right, without granting to each the enjoyment of that right), this would have no tendency to produce harmony. (2) Such policy would lead to an absence of interest: every man's duty being no man's duty. The sonship proposed would be a weaker tie than the most distant relationship now recognized. (3) It is impracticable: resemblance would betray the closer relationship. (4) Concealment of relationship would open the door to offences against nature. (5) As regards property, Communism destroys the charm of property and the virtue of liberality'. (6) The State is split up into two nations differing altogether in manners and institutions. (7) The argument from the customs of animals (οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν) to the customs of men, ignores the moral difference between the two. After urging these and similar objections, Aristotle proceeds to point out defects in the more practical Ideal contained in the Laws, as also in the ideal commonwealths of Phaleas and others. He discusses, by the way, how far it is desirable to make changes in laws. On the one hand, laws need constant improvement; men should not care for antiquity but for utility. On the other hand, since laws derive their force from custom, every change must weaken the reverence which the citizens should have for the constitution. The book ends with an account of the constitutions of Sparta, Crete &c.

Existing forms of government may be classified as follows. A State may be ruled by One, by the few who are rich, or by the many who are poor; and the rule is just or unjust, as it is for the public good, or for the good of the

1 See p. 1263 βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς.

rulers only. We shall thus have three normal or legitimate forms of government and three perversions (Tapexßáσeis), monarchy (Barrieía) with its perversion tyranny (rupavvis), aristocracy (poтоKρaría) with its perversion oligarchy (ὀλιγαρχία), and republic (πολιτεία) with its perversion democracy (nuoкparía). Each of these is better or worse in proportion as it is adapted to the nature and position of the people, and as it approaches to the ideal State, the true aρioтокρaría, of which the end is to dispose all the citizens to a noble and virtuous activity; not simply to train for war, as Lycurgus sought to do, but far more to foster the peaceful virtues of self-control, justice, wisdom, since all war is undertaken for the sake of peace, as all business for the sake of leisure. This ideal State requires certain external advantages (as the good man his Bíos Téλelos). It must not be too small for strength, or too large for unity'; must possess a country fruitful, not luxurious, well situated for commerce and for defence. The people must neither have the fierceness of the North, nor the softness of the East, but combine spirit with intelligence like the Greeks, who are the mean between these two extremes. None can be admitted to citizenship who are incapable of exercising the virtues of the citizen, which in the ideal State will be identical with all human virtue. That is to say, all the citizens will be gentlemen enjoying an honorable and virtuous leisure (σχολάζοντες ἐλευθερίως ἅμα καὶ σωφρόνως Pol. VII. 5 p. 1326), supported in part by the State and in part by their hereditary allotments, which will be worked for them

1 It is remarkable that Aristotle, writing after the conquests of Alexander, seems to have no suspicion that the State of the future would exceed the limits of a Greek πόλις.

by slaves or other dependents. They will have common meals, as at Sparta, and form the standing army during the military age, after which they will be employed in civil duties and such magistracies as they may be appointed to by the common vote. Their highest work, however, will be thought and study, the advancement of science and the superintendence of education. When age unfits them for more active duties they will become eligible for the priesthood. The number of citizens and allotments being strictly limited by law, it will be the duty of the magistrates to regulate marriage with a view to restrict the number of children and to prevent any but the healthiest and strongest being reared. Children born under the conditions sanctioned by the law will be taught at home till their 7th year, and will then be sent to the public schools, where the education will be directed to train the body, the feelings, and the reason for a noble life.

Unfortunately we have only an incomplete account of the subjects of education. Besides Reading and Writing, Drawing is recommended as training the eye to beauty of form; Music is praised, not only for the pleasure it gives, but for its power of calming the passions and generally for its moral influence: it is the natural expression of emotion and tends to produce the emotion which it expresses; it is therefore of great importance to exclude all music which is of a vulgar or debasing character. Education should be general and liberal, not utilitarian or professional'. One of its chief uses is to teach the proper use of leisure (σχολάζειν καλῶς).

1 τὸ ζητεῖν πανταχοῦ τὸ χρήσιμον ἥκιστα ἁρμόζει τοῖς μεγαλοψύχοις καὶ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις. Pol. v. p. 1338α.

To return to existing constitutions, Monarchy is allowable where one citizen far surpasses all the others in wisdom and virtue, or where the mass of the people are only fit for subjection, as in the East. Aristocracy is allowable where the qualitative superiority of the wealthy more than counterbalances the quantitative superiority of the poor. A republic is best where the citizens are nearly on a level in respect to the contribution of service which they bring to the State. It has an advantage because it interests the majority in the government; and though, taken separately, the poor may be inferior to the rich, yet in combination they may surpass them; as for instance the popular judgment is decisive in works of art. They should share in any part of government which can be safely intrusted to a number, and have a voice in electing the higher officers. Each of these three normal constitutions is better in itself and more likely to be permanent, the more it borrows from the other two, and the more influence it allows to the middle class which forms the link between rich and poor. Revolutions are brought about by the excess of the characteristic quality of each constitution, as an oligarchy is overthrown by the temper shown in the oligarchical oath 'I will be an enemy of the Commons and do them all the harm I can'. The true policy is the exact contrary; the government should show special tenderness to the interest which it does not itself represent. It is a sign of a good, i.e. an appropriate constitution, when no portion of the body politic is desirous of organic change. The functions of government are Deliberative, Administrative

1 τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν. Pol. v. 9.

and Judicial. General principles should be as far as possible laid down by the Law, leaving only questions of fact and details of application to be determined by votes of assemblies or the judgment of the magistrate. When the Law rules, it is the rule of Reason and of God; when man rules, without law, he brings with him the wild beast of passion'.

Aristotle treats at considerable length of the varieties of each kind of constitution, e.g. of the difference caused in the nature of a democracy, according as the citizens are mainly agricultural or manufacturing, and as the franchise is higher or lower. He points out, with very full historical illustrations, the characteristics of each variety, the dangers to which it is exposed and the means of guarding against them. Many of the maxims of Machiavelli's Prince are taken from Aristotle's chapters on the Tyrant. The broad distinction between the normal constitution and its perversion seems here to pass into a gradation of varieties, a view which is perhaps more in accordance with actual facts.

It is strange that, in constructing his Ideal State, Aristotle should have fallen into some of the errors which he condemns in Plato. As far as we can judge from the imperfect sketch which he has left, there would have been less of common feeling between his gentleman-citizens and the urban and rural population by whose labour they are supported, than between Plato's Guardians and Artizans. The latter had at any rate the name of citizens, and Plato

1 ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νόμον κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὸν νοῦν μόνους, ὁ δ ̓ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον. Pol. 111. 16.