to which fortify that opinion. Per Brady, C. B., in ibid

251

3. As to the construction to be given to
the exception, I apprehend that if it
rested upon the words "bogs and turf-
mosses" alone, there could be no doubt
about it. A grant of bog, or an excep-
tion of bog out of a grant of land, ne-
cessarily imports a grant or an exception
of the soil. Then what construction is
to be put on "turf-mosses ?" A moss
is a soft piece of swampy ground; and
the addition of "turf" to it, designates
it as a swamp capable of producing turf.
"Bogs and turf-mosses are used in
connection with each other. We cannot
construe it to be any thing else than an 2.
exception out of a grant of land, which
grant could not otherwise have conveyed
the bogs and turf-mosses than by hold-
ing that they were land. If the grant
had been of land, except the bogs and
turf-mosses, it could not be contended
that the soil in them passed to the
tenant. Per Pennefather, B., in Boyle
v. Olpherts
253

BOND.

were to decide on what was the law of England before the passing of that Act, I should say, that the Act itself proves to demonstration that those charitable trusts were binding, although it was necessary to adopt additional means of guarding against the breaches of trust mentioned in the preamble, and that it meant to enlarge the means of carrying into effect charitable uses, but not to affect the validity of the disposition of property to those uses. Per Sir E. Sugden, C., in The Incorporated Society, &c., v. Richards 201

So far, however, from its affecting in any way the jurisdiction of this Court, I think it is a clear parliamentary recognition of the jurisdiction which existed at the time. It recognises the authority residing in this Court, which could have compelled any man to perform a trust; but as against those particular classes of persons who were possessed of great power that might enable them to disregard its decrees, it establishes a new jurisdiction. I have carefully compared the charitable uses mentioned in this Act, with those enumerated in the 43 Eliz., and I find there is very little difference between them, although the order in which they are put is different in both. There is scarcely one in the Act of Elizabeth which is not to be found in the Irish Act; but the latter goes farther than the former, with respect to the liberal arts, and it also includes trusts "for the maintenance of any Minister or Preacher of the Holy Word of God," which are not included in the former. Ibid 210, 211

3. It is said, and with truth, that this statute (10 Car. 1, sess. 3, c. 1), is confined to gifts to Archbishops and Bishops; and therefore, it is contended that it has no operation in a case like this; but would it not be extraordinary that the Legislature should pass an Act relative to Bishops and Archbishops, providing for their applying to the proper objects property vested in them upon trust; but that if such gifts were made to Archdeacons or any other churchmen, they should be allowed to appropriate them as they pleased? Ibid

4. This statute (10 Car. 1, sess. 3, c. 1),
proves that all the uses mentioned in it
were legal at the time it was passed,
independently of its operation.
A par-
ticular mode of enforcing them is given
in certain cases, but their legality is not
created by it; it is treated as pre-exist-
ing, and it is open to all the observations
upon that point which I made already
upon the statute of Elizabeth. I con-
sider the Act of Charles as moulded on
the 43rd Elizabeth, and that whatever
the latter gives in England, is given by
the former in this country. The Incor-
porated Society v. Richards

211

5. A testatrix gave such sum of stock as she should be possessed of at her death to A. and B., "to be by them applied to charitable purposes, according to her instructions deposited with A." The instructions to A. were verbal, leaving it to his discretion to select the charitable purposes to which it was to be applied; Held, that this was a good gift of the stock to charity, and that the Court would direct a scheme for its application. C. The Commissioners of Charitable Donations, &c., v. Sullivan

280

6. I take it, however, that it is perfectly well settled that in either case-either where a charitable purpose is expressed generally, or where a particular charity is contemplated, but has not been specified-the Court has jurisdiction to

CHILDREN.

See DEEDS, 12, 13.
ESTATE, II.
WILL, 5, 6.

CLIENT.

See SOLICITOR, I.

COLLATERAL SECURITY.
See MORTGAGE, 7.

COMPENSATION.
See SALES JUDICIAL, 2.

COMPROMISE.
See AGREEMENT, 6.
GRAFT, 1.

CONFIRMATION.
See ESTATE, 8, 9.
INFANT, 2, 3, 4, 5.

CONSENT.
See MOTION, 1.

CONSIDERATION.
See SOLICITOR, I.

CONSTRUCTION.
See also, AGReement, 7.

BOG, 1, 2, 3.

DEEDS, III.

EVIDENCE, I.

LEGACIES & LEGATEES.
RENEWAL.

WILL, I.

apply the fund to such charitable pur-1. As to cases in which parol evidence is poses as it shall select. Per Sir E. Sugden, C., in ibid

282 7. Testatrix bequeathed the residue of her personal property to W. R., to be by him applied for such pious purposes and uses,

as should appear to him to be most conducive to the honour and glory of God, and the salvation of her soul. Upon a bill to administer her assets, this bequest was decreed to be a good charitable bequest; and it was, with the consent of W. R. referred to the Remembrancer to settle a scheme. W. R. died before the Remembrancer made his report ;Held, that, thereupon, the disposition of the fund belonged to the Crown by sign-manual. E. E. Felan v. Russell 701

admitted in aid of the construction of wills and written documents, see observations of Sir E. Sugden, C., in Hall v. Hill 41 et seq. 2. If there be a positive rule of construction, to admit evidence, to raise a presumption against it is to violate the rule. Per Sir E. Sugden, C., in ibid

3.

48

If I find technical words in an instrument, I must suppose that they were used in their proper technical sense, unless something appears on the face of the instrument to show that they were used in some other sense, and certainly that raises the only difficulty here.Because, where it was clearly the intention to give estates tail, as to the unborn

4. If a man have two sorts of property, one of which answers precisely the entire description in his will, and the other does not precisely answer any part of that description, and I find a description in his will, which taken altogether, would confine the gift to that particular species of property which answers the description exactly-can I reject the latter part of that description, in order to consider whether the other species of property might he included in the former? Per Sir E. Sugden, C., in Ridge v. Newton 396

CONTRIBUTION.
See ESTATE, 20.

CONVICTED FELON.
See SALES JUDICIAL, 5.

CORPORATION.

See also CHARITABLE DEVISES
AND BEQUESTS.
WILL, 1.

An objection has been taken to the terms
of the devise here, and it has been con-
tended that there cannot be a devise to
this Corporation for the charitable pur-
pose mentioned, because the Society is
incorporated solely for this charitable
purpose that it is, therefore, a gift to a
Corporation for its corporate purposes,
which is not allowed by the Statute of
Wills. If, however, we look to the
cases, it will be seen that a gift may be
made by a devise to a Corporation for a
charitable purpose, precisely as it might
to a private person; and, therefore, I
cannot see why this devise is void. Per
Sir E. Sugden, C., in The Incorporated
Society v. Richards

5. The cases which have been cited show
that where there is a clear gift of a par-
ticular property, superadded words of
description shall not vitiate it, but may
be rejected as useless, as, for instance-
where a testator gives all his farm at a
particular place, in the occupation of a
particular person, and it turns out, in
point of fact, that the entire of the farm
is not in the occupation of that person,
there it is held that the entire farm will
pass, nothwithstanding the error in the
description. It would be very odd if it 1.

were not so decided, because the testator
has clearly given the whole of the pro-
perty; and then, to give effect to that
gift, you reject unmeaning words of de-
scription.

Those cases are perfectly clear. Per Sir E. Sugden, C., in ibid.

CONTEMPT.

A defendant in contempt to a sequestration cannot shew cause by affidavit against making a conditional order for a receiver on process, absolute. E. E. Creed v. Moore 684

CONTINGENT ESTATE.

See ESTATE, 14.

CONTINGENT LEGACY.

See LEGACY AND LEGATEES, 3.

CONTRACT.

See AGREEMENT AND CONTRACT.

COSTS.

See also, ESTATE, 20.

214

RECEIVER, 4, 5.
SALES JUDICIAL., 4.
SOLICITOR, III.

A purchaser under a decree of the

Court, took several objections to the title, in some of which he failed and succeeded in others; Held, that he was entitled to the costs properly and necessarily incurred by him in investigating the title, after deducting thereout the costs occasioned by the objections in which he failed. E. E. Brown v. Lynch

59